Detecting Linguistic Markers of Violent Extremism in Online Environments

The ability to disseminate information instantaneously over vast geographical regions makes the Internet a key facilitator in the radicalisation process and preparations for terrorist attacks. This can be both an asset and a challenge for security agencies. One of the main challenges for security agencies is the sheer amount of information available on the Internet. It is impossible for human analysts to read through everything that is written online. In this chapter we will discuss the possibility of detecting violent extremism by identifying signs of warning behaviours in written text – what we call linguistic markers – using computers, or more specifically, natural language processing.

“On the Internet, Nobody Knows You're a Dog”

Online behaviour can provide a unique window from which we can glean intent. From an intelligence standpoint it provides an important source of open-source information. However, making inference of intent from online activity is inherently difficult. Yet elsewhere progress is being made in incorporating information online into decisions regarding risk and offender prioritisation. This chapter synthesises lessons learnt from studies of risk assessment of violent extremists, risk assessment online, and the form and function of extremist materials online in order to begin to approach the issue of online risk assessment of violent extremism. In doing so it highlights issues associated with the diversity of online extremist behaviour, the diversity of offline extremist behaviour and the general lack of understanding related to the interaction of online and offline experiences, and how this contributes to the wider psychological process of ‘radicalisation'. Implications for practitioners are discussed.

Towards a Comprehensive Approach to Combating Violent Extremist Ideology in the Digital Space

Based on the assumption that ideology is the centre of gravity of a violent Islamist terrorist network, this chapter proposes a Counter-Ideological Response (CIR) Model for countering violent extremism (CVE) in Southeast Asia. The Model seeks to gradually diminish the appeal of violent extremist ideology. It comprises of five conceptual Spaces of Sender, Message, Mechanism, Recipient and Context, within which ideology-relevant policy interventions may be attempted, so as to impact the overall reach and appeal of the violent extremist narrative vis-a-vis any countervailing narrative put out against it. The model is applied to the Indonesian CVE milieu in this chapter.

What We Know and What Else We Need to Do to Address the Problem of Violent Extremism Online

This concluding chapter is an attempt made to summarise and analyse the chapters provided by the various authors in this book. The analysis used in this chapter is based on a public health prevention model created by Quick, Quick, Nelson, and Hurrell (1997). The value of this approach is the systemic prevention angle that it undertakes to examine problems and solutions.

Internet Use and Violent Extremism

This chapter introduces a new approach to the risk assessment for violent extremism that is focused on cyber-related behaviour and content. The Violent Extremist Risk Assessment (VERA-2) protocol, used internationally, is augmented by an optional cyber-focused risk indicator protocol referred to as CYBERA. The risk indicators of CYBERA are elaborated and the application of CYBERA, conjointly with the VERA-2 risk assessment protocol, is described. The combined use of the two tools provides (1) a robust and cyber-focused risk assessment intended to provide early warning indicators of violent extremist action, (2) provides consistency and reliability in risk and threat assessments, (3) determines risk trajectories of individuals, and (4) assists intelligence and law enforcement analysts in their national security investigations. The tools are also relevant for use by psychologists, psychiatrists, communication analysts and provide relevant information that supports Terrorism Prevention Programs (TPP) and countering violent extremism (CVE) initiatives.

Framing the Challenges of Online Violent Extremism

This chapter argues that ‘framing' the challenges posed by radicalised individuals ‘online' where the path to violent extremism is just a click away, is as much about getting the framing right as it is about getting the operational plans right. A general framework based on 4 P's (Policing-Public-Policies-Politics) is proposed as the conceptual ‘frame' for combating violent extremism. The metaphor of a compass is used to examine this 4P's framework from the perspective of knowledge management. The key notions of ‘violent extremism', ‘radicalisation' and ‘digital era' are deconstructed before presenting a neurocognitive-based model of ‘self-indoctrination' by those who ‘inspire' a violently extreme narrative through social media technologies using the ‘dark net' of cyberspace. Law enforcement's use of communication interception technologies and data retention laws is critically examined. The chapter concludes with operational implications for Policing the Public with Policy tools in the context of Political realities.

An Internet-Mediated Pathway for Online Radicalisation

This chapter proposes an Internet-mediated radicalisation model, RECRO. It consists of five phases: (1) the Reflection phase details the triggers, needs, and vulnerabilities that an individual may have which increase one's receptiveness towards alternative belief systems; (2) the Exploration phase details the period where the individual begins making sense of the information put forth by violent extremists; (3) the Connection phase details the influence of like-minded individuals and the online community on the individual's new worldview; (4) the Resolution phase details the period during which the individual gains the momentum to translate one's radical beliefs into action; and finally (5) the Operational phase details the period during which the individual is ready to commit violence to further one's radical objectives. This model provides a basis for understanding and informing judgements about an individual's level of involvement, and paves the way for future empirical work.

Why Is ISIS so Psychologically Attractive?

Since the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) became prominent after the release of beheading videos of its prisoners, many have been confused over how to describe this development in relation to the way the Internet is exploited by violent extremists. While the element of surprise and horror lingered on the minds of many observers, a more pressing question facing the law enforcement is: how does ISIS attract foreign fighters using such videos and online propaganda? As countries around the globe grapple with the security threat posed by their nationals travelling to join ISIS, the need to be au fait with the appeal of ISIS and its ability to use the Internet to recruit new members and sympathisers becomes even more apparent. This chapter uses a behavioural sciences lens to explicate how individual and organisational motivational factors may contribute to the overall appeal of joining ISIS.

Getting out of the Armchair

This chapter will explore possible factors (both online and real world) that can ‘tip' an ‘armchair jihadi' towards real world extremism. This entails examining social psychological research on tipping points that can be translated to the process of radicalisation. Prominent cases of jihadists will then be examined to illustrate the physiognomies behind their tipping points and the applicability of such theories. Finally, strategies to incorporate tipping point mechanisms towards countering violent extremism will be discussed. This chapter emphasises how the key to understanding tipping points in extremism lies in understanding the cognitive, social and emotive barriers to extremist thinking and action. There is thus an imperative need for more research and experimentation on persuasion tactics and in particular tipping points. Extremist counter-narratives can only be successful if they incorporate the energies of youth and other key individuals at the grassroots towards crafting, spreading and adding credibility to counter-narratives.

Understanding Personality and Person-Specific Predictors of Cyber-Based Insider Threat

The chapter aims to provide an opinion on major challenges for ongoing personality research on cyber security, especially in the area of insider threat. While research on the prevention and perpetuation of insider threat activity within cyberspace has grown substantially in the recent decade, there remain many unanswered challenges and unchartered territories of knowledge in the field. Specifically, compared to the amount of work done on algorithmic modelling approaches, much of the psychological data is scant and focuses on correlations between the so-called Big Five personality traits (i.e., extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness, emotional stability, conscientiousness) or demographic variables (e.g., gender, age) with insider threat activity. Thus, the focus of this article is to articulate the major challenges for understanding insider threat in the context of cyber security, particularly from a personality and person-specific perspective that emphasises internal characteristics of the individual actor as explanations of actions and events.