Economic sanctions against North Korea: The pivotal role of US–China cooperation

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-193
Author(s):  
Woo-Jun Min ◽  
Sukhee Han

At the beginning of 2018, North Korea halted its long-range nuclear- and ballistic-missile development programs and announced that it was willing to denuclearize. Soon afterwards, it reached out to countries including the US, China and South Korea. This sudden change in behavior marked the end of six years of extreme isolation under Kim Jong-un’s leadership. To explain why North Korea decided to reach out when it did, the present study examines the 2006–2018 economic sanctions levied on North Korea under the US maximum-pressure policy, carried out partly in cooperation with China. The findings suggest that economic sanctions were ineffective between 2006 and 2016 for two reasons: the lack of cooperation between the US and China, and China’s policy of assisting North Korea. In 2006–2016, China and North Korea had shared values and high volumes of trade; there were no clear signs of cooperation between the US and China. However, as trade between China and North Korea began to decrease in late 2017 and early 2018, there were signs of cooperation between the US and China, and changes in North Korean behavior. North Korea came to the negotiating table largely to lift the economic sanctions, which were strengthened by cooperation between the US and China. Increased economic pressure compelled North Korea to normalize its relations with the US, China and South Korea.

2018 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bob Carbaugh ◽  
Koushik Ghosh

The United States has enacted economic sanctions against North Korea since the early 1950s when North Korea attacked South Korea. Can North Korea be pressured into giving up its nuclear weapons? This article discusses the role of economic sanctions as a tool of international diplomacy with North Korea. Using concepts and tools taught in undergraduate economics classes, the article discusses the operation of sanctions and then it applies this analysis to the case of North Korea. The article examines the success that sanctions have achieved in bringing Kim Jong Un to the bargaining table and the difficulties that sanctions encounter in promoting a lasting resolution of the conflict between North Korea and the United States. The article is written for a broad audience of economics students. JEL Classifications: F0, F1


Author(s):  
Jude Woodward

This chapter looks at South Korea’s response to the US ‘pivot’. It takes stock of the post-war division of the peninsula and its consequences for the international alignment of both North and South. It considers how the ‘economic miracle’ in South Korea led to growing competition with Japan and greater synergies with China. It looks at the degree to which North Korea threatens stability in the region, and to what extent its demonisation justifies a major US presence in close proximity to China. The chapter discusses whether resurgent China is seen as a threat to South Korean interests or chiefly viewed through the prism of mutual economic benefit; and contrasts alleged concerns about China with those provoked by Japan. It concludes that while South Korea has continued to step up its military collaboration with the US, it has not become a cheerleader for pushing back against China and has not signed up to a US strategy to contain China.


2004 ◽  
Vol 103 (674) ◽  
pp. 280-283 ◽  
Author(s):  
James E. Auer ◽  
Robyn Lim

There are signs that Japan will assume the geostrategic role of the ‘new South Korea’-a leverage point against China. Missile defense in particular will transform the us-Japan relationship into a ‘normal’ alliance, taking it in directions not hitherto contemplated.


Significance Harris visited Singapore and Vietnam, both of which figure heavily in US security policy in the region. In Singapore, she weathered criticism of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. In Hanoi, she proposed talks about a strategic partnership, which would mean a significant upgrade to relations with Vietnam. Impacts The Afghanistan withdrawal will make alliances and US reliability central issues in upcoming elections in Japan and South Korea. Japan will strengthen its emerging security cooperation with India, shoring up its defence in the west of the Indo-Pacific region. To test US commitment to the region after the Afghanistan withdrawal, China and North Korea will be increasingly provocative.


Energies ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (10) ◽  
pp. 1895
Author(s):  
Yusin Lee

This study analyzes the political viability of the Russia-North Korea-South Korea (RNS) gas pipeline project. This analysis demonstrates that North Korea’s fourth nuclear test in January 2016 changed the dynamic of the project. Before the test, when inter-Korean relations were good, South Korea and Russia could make efforts to secure political support for the project. However, after the fourth nuclear test, this was no longer the case. As North Korea’s nuclear power status became more evident, this nuclear problem began to have profound implications for U.S. security. In response, Washington not only led the UN Security Council to impose very severe sanctions against North Korea, but also placed its own sanctions on the country. These sanctions began to contain provisions that could prevent the implementation of the pipeline project. In addition to these sanctions, the U.S. sanctions against Russia in 2017 over its intervention in the U.S. election and aggression against Ukraine also contained clauses that could hamper it. Therefore, unless the U.S. lifts or eases all of these sanctions, South Korea and Russia are unwilling to take any concrete actions to secure political support for the RNS pipeline project. Based on this analysis, this paper argues that the U.S. now holds the most important key to its political viability.


2017 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 8-15
Author(s):  
Jina Choi ◽  
◽  
Hyoshin Kim ◽  
Jinhwan Oh ◽  
◽  
...  

2020 ◽  
pp. 142-180
Author(s):  
Francine R. Frankel

North Korea’s attack against South Korea evoked an immediate military response from the United States, under a UN command, to draw the line against communist expansion in Asia. Once the Chinese entered the war on the side of North Korea, India could not sustain its policy of nonalignment on the merits but began to practice nonalignment as an informal version of neutrality justified as its commitment to seek peace in the nuclear age. When Mao prolonged the war in an effort to win total victory and force the United States out of Asia, India’s bias toward China in the United Nations met with the US decision to exclude India from the Geneva Conference on Korea and Indo-China, paving the way for China to assert its position as a great power.


Author(s):  
Angela Poh

Drawing on secondary source material as well as interviews with government officials and commercial actors from 12 countries and 16 cities that were on the receiving end of purported Chinese sanctions, Chapter 6 establishes the nature, scope, and duration of unilateral economic sanctions employed by China between 2008 and 2018. It examines eight international disputes that have frequently been cited by scholars, policymakers, and journalists as examples of China’s increasing use of unilateral sanctions: namely, alleged sanctions against France (2008); the US (2010); Japan (2010); Norway (2010); the Philippines (2012); Vietnam (2014); Taiwan (2016); and South Korea (2017). It shows that China’s use of economic sanctions was far less widespread or far-reaching than commonly assumed by scholars and policymakers.


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