Effective international enforcement of employee rights? Challenging Hungarian ‘unorthodox’ laws

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 116-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tamás Gyulavári ◽  
Gábor Kártyás
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Employee Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
International Courts ◽  
Severance Pay ◽  
Legal Principles ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Legal Nature

International courts have become a crucial element of protecting employee rights in recent decades. The ‘unorthodox’ 1 measures of the Hungarian Orbán government have provided a unique opportunity to test the effectiveness of international courts, since these national measures have been defying various legal principles in general, but in particular in the field of employment, since acquiring a two-thirds parliamentary majority in 2010. The article analyses the most important of these employment laws, their objectives, problematic legal nature and the responses of the Hungarian Constitutional Court (hereinafter CC), the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter CJEU), and the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ECtHR). 2 Are these national and international courts able to ensure effective protection against such policies when they adversely affect workers’ fundamental rights, and if so, on what legal basis? Conclusions regarding unorthodox employment laws, such as termination without cause, the compulsory retirement of judges, a retroactive 98% tax on severance pay, and/or the nationalisation of private pension funds, might be useful to other countries with similar legislative tendencies. The article focuses on the question of whether international courts are able to block and efficiently remedy such national measures and tendencies in employment law.

scholarly journals La aplicación judicial de la CDFUE; un decálogo a partir de la jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea

2017 ◽  
pp. 333
Author(s):  
Rafael Bustos Gisbert
Keyword(s):  
Case Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Basic Point ◽  
Derechos Humanos ◽  
High Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights

En este ensayo se pretende examinar cuáles son las pautas que ha de seguir el juez nacional cuando se enfrenta a la aplicación de la CDFUE. El punto de referencia básico en esta materia ha de ser la jurisprudencia sobre el tema del Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea. De forma complementaria habrá de tenerse en cuenta la posición del Tribunal Constitucional y del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos. A partir de lo ocurrido en los casos más importantes hasta ahora planteados se pretende esclarecer cuándo y cómo ha de seguirse la jurisprudencia de los tres altos tribunales.This essay tries to establish the basic patterns that judges must follow when facing the adjudication of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The basic point of reference is the case law of the European Court of Justice. But they also must be take into account the case law of the Spanish Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights. After the study of the most important cases in the topic, the essay attempts to clarify when and how to follow the jurisprudence of these High Courts.

scholarly journals ¿Es real el diálogo entre tribunales? Cuestión prejudicial y control de constitucionalidad por vulneración de derechos y libertades fundamentales

2017 ◽  
pp. 529
Author(s):  
Encarnación Roca Trías ◽  
Susana García Couso
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
National Constitution

Es de sobra conocida la tensión existente entre los Tribunales Constitucionales de los Estados miembros y el Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea a raíz del planteamiento de cuestiones prejudiciales ante el TJUE en supuestos en los que, aunque el asunto se plantee como una cuestión interpretativa del derecho de la Unión, comprende, además, un problema de derechos fundamentales susceptibles de ser controlados, también, constitucionalmente. Ambos procedimientos terminan con una decisión de compatibilidad con los derechos fundamentales. Este artículo pretende hacer una reflexión acerca de los problemas que suscita el hecho de que dos Tribunales —TJUE y TC— competentes en materia de protección de derechos fundamentales, y, al mismo tiempo, interpretadores de un mismo ordenamiento jurídico, puedan emitir juicios paralelos sobre una misma norma que ha sido sometida a su control y con parámetros diferentes de control: la Carta de Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea y la Constitución.This paper purports to reflect on the complex issues that arise from the fact that both the European Court of Justice and the national constitutional court have the power to adjudicate on fundamental rights and that, therefore, on the basis of the application of different rules — the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the national Constitution — they can occasionally arrive at different decisions. National courts are more and more aware of this dual avenue to challenge national regulations, through the preliminary reference to the ECJ and through the reference to the Constitutional Court of constitutional doubts with regard to national legislation. In consequence, national Constitutional Courts must accommodate into this new scenario.

A Constitutional Court for Europe?

2004 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
Anthony Arnull
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
European Council ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Future ◽  
Draft Constitution

The purpose of this article is to consider the effect of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe on the European Court of Justice (ECJ). At the time of writing, the future of the draft Constitution is somewhat uncertain. Having been finalised by the Convention on the Future of Europe in the summer of 2003 and submitted to the then President of the European Council, it formed the basis for discussion at an intergovernmental conference (IGC) which opened in October 2003. Hopes that the text might be finalised by the end of the year were dashed when a meeting of the IGC in Brussels in December 2003 ended prematurely amid disagreement over the weighting of votes in the Council. However, it seems likely that a treaty equipping the European Union with a Constitution based on the Convention’s draft will in due course be adopted and that the provisions of the draft dealing with the ECJ will not be changed significantly. Even if either assumption proves misplaced, those provisions will remain of interest as reflecting one view of the position the ECJ might occupy in a constitutional order of the Union.

The German Constitutional Court and Preliminary References—Still a Match not Made in Heaven?

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1491-1508
Author(s):  
Eva Julia Lohse
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
German Constitutional Court ◽  
In The Beginning ◽  
The Eu

So far, the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, henceforth:BVerfG) has only made a single preliminary reference to the (now) Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), despite frequent rulings on matters connected with European Union (EU) Law. Its apparent reluctance seemed odd considering the atmosphere of dialogue and cooperation which prevails between the non-constitutional courts and the EU courts. This situation might, however, have changed with the preliminary reference from January 2014, proving predictions on the perceived “most powerful constitutional court” and its relationship to the EU partly wrong. The legal effects of its preliminary reference on the interpretation of Articles 119, 123, 127 ff. of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the validity of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) by the European Central Bank (ECB) under EU Law are as yet unclear; although the Opinion of the Advocate General Cruz Villalón was delivered in the beginning of 2015, which did not confirm the doubts expressed by theBVerfGabout the conformity of the OMT programme with EU law. Nonetheless, the interpretative scheme and the normative questions as to the reluctance of theBVerfGremain the same after this single referral and offer explanations as to why theBVerfGhad for nearly sixty years not referred a question to the former European Court of Justice (ECJ).

The First Preliminary Reference of the French Constitutional Court to the CJEU:Révolution de Palaisor Revolution in French Constitutional Law?

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1471-1490
Author(s):  
François-Xavier Millet ◽  
Nicoletta Perlo
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Major Change ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Face ◽  
First Time

A preliminary reference on the part of the Constitutional Council was, in several respects, not to be expected. It was debatable whether it would consider itself as a “court or tribunal” within the meaning of Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and, therefore, whether it would refer a case to the European Court of Justice (CJEU) at all. The French constitutional court could also have resorted to theacte clairdoctrine so as to escape from their obligation to ask for the interpretive guidance of the CJEU. However, the main reason why a reference was not awaited by legal actors lies in the limited jurisdiction of the Constitutional Council. Until the introduction in 2008 of the so-called QPC, that is,question prioritaire de constitutionnalité(the Priority Preliminary Reference mechanism on issues of constitutionality), theConseil constitutionnelhad a very limited jurisdiction compared to its European counterparts. Its main mission was to assess the conformity of parliamentary bills and treaties with the Constitution and only with the Constitution. Its review could only take placeex ante, between the adoption and the promulgation of a text. By opening the way to anex postreview of statutes with regard to the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, the QPC brought about a major change in the French adjudication system: statutes are no longer immune from constitutional challenge once they are in force. However, treaties and other international or European commitments are no parameters of constitutional review. TheConseil constitutionnelmade this clear in 1975 and never seriously changed track, despite minor qualifications to the rule. In their seminalIVGruling on the Voluntary Interruption of Pregnancy Act, they held that it was not up to them to review the compatibility of bills with treaties, in spite of Article 55 of the Constitution. Consequently, the task of the constitutional judges does not go beyond the assessment of laws with regard to the Constitution. This is the main reason that explains why, on the face of it, theConseil constitutionnelwas unlikely to refer a case to the CJEU. Why would it seek the interpretation or ask for the review of a European text if this text is immaterial for it and if the yardstick of its examination is the Constitution and only the Constitution? Yet, it happened. For the first time, theConseilreferred a case to the CJEU on 4 April 2013. Although this is undoubtedly a major legal breakthrough, we will see in due course that this is probably more arévolution de palaisthan a true revolution in French constitutional law.

14. The European Union

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Berthold Rittberger
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
Constitutional Principle ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Eu

This chapter examines how the European Union acquired distinctive constitution-like features. It begins with a discussion of three routes to constitutionalization: the first is through changes in the EU's primary law; the second focuses on ‘in between’ constitutionalization; and the third leads directly to the European Court of Justice and its jurisprudence. The chapter proceeds by discussing two developments that have shaped the EU constitutional order almost since the beginning: the emergence of a body of EU law constituting a set of higher-order legal rules, and the consolidation of the constitutional principle of representative democracy. It explains how the supremacy and direct effect of EU law, as well as the EU court's concern with the protection of fundamental rights, helped transform the EU into a constitutional polity. It also considers how the extension of the legislative, budgetary, and other powers of the European Parliament animated the constitutional principle.

Between Informal Dialogue and Official Criticism

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 409-420
Author(s):  
Anna Podolska
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Mutual Recognition ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Protection Of Human Rights ◽  
Judicial Proceedings

Abstract There are various forms of jurisdictional dialogue. In addition to drawing from the case law of another court or seeking direct assistance of such another court in passing the judgment, we can notice in practice situations when by issuing a verdict the courts are communicating with each other. The rulings of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the Court of Justice of the European Union, and the European Court of Human Rights regarding the free movement of judgments in the European Union and protection of fundamental rights are the example of such activities. Each of these bodies was interpreting separately the extent to which the mechanisms of recognising and executing the judgments may interfere with the level of protection of fundamental rights. A common conclusion concerns assigning the priority to protection of fundamental rights, while individual bodies were determining differently the standards of such protection. The analysed judgments can be construed as a communication between these bodies. Although no direct discussion takes place between these courts, this is still a form of interaction which affects the development of the case law and understanding of the boundaries of mutual recognition of judgments and protection of human rights within judicial proceedings.

scholarly journals The Dialectics Between Constitutional Identity and Common Constitutional Traditions: Which Language for Cooperative Constitutionalism in Europe?

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (8) ◽  
pp. 1097-1118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Massimo Fichera ◽  
Oreste Pollicino
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Binding Force ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
And Function ◽  
Role And Function ◽  
Constitutional Identity ◽  
The Eu

AbstractThis Article revisits the role and function of constitutional identity and common constitutional traditions and claims that the latter have had an increasingly stronger influence on the process of European integration—more than may appear at first sight. In addition, the relevance of common constitutional traditions has not been undermined but, on the contrary, strengthened by the emergence of fundamental rights in EU law and the subsequent conferral of binding force on the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Constitutional identity and common constitutional traditions are part of two discourses—security and fundamental rights—which are an expression of the security of the European project as an overarching frame characterizing the EU as a polity and legal system. After an overview of some of the most important rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union, this Article concludes by emphasizing the importance of the recent conciliatory attitude recently adopted by the Court of Justice, although the more ambivalent attitude of the Italian Constitutional Court indicates how conflictual features are becoming increasingly important and can no longer be concealed as the EU reaches a more advanced stage of integration.

scholarly journals La tutela judicial de los derechos fundamentales en el ámbito de aplicación nacional del derecho de la Unión Europea : recientes acotaciones del Tribunal de Justicia y del Tribunal ConstitucionalEspañol = The judicial protection of fundamental rights in the sphere of the national application of EU law : recent remarks by the Court of Justice and by the Spanish Constitutional Court

2013 ◽  
pp. 391
Author(s):  
Juan Ignacio Ugartemendia Eceizabarrena
Keyword(s):  
National Level ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
National Standards ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
El Sistema ◽  
Judicial Protection ◽  
The Eu

Este artículo es un estudio relativo a la tutela judicial de los Derechos Fundamentales cuando se aplica Derecho de la Unión en el ámbito interno, y a cuáles son los principales problemas con los que se topa el Juez nacional que aplica el Derecho de la Unión al llevar a cabo dicha función protectora. El trabajo, dicho de forma más concreta, se centra en el examen de una serie de recientes y decisivas resoluciones jurisdiccionales, dictadas tanto por parte del Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea como por parte del Tribunal Constitucional Español, que analizan problemas y señalan soluciones relativas a esas cuestiones, además de mostrar cuál es la evolución y el estado de la situación al respecto. Se trata de resoluciones que abordan cuestiones de fondo, como, por ejemplo: ¿hasta qué punto es posible utilizar estándares nacionales de protección de los Derechos Fundamentales en situaciones conectadas con el Derecho de la Unión o con su aplicación, en lugar de utilizar el sistema de protección de los Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea? Y asimismo, resoluciones que atienden a cuestiones de dimensión más procesal como la de dirimir hasta qué punto tiene autonomía el Juez nacional a la hora de plantear una petición prejudicial (se entiende a la hora de tutelar derechos reconocidos por normas de la Unión) en relación a las normas procesales nacionales.This article deals with the judicial protection of fundamental rights when EU Law is applied at national level and the main problems national judges have to deal with when applying EU Law as protectors of rights. More precisely, the work is focused on the examination of some recent and decisive judicial decisions, both by the European Court of Justice and by the Spanish Constitutional Court which analyze the problems and address the solutions to those questions besides showing the evolution and current situation in that regard. They are decisions that deal with the merits as for example to which extent it might be possible to use national standards of protection of fundamental rights in situations connected to EU Law or to its application instead of using the system of protection of EU human rights. Likewise, they are decisions which handle with more procedural questions as for example to what extent national judges are autonomous to file a preliminary question (it is understood that when it comes time to protect rights acknowledged by the EU) relative to national procedural rules.

Effectiveness of EU law and protection of fundamental rights

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosaria Sicurella
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Critical View ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Significant Step ◽  
Principle Of Legality

The decision of the Court of Justice in the M.A.S. and M.B. case marks a very significant step forward in the Taricco saga. It clearly shows the intention of the European Court to tone down the confrontation with the Italian Constitutional Court, while at the same time maintaining the most relevant achievement of the decision in the Taricco case, that is to say the fact to consider Article 325 TFEU as having direct effect. The author expresses quite a critical view on the solution adopted by the ECJ which finally results in a sort of “flexibilization” of the principle of legality at EU level in order to meet some of the claims by the Italian Constitutional Court. In the author's opinion, such a solution risks to undermine the overall coherence and soundness of the protection of fundamental rights at EU level, although it can appear at a first glance to boost the legality principle. A better solution could have been to develop a different reasoning relying on rights in the Charter other that the nullum crimen principle, and avoid to touch at the well-established scope of this principle as established in Article 49 Charter and also in Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

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