scholarly journals The Role of Short-Term and Longer Term Immigration Trends on Voting for Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe

2021 ◽  
pp. 194855062110436
Author(s):  
Miguel R. Ramos ◽  
Sandy Schumann ◽  
Miles Hewstone
Keyword(s):  
Intergroup Relations ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
European Social Survey ◽  
Radical Right ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Social Survey ◽  
Populist Radical Right ◽  
Recent Increase ◽  
Radical Right Parties

The success of populist radical right parties (PRRPs) in Europe has, in part, been attributed to growing immigration, but previous findings have found an inconsistent relationship between immigration and voting for PRRPs. We address previous inconsistencies by suggesting a time-focused perspective on intergroup relations. We disentangle short-term from longer term immigration trends and argue that a recent increase in immigration should predict PRRP support. With time, however, citizens will adapt to these demographic changes and voting for PRRPs could decline. We drew on official immigration records and representative data from the European Social Survey, capturing the voting behavior of 75,874 individuals from 15 European countries between 2002 and 2014. We found that a recent increase in immigration predicted more PRRP voting, and this relationship was strengthened under conditions of higher economic strain and inequality. In contrast, sustained immigration in the longer term was not related with PRRP votes.

scholarly journals The radical right, the labour movement and the competition for the workers’ vote

2018 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nadja Mosimann ◽  
Line Rennwald ◽  
Adrian Zimmermann
Keyword(s):  
Working Class ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
European Social Survey ◽  
Radical Right ◽  
Social Survey ◽  
Labour Movement ◽  
Non Union ◽  
Radical Right Parties ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Better Than

This article analyses the capacity of radical right parties to attract support from union members in recent elections in Western Europe. It is argued that unionized voters resist the appeals of the radical right better than non-union members. Using data from the European Social Survey 2010–2016, the article shows that union members are overall less likely to vote for the radical right than non-union members. Even though it is found that unionized working-class and middle-class voters are less likely to vote radical right than their non-unionized peers in the pooled sample, it is also observed that these subgroups of unionized voters and especially unionized working-class voters are not immune to radical right voting in all the countries analysed. The article thus indicates a growing capacity of the radical right to attract unionized working-class segments of the electorate in some countries and to directly compete with left parties for these voters.

Do religious voters support populist radical right parties? Opposite effects in Western and East-Central Europe

2021 ◽  
pp. 135406882098518
Author(s):  
Kamil Marcinkiewicz ◽  
Ruth Dassonneville
Keyword(s):  
Central Europe ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
European Social Survey ◽  
Radical Right ◽  
Far Right ◽  
East Central Europe ◽  
East Central ◽  
Populist Radical Right ◽  
Religious Devotion ◽  
Radical Right Parties

The rise of populist radical right parties fuels a discussion about the roots of their success. Existing research has demonstrated the relevance of gender, education and income for explaining the far-right vote. The present study contributes to the aforementioned debate by focusing on the role of religiosity. The data collected in the eighth round of the European Social Survey (2016) allow examining in more detail the political relevance of attendance at religious services and other measures of religious devotion. This study focuses in particular on 15 countries, 11 from Western Europe and 4 from East-Central Europe. In none of the Western European countries is there evidence of a positive relationship between religiosity and vote for a populist radical right party. In fact, in many countries of this region more religious voters are substantively less inclined to support far-right movements. The situation is different in parts of East-Central Europe. In Poland, and to a weaker extent also in Hungary, the probability of a vote for right-wing populists increases with religiosity.

scholarly journals The “losers of automation”: A reservoir of votes for the radical right?

2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 205316801882239 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhen Jie Im ◽  
Nonna Mayer ◽  
Bruno Palier ◽  
Jan Rovny
Keyword(s):  
Labour Market ◽  
European Social Survey ◽  
Radical Right ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Social Survey ◽  
Political Consequences ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Market Risks ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Radical Right Parties

This paper studies the association between the risk of automation and vote choice in 11 West European countries. We extend upon labour economics literature on the effects of automation on the labour market by focusing on the political consequences of automation. We also build on existing work relating labour market risks to support for radical right parties. We argue that automation threat is most likely to increase support for radical right parties. We demonstrate that those more inclined to vote for the radical right rather than the average voters are those who are both threatened by automation and are still “just about managing” economically. They are more receptive to the narrative of the radical right, which simultaneously highlights the risk, and proposes protection. Using cross-sectional individual level data drawn from the European Social Survey (rounds 6, 7 and 8), we find that individuals who perceive themselves as “coping on present income” are significantly more likely to vote for radical right parties as risk of automation increases. They are also less likely to vote for major right parties.

Not So Radical After All: Ideological Diversity Among Radical Right Supporters and Its Implications

2019 ◽  
Vol 68 (3) ◽  
pp. 600-616 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caroline Marie Lancaster
Keyword(s):  
Latent Class Analysis ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
Latent Class ◽  
European Social Survey ◽  
Radical Right ◽  
Euro Crisis ◽  
Social Survey ◽  
The Core ◽  
Radical Right Parties ◽  
Migration Crisis

Radical right voters and parties are often characterized as conservative and traditionalist on issues of gender, sexuality, and morality. Common wisdom is that they reject the progressive sociopolitical shifts that began in the 1970s and early 1980s. However, some radical right parties, such as the Dutch Party for Freedom, maintain moderate positions on morality issues. Are radical right supporters still traditionalist? Latent class analysis applied to European Social Survey data from 10 West European countries reveals that radical right supporters belong to three ideologically distinct classes. The fastest growing group is the sexually-modern nativists, who make up about 45% by 2016. Contrary to extant literature, traditionalism no longer appears to be a major motivation for today’s radical right. Instead, immigration and nationalism are now the core common concerns for radical right supporters in Western Europe. This development may be due to the Euro crisis and the migration crisis, which have increased the salience of national borders.

scholarly journals Local David Versus Global Goliath: Populist Parties and the Decline of Progressive Politics in Italy

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-85
Author(s):  
Matteo Cavallaro
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Social Services ◽  
Radical Right ◽  
Political Crisis ◽  
Social Spending ◽  
Local Policy ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Populist Radical Right ◽  
Radical Right Parties

This paper analyzes the role of local spending, particularly on social welfare, and local inequality as factors in the Italian political crisis following the adoption in 2011 of more radical national austerity measures. We employ two different methods. First, we develop an original database of municipal budgets. There we show that even the lowest level of social welfare spending, that offered by Italian municipalities, though also hit by austerity, was still able to moderate this national shock. We test three operationalizations of local spending: aggregate current expenditures, aggregate current expenditures on social services, and current expenditures disaggregated by function. We show that municipal current expenditures, particularly on social spending, significantly affected the post-2011 share of votes for the progressive coalition. The results also show that social spending, especially on education, significantly moderated the combined effect of national austerity and the economic crisis on voting for populist radical right parties, while no significant results appeared for populist parties in general. Local inequality appears to significantly enhance vote shares of populist radical right parties and populist parties in general. We caution that, although significant, the effect is not strong: that local policy and economic conditions can moderate national shocks but cannot reverse them. The second analysis relies on survey data to ascertain the individual-level mechanisms behind the role of local welfare. The paper argues that local economic inputs influence voters’ position on non-economic issues. Our results, however, do not identify any significant individual-level channel of transmission, be it cultural or economic.

Competing for Loyalists? How Party Positioning Affects Populist Radical Right Voting

2021 ◽  
pp. 001041402199716
Author(s):  
Winston Chou ◽  
Rafaela Dancygier ◽  
Naoki Egami ◽  
Amaney A. Jamal
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Radical Right ◽  
Immigration Policies ◽  
Populist Radical Right ◽  
Alternative Für Deutschland ◽  
Party Loyalty ◽  
The Status ◽  
Radical Right Parties ◽  
Voter Groups

As populist radical right parties muster increasing support in many democracies, an important question is how mainstream parties can recapture their voters. Focusing on Germany, we present original panel evidence that voters supporting the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)—the country’s largest populist radical right party—resemble partisan loyalists with entrenched anti-establishment views, seemingly beyond recapture by mainstream parties. Yet this loyalty does not only reflect anti-establishment voting, but also gridlocked party-issue positioning. Despite descriptive evidence of strong party loyalty, experimental evidence reveals that many AfD voters change allegiances when mainstream parties accommodate their preferences. However, for most parties this repositioning is extremely costly. While mainstream parties can attract populist radical right voters via restrictive immigration policies, they alienate their own voters in doing so. Examining position shifts across issue dimensions, parties, and voter groups, our research demonstrates that, absent significant changes in issue preferences or salience, the status quo is an equilibrium.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document