scholarly journals Member States’ Sovereignty in the Socio-Economic Field: Fact or Fiction?

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Femke Laagland

The author assesses the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (the Court) in which the European business freedoms collide with national labour law. The approach of the Court will be scrutinised with the aim of discovering the extent to which the Court encroaches upon the Member States’ autonomy in the field of labour law. This topic became popular directly after the landmark decisions in Viking and Laval of December 2007. Both cases addressed conflicts that were related to socio-economic diversity in the European Union following the enlargements. In the end, the Court decided where the balance between the conflicting economic and social values had to be struck and, by doing so, did not grant any room of discretion to the Member States. Since then, the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services have obtruded themselves into the sphere of national labour law. The Court has broadened its jurisdiction in the socio-economic field not only in cross-border situations but also in internal situations via its interpretation of social policy Directives by virtue of Article 16 CFREU. The research shows that the Court is assessing the legitimacy of restrictions imposed by national labour law in seemingly different distinguishable ways since 2007. Although the Court does not seem to aspire to a uniform labour law system throughout the European Union, its approach applied in Viking and Laval cannot be considered a thing of the past. Due to poor reasoning, it is not clear when and where the Court draws the line. Since its rulings cannot readily (or even at all) be subject to political review, the ensuing legal uncertainty leads to anxiety about the Court being the ultimate decider in the socio-economic field.

2019 ◽  
pp. 43-46
Author(s):  
O. M. Rym

The article deals with certain aspects of collective labour rights in the European Union. Prerequisites and procedure of this rights guaranting as general principles of EU law are analyzed and their content is characterized. It is emphasized that such legal establishing took place somewhat haphazardly, both at the level of the acts of primary and secondary law of the European Union and in the case law. As a result, there is no single position on the spectrum of collective labour rights as principles of EU labor law. The author focuses on significant changes in the understanding of the necessity of cooperation of social partners and the extension of their interaction at the supranational level. It is under the responsibility of the European Commission to promote cooperation between Member States and to facilitate coordination of their activities in the field of the right of association and collective bargaining between employers and employees. The article clarifies the content of collective labour rights as general principles of EU law on the basis of EU legal acts, the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, as well as the scientific works of domestic and foreign scholars. It is noted that the system of collective labour rights, as general principles of EU labour law, consists of the right of collective bargaining and collective action, the right of employees to information and consultation within the enterprise, as well as the freedom of assembly and association. It is concluded that the necessity of cooperation between the social partners is recognized as one of the foundations of EU labour law. Herewith appropriate interaction is ensured through the normative-legal consolidation of collective labour rights and procedures for their implementation. After all, European Union legal acts allow employees and employers’ representatives to play an active role in regulating labour legal relations. For example, Member States may instruct employers and employees, upon their joint request, to implement Council directives or decisions. In addition, many directives contain warnings about the possibility of derogating from their provisions through the adoption of a collective agreement.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 1099-1130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tamás Szabados

AbstractIn several golden share cases, the Court of Justice of the European Union (the “Court”) condemned Member States for reserving certain special rights in privatized companies for themselves. In spite of the Court's consistently strict approach in the golden share cases, the more recent golden share judgments demonstrate that the Court's practice is not free from uncertainties. In its case law, the Court seems to hesitate between the application of the freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital. Additionally, it is not entirely clear which measures are caught by provisions on the freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-77
Author(s):  
Iryna Basova

Cross-border conversions may be considered as an achievement of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU, Court) since its case law paves the way towards acceptance of such cross-border operations in all Member States. In the Polbud case, the CJEU clarified the scope of the freedom of establishment in regard to cross-border conversions. That judgement should give an impulse to those Member States whose law remains silent on the issue, lacks regulation or is not in line with the provisions on the freedom of establishment, to take appropriate legislative measures. However, a creation of a legal framework at the European level is still needed to provide a commonly-accepted procedure for such operations, to secure protection for vulnerable constituencies of a company, to prevent abusive practices and to regulate cooperation between the states which are involved in cross-border conversions.


Author(s):  
Joni Heliskoski

Whatever terminology one might wish to employ to describe the form of integration constituted by the European Union and its Member States, one fundamental attribute of that arrangement has always been the division, as between the Union and its Member States, of competence to conclude international agreements with other subjects of international law. Today, the fact that treaty-making competence—as an external facet of the more general division of legal authority—is divided and, to some extent, shared between the Union and its Member States is reflected by some of the opening provisions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Notwithstanding the changes to the scope and nature of the powers conferred upon the Union, resulting from both changes to primary law and the evolution of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the basic characteristics of the conferment as an attribution of a limited kind has always been the same; there has always existed a polity endowed with a treaty-making authority divided between and, indeed, shared by, the Union and its Member States. In the early 1960s mixed agreements—that is, agreements to which the European Union


EU Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 832-888
Author(s):  
Paul Craig ◽  
Gráinne de Búrca

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing students with a stand-alone resource. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) has two separate chapters on self-employed persons who move on a permanent or temporary basis between Member States: the chapters on freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services. The central principles governing freedom of establishment and the free movement of services are laid down in the TFEU and have been developed through case law. Important developments have also been brought about through secondary legislation in sectors such as insurance, broadcasting, financial services, electronic commerce, telecommunications, and other ‘services of general economic interest’. This chapter focuses on the broad constitutional principles applicable to every sector. The UK version contains a further section analysing issues concerning freedom of establishment and the provision of services between the EU and the UK post-Brexit.


2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (7) ◽  
pp. 1223-1255 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miroslava Scholten ◽  
Marloes van Rijsbergen

Although not explicitly regulated by the EU treaties, EU agencies not only exist but also have increased in number and power. In addition, while EU agencies may exercise very similar functions to those of the Commission, Articles 290 and 291 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) do not list agencies among the possible authors of non-legislative acts. The existing situation raises the questions of the extent to which the ongoing agencification in the EU is legitimate and what its limits are. This article addresses these questions in the light of the old and new Treaties and case law, including the just releasedESMA-shortsellingcase. It shows that while the Lisbon Treaty made a few steps forward on the road of legitimizing EU agencies and delegating important powers to them, the scope of powers that EU agencies can have remains unclear. In this respect, the European Court of Justice's lenient approach in theESMA-shortsellingcase is unfortunate because it neither clarifies the issue nor pushes the Union Legislator and the Member States to address it. Consequently, in the absence of clear limits, further agencification is likely to persist at the risk of increasing the democratic legitimacy deficit and remaining accountability gaps.


Author(s):  
Juan Ignacio Ugartemendia Eceizabarrena

La finalidad principal de este trabajo es analizar la eficacia vinculante de la Carta de Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea en las relaciones entre particulares. Una vez apuntada brevemente la capacidad vinculante de la misma en relación al poder público (eficacia vertical), sea de la Unión o de los Estados miembros (cuando aplican Derecho de la Unión), el artículo se centra en la descripción de las diversas posiciones y argumentos en torno a la eficacia inter privatos de la Carta, esto es, a su capacidad para vincular (directa o indirectamente) a los particulares (eficacia horizontal). Puestos a ello, estas líneas se adentran, asimismo, en señalar una de las principales cuestiones a las que se enfrenta en la actualidad la jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Justicia en esta materia. Esto es, si la conexión de un derecho de la Carta con una Directiva, o su concreción en la misma, viene a fortalecer su eficacia vinculante horizontal (sabiendo que, por definición, éstas carecen de tal eficacia en las relaciones entre particulares) o invocabilidad, una cuestión que se está planteando en relación con los derechos de igualdad (particularmente, con la no discriminación) y con los derechos de solidaridad de la Carta.The main purpose of this paper is to analyze the binding effectiveness of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in relationships between individuals. After explaining briefly its binding capacity in relation to public authorities (vertical efficacy), either in the Union or in the Member States (when applying Union law), the article focuses on the description of the various positions and arguments about the inter privatos effectiveness of the Charter, that is, its ability to bind or constrain (directly or indirectly) individuals (horizontal effectiveness). In that respect, these lines also aim at one of the main issues the Court’s case-law is currently facing in this area: whether the connection of a Charter right with a Directive, or its realization in it, strengthens its horizontal binding effectiveness (knowing that, by definition, these rights lack of efficacy in the relationships between individuals), or its invocability, an issue that is being raised in relation to the Charter’s rights of equality (particularly, non-discrimination) and of solidarity.


2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (31) ◽  
pp. 24-36
Author(s):  
Valentin Paul Neamt

Abstract The present paper presents the obligation that courts in the member states of the European Union have to refer questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union, with a focus on courts against whose decision there is no judicial remedy under national law. The paper starts by presenting the applicable framework regarding the preliminary reference procedure, then focuses on analyzing the exceptions to national court’s duty under article 267 TFEU, with a focus on the direction in which the case law is heading based on the most recent judgments handed down by the Court of Justice of the European Union in 2015, finally presenting the author’s conclusions and observation on the subject.


Author(s):  
Susanne K. Schmidt

The European Court of Justice is one of the most important actors in the process of European integration. Political science still struggles to understand its significance, with recent scholarship emphasizing how closely rulings reflect member states’ preferences. In this book, I argue that the implications of the supremacy and direct effect of the EU law have still been overlooked. As it constitutionalizes an intergovernmental treaty, the European Union has a detailed set of policies inscribed into its constitution that are extensively shaped by the Court’s case law. If rulings have constitutional status, their impact is considerable, even if the Court only occasionally diverts from member states’ preferences. By focusing on the four freedoms of goods, services, persons, and capital, as well as citizenship rights, the book analyses how the Court’s development of case law has ascribed a broad meaning to these freedoms. The constitutional status of this case law constrains policymaking at the European and member-state levels. Different case studies show how major pieces of EU legislation cannot move beyond case law but have to codify its principles. Judicialization is important in the EU. It also directly constrains member-state policies. Court rulings oriented towards individual disputes are difficult to translate into general policies, and into administrative practices. Policy options are thereby withdrawn from majoritarian decision-making. As the Court cannot be overruled, short of a Treaty change, its case law casts a long shadow over policymaking in the European Union and its member states, undermining the legitimacy of this political order.


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