Counterterrorism and the challenges of terrorism from the far right

2020 ◽  
pp. 147377952097512
Author(s):  
Kent Roach
Keyword(s):  
Al Qaeda ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Preliminary Assessment ◽  
Far Right ◽  
Double Standards ◽  
Violent Extremism ◽  
Difficult Cases

This article examines how post-9/11 counterterrorism has often not been applied to far-right terrorism. Discriminatory double standards in counterterrorism should not be tolerated. Nevertheless, the answer is not simply to ratchet up counterterrorism to apply to the far-right. The legitimate desire for symbolic equality should not blind us to the underlying weaknesses of many of those instruments both in preventing terrorism and in respecting rights. In some cases, such as the United Nation’s regime of individual sanctions related to financing and travel of those associated with al Qaeda and Daesh, application to the far-right is not legally possible. It will be suggested in this article that far-right terrorism should be used as an opportunity to re-evaluate the effectiveness and propriety of all counterterrorism. A preliminary assessment suggests that counterterrorism tied to international or national proscription may not be effective (both generally and specifically in relation to the far-right). More difficult cases involve whether terrorism offences and offences targeting speech should be applied against all forms of terrorism. Interventions regulating items and material on the Internet used by terrorists and programs to counter violent extremism and to rehabilitate offenders may be promising in addressing both far-right and Daesh-inspired terrorism. Both New Zealand’s increased regulation of guns and the Christchurch calls for greater regulation of the Internet follow these more promising strategies.

Love and Jihad. Female Trajectories from North Caucasus to the Islamic State

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-151
Author(s):  
Denis Sokolov
Keyword(s):  
Muslim Women ◽  
Al Qaeda ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
North Caucasus ◽  
The Caucasus ◽  
The North ◽  
Caucasian Women

In the 2000s, Al-Qaeda, represented by the Caucasus Emirate, took over the first Chechen resistance, as well as local Islamist armed groups in Dagestan and other republics of the North Caucasus. However, a decade later, the Islamic State won the competition with Al-Qaeda, by including the involvement of women in its project. Hundreds of Russian-speaking Muslim women followed men to live by the rules of Islam. Some joined their husbands or children. Others travelled to the Islamic State in pursuit of love and romance with future husbands they had met on the internet. Based on exclusive interviews done with women detained in the Roj detention camp in the Kurdish territories in northeastern Syria near the Iraqi border, this article analyzes some of the trajectories that has pushed young North Caucasian women to the Syrian war theater in the name of love.

Countering Violent Extremism in Canada and Abroad

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nora Abdelrahman Ibrahim
Keyword(s):  
Best Practice ◽  
Unintended Consequences ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Policy And Practice ◽  
Far Right ◽  
Significant Development ◽  
The Us ◽  
Violent Extremism ◽  
Recent Trends ◽  
The Uk

Terrorism and violent extremism have undoubtedly become among the top security concerns of the 21st century. Despite a robust agenda of counterterrorism since the September 11, 2001 attacks, the evolution of global terrorism has continued to outpace the policy responses that have tried to address it. Recent trends such as the foreign fighter phenomenon, the rampant spread of extremist ideologies online and within communities, and a dramatic increase in terrorist incidents worldwide, have led to a recognition that “traditional” counterterrorism efforts are insufficient and ineffective in combatting these phenomena. Consequently, the focus of policy and practice has shifted towards countering violent extremism by addressing the drivers of radicalization to curb recruitment to extremist groups. Within this context, the field of countering violent extremism (CVE) has garnered attention from both the academic and policy-making worlds. While the CVE field holds promise as a significant development in counterterrorism, its policy and practice are complicated by several challenges that undermine the success of its initiatives. Building resilience to violent extremism is continuously challenged by an overly securitized narrative and unintended consequences of previous policies and practices, including divisive social undercurrents like Islamophobia, xenophobia, and far-right sentiments. These by-products make it increasingly difficult to mobilize a whole of society response that is so critical to the success and sustainability of CVE initiatives. This research project addresses these policy challenges by drawing on the CVE strategies of Canada, the US, the UK, and Denmark to collect best practice and lessons learned in order to outline a way forward. 

scholarly journals Terrorist Speech under Bills C-51 and C-59 and the Othman Hamdan Case: The Continued Incoherence of Canada’s Approach

2019 ◽  
pp. 203
Author(s):  
Kent Roach
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
Hate Speech ◽  
Criminal Code ◽  
Immigration Law ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Media Companies ◽  
Violent Extremism ◽  
Fundamental Freedoms

It is argued that neither the approach taken to terrorist speech in Bill C-51 nor Bill C-59 is satisfactory. A case study of the Othman Hamdan case, including his calls on the Internet for “lone wolves” “swiftly to activate,” is featured, along with the use of immigration law after his acquittal for counselling murder and other crimes. Hamdan’s acquittal suggests that the new Bill C-59 terrorist speech offence and take-down powers based on counselling terrorism offences without specifying a particular terrorism offence may not reach Hamdan’s Internet postings. One coherent response would be to repeal terrorist speech offences while making greater use of court-ordered take-downs of speech on the Internet and programs to counter violent extremism. Another coherent response would be to criminalize the promotion and advocacy of terrorist activities (as opposed to terrorist offences in general in Bill C-51 or terrorism offences without identifying a specific terrorist offence in Bill C-59) and provide for defences designed to protect fundamental freedoms such as those under section 319(3) of the Criminal Code that apply to hate speech. Unfortunately, neither Bill C-51 nor Bill C-59 pursues either of these options. The result is that speech such as Hamdan’s will continue to be subject to the vagaries of take-downs by social media companies and immigration law.

From “Cyberterrorism” to “Online Radicalism”

2014 ◽  
pp. 198-217
Author(s):  
Maura Conway
Keyword(s):  
Web 2.0 ◽  
Social Networking ◽  
Digital Video ◽  
User Generated Content ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Counter Terrorism ◽  
The Past ◽  
Violent Extremism

This chapter explores the changes that have taken place in the role and functioning of the Internet in terrorism and counter-terrorism in the past decade. It traces the shift in focus from a preoccupation with the threat of so-called “cyberterrorism” in the period pre- and immediately post-9/11 to the contemporary emphasis on the role of the Internet in processes of violent radicalization. The cyberterrorism threat is explained as over-hyped herein, and the contemporary focus, by researchers and policymakers, on the potential of the Internet as a vehicle for violent radicalization viewed as more appropriate albeit not without its difficulties. This change in emphasis is at least partially predicated, it is argued, on the significant changes that occurred in the nature and functioning of the Internet in the last decade: the advent of Web 2.0, with its emphasis on social networking, user generated content, and digital video is treated as particularly salient in this regard. Description and analysis of both “negative” and “positive” Internet-based Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) and online counterterrorism measures and their evolutions are also supplied.

Leveraging on Digital Footprints to Identify Potential Security Threats

2020 ◽  
pp. 1003-1017
Author(s):  
Loo Seng Neo
Keyword(s):  
National Level ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Security Threats ◽  
Law Enforcement Agencies ◽  
Security Issues ◽  
Violent Extremism ◽  
Technological Interventions ◽  
The World ◽  
Digital Footprints ◽  
Malicious Intent

The growing pervasiveness of the internet and the rise of social media have revolutionised how individuals communicate and interact with one another. Serving as an effective conduit for communication, these technological advancements have also been exploited by individuals with malicious intent (e.g., criminals, violent extremists). As the world witnesses an upward trend of such crime and security concerns in the online sphere, it places the ‘responsibility' on intelligence and law enforcement agencies to respond with the appropriate technological interventions. Thus, this article will discuss how digital footprints can be leveraged to identify potential security threats, particularly for crime and security issues that will result in negative repercussion at the national level, such as acts of violent extremism and hate crimes.

Support Your Prophet—Peace and blessings be Upon Him

Al-Qaeda 2.0 ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 169-184
Author(s):  
Cerwyn Moore
Keyword(s):  
Arabian Peninsula ◽  
Al Qaeda ◽  
Central Command ◽  
The West ◽  
Double Standards ◽  
Support For Democracy ◽  
Charlie Hebdo

In this video message, Zawahiri celebrates the attack on the headquarters of French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo and is quick to claim credit for it on behalf of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. This of course comes at a time when Al-Qaeda’s central command is broadly seen as inactive and marginalized. He focuses on alleged double standards of the West regarding its support for democracy, tracing, as always, his grievances back to colonial times, whilst emphasizing more normative components of this grievance, with an obvious focus on the prohibition of ridiculing the prophet. He reiterates his criticism of the transgressors in Syria, noting that the route taken by IS contravenes the more inclusive plan for caliphate creation drafted by bin Ladin.

Detecting Linguistic Markers of Violent Extremism in Online Environments

2016 ◽  
pp. 374-390 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fredrik Johansson ◽  
Lisa Kaati ◽  
Magnus Sahlgren
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language Processing ◽  
Natural Language ◽  
Language Processing ◽  
Terrorist Attacks ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Written Text ◽  
Linguistic Markers ◽  
Geographical Regions ◽  
Violent Extremism ◽  
Online Environments

The ability to disseminate information instantaneously over vast geographical regions makes the Internet a key facilitator in the radicalisation process and preparations for terrorist attacks. This can be both an asset and a challenge for security agencies. One of the main challenges for security agencies is the sheer amount of information available on the Internet. It is impossible for human analysts to read through everything that is written online. In this chapter we will discuss the possibility of detecting violent extremism by identifying signs of warning behaviours in written text – what we call linguistic markers – using computers, or more specifically, natural language processing.

“On the Internet, Nobody Knows You're a Dog”

2016 ◽  
pp. 349-373 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil D. Shortland
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Psychological Process ◽  
Source Information ◽  
Online Activity ◽  
Form And Function ◽  
Online Risk ◽  
Violent Extremism ◽  
Online Behaviour ◽  
And Function

Online behaviour can provide a unique window from which we can glean intent. From an intelligence standpoint it provides an important source of open-source information. However, making inference of intent from online activity is inherently difficult. Yet elsewhere progress is being made in incorporating information online into decisions regarding risk and offender prioritisation. This chapter synthesises lessons learnt from studies of risk assessment of violent extremists, risk assessment online, and the form and function of extremist materials online in order to begin to approach the issue of online risk assessment of violent extremism. In doing so it highlights issues associated with the diversity of online extremist behaviour, the diversity of offline extremist behaviour and the general lack of understanding related to the interaction of online and offline experiences, and how this contributes to the wider psychological process of ‘radicalisation'. Implications for practitioners are discussed.

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