scholarly journals Political Viability of the Russia-North Korea-South Korea Gas Pipeline Project: An Analysis of the Role of the U.S.

Energies ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (10) ◽  
pp. 1895
Author(s):  
Yusin Lee

This study analyzes the political viability of the Russia-North Korea-South Korea (RNS) gas pipeline project. This analysis demonstrates that North Korea’s fourth nuclear test in January 2016 changed the dynamic of the project. Before the test, when inter-Korean relations were good, South Korea and Russia could make efforts to secure political support for the project. However, after the fourth nuclear test, this was no longer the case. As North Korea’s nuclear power status became more evident, this nuclear problem began to have profound implications for U.S. security. In response, Washington not only led the UN Security Council to impose very severe sanctions against North Korea, but also placed its own sanctions on the country. These sanctions began to contain provisions that could prevent the implementation of the pipeline project. In addition to these sanctions, the U.S. sanctions against Russia in 2017 over its intervention in the U.S. election and aggression against Ukraine also contained clauses that could hamper it. Therefore, unless the U.S. lifts or eases all of these sanctions, South Korea and Russia are unwilling to take any concrete actions to secure political support for the RNS pipeline project. Based on this analysis, this paper argues that the U.S. now holds the most important key to its political viability.

Significance Mestan also implied that Borisov and Dogan were allied in promoting Russian interests in Bulgarian politics -- while Bulgaria's 'yellow press' accuses him of being a Turkish puppet. On January 13, Borisov dismissed reports that he was keen to revive the South Stream gas pipeline project, but confirmed that Bulgaria was lobbying the European Commission for a Varna gas hub that would revive at least the underwater part of South Stream bringing Russian natural gas to Europe. Impacts DPS realignment will strengthen Borisov's hand domestically, but alienate Turkey and worry the United States. His interest in a gas hub enjoys overwhelming support in both government and opposition, with only about 20 deputies likely to oppose it. Broadly coinciding with Russian interests, the hub must now secure EU financial and political support, in the teeth of US opposition.


Asian Survey ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 584-606 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yusin Lee

This paper analyzes the potential risks of the Russia-North Korea-South Korea (RNS) gas pipeline, comparing it with the Russia-Ukraine-Europe (RUE) pipeline. I argue that the possibility of disputes is much higher in the RNS case. Furthermore, I propose that the South Korean government opt to import liquefied natural gas by ship directly from Russia if contingency plans in the case of gas supply disruptions in the RNS pipeline are not available.


Author(s):  
G. D. Toloraya

The importance of Korean Peninsula in Russian foreign strategy is based on the need to preserve peace and stability in the Russia's Far East "soft underbelly" and to be a part of international efforts to solve the Korean problem, as well as to promote regional economic cooperation. In 1990-s Russia's position on the peninsula weakened, mainly because of the rupture of ties with North Korea, while relations with South Korea were reactive in nature. Rebalancing relations with the two Koreas in 2000-s increased Russia's involvement into Korean settlement, including the 6- party format. Russia/s relations with North Korea are now based on good neighborhood principle, however, they are far from idyllic as Russia disapproves of Pyongyang's behavior, especially its nuclear and missile activities. However to influence the situation more Russia should deepen its ties with the current Pyongyang leadership regardless of how irritating its behavior might be. Relations with the ROK are aimed at becoming strategic, but in reality are limited due to ROK's alliance with the USA. However South Korea has become the third most important economic partner in Asia. Russia is especially interested in three- party projects, such as Trans-Korean railroad (linked to Transsiberan transit way), gas pipeline and electricity grid. However implementation of these project is negatively influenced by the tensions in Korean peninsula. It can be solved only by multilateral efforts for comprehensive solution combining security guarantees for North Korea and its abandonment of nuclear option.


Significance Since its first nuclear test in 2006, North Korea has made steady progress in nuclear weapons technology. The July 4 ICBM test reflects its progress on delivery systems with longer ranges and increased sophistication. Pyongyang routinely claims to possess the status as a full nuclear power with the ability to retaliate with strategic nuclear arms against a US attack. Impacts Beijing is likely to share Washington’s concerns about nuclear technology transfer by a more secure North Korean regime. However, Washington is likely to position more rapid-strike conventional forces in the region, over China’s vociferous objections. Once North Korea is confident in its deterrent, it may be willing to offer a cessation of testing in exchange for sanctions relief.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
Amira Schiff

Abstract This study explores the relevance of readiness theory’s analytical framework in illuminating the fundamentals that contribute to the de-escalation process in international crises. By applying this analytical framework to the U.S.-North Korea crisis management episode of 2017–2018, this study elucidates the interplay of elements that led to the winding down of the intense crisis and to the parties’ agreement to formally embark on negotiations at the end of the Singapore Summit in June 2018. The study shows how the multiple variables underlying the movements in conflict transformation, as outlined by readiness theory, can help to explain the effect of bilateral strategies applied by the U.S. and North Korea and the role of third-party involvement by South Korea and China in managing the crisis.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-56
Author(s):  
Jangho Kim ◽  
Daewon Ohn ◽  
Jae Jeok Park ◽  
Mason Richey
Keyword(s):  

2009 ◽  
Vol 282 (3) ◽  
pp. 773-779 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Ringbom ◽  
Klas Elmgren ◽  
Karin Lindh ◽  
Jenny Peterson ◽  
Theodore W. Bowyer ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
V. Denisov

The nuclear problem of the Korean peninsula remains unsolved, tensions continuing for the past five years. The mechanism of the Six-Party Talks in which Russia, China, the USA, Japan, North and South Korea took part, is inactive, while each party develops its own strategy to counteract the new nuclear program of North Korea. Such an approach stimulates further escalation in the region, because there is no mutual understanding of North Korea nuclear status. In addition there exist a number of contradictions between the members of Six-Party Talks, each of them trying to resolve North Korean issue pursuing their own interests. However, in the current situation a peaceful resolution of the problem is still possible. Moreover, it is the only reasonable solution.


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