scholarly journals Human Embryo Adoption: Biotechnology, Marriage, and the Right to LifeHuman Embryo Adoption: Biotechnology, Marriage, and the Right to Life Rev. BergThomas V. and FurtonEdward J.Philadelphia, PA: The National Catholic Bioethics Center, 2006. 347 pages.

2011 ◽  
Vol 78 (2) ◽  
pp. 232-234
Author(s):  
Jason T. Eberl
2016 ◽  
Vol 61 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlo Casini

Il contributo è dato dall’esame e dal commento della Relazione del Ministro della Salute sull’attuazione della Legge 40 del 19 febbraio 2004 “Norme in materia di procreazione medicalmente assistita”, presentata, al Parlamento ai sensi dell’art. 15, comma 2 della legge stessa. Il Movimento per la Vita Italiano (MpVI) per valutare i dati di volta in volta riportati nei documenti ministeriali ha finora presentato quattro Rapporti al Parlamento: il primo nel 2007, il secondo nell'aprile 2009, il terzo a luglio 2011 e il quarto – oggetto del presente articolo – nell’agosto 2012. L’attenzione della Relazione ministeriale è rivolta soprattutto alla realizzazione del desiderio degli adulti di avere un figlio, in base allo scopo dichiarato dalla legge di “favorire la soluzione dei problemi riproduttivi derivanti dalla sterilità o dalla infertilità umana”. Perciò la descrizione del percorso seguito dalle varie tecniche e gli incroci tra i vari dati a disposizione fanno riferimento prevalente alla coppia adulta. Tuttavia, si sottolinea nella Rapporto del “MpVI” non si deve sottovalutare l’art. 1 della legge indica l’altro fondamentale obiettivo della legge e cioè quello di: “assicurare i diritti di tutti i soggetti coinvolti compreso il concepito”. I soggetti di cui è doveroso tener conto non sono solo gli adulti desiderosi di avere un figlio, ma anche i figli fin dal primo momento della loro esistenza (proprio l’evento che le nuove tecniche intendono determinare), cioè fin dal momento del concepimento. L’articolato, documentato e ricco Rapporto del MpVI richiama sinteticamente l’impianto della normativa – seriamente alterato dalla sentenza costituzionale 151/2009 – e gli interventi giudiziari che lo riguardano; rimarca con forza la grande differenza – in ordine alla protezione del diritto alla vita – tra la morte dell’embrione dopo il trasferimento nelle vie genitali della donna e la sua soppressione deliberata, diretta, concordata, che avviene quando l’embrione, non trasferito nelle vie genitali della donna viene selezionato, reso oggetto di sperimentazione, distrutto, congelato; contesta la teoria del c.d. “diritto affievolito” con riferimento al diritto alla vita del concepito; si sofferma sulla necessità di rimuovere le cause impeditive della procreazione alternative alla procreazione artificiale (a questo proposito viene segnalata la significativa esperienza dell’Istituto Scientifico Internazionale Paolo VI di ricerca sulla fertilità e infertilità umana operante presso il Policlinico “A. Gemelli” di Roma dal 2003). Infine, il rapporto si conclude con alcune domande e proposte di lavoro rivolte al Ministro della Salute. Non vi è dubbio, comunque, che quella dello statuto giuridico dell’embrione umano non deve essere emarginata nella relazione annuale del Ministro: “se nell’attuazione della L. 40/04 vogliamo raggiungere un adeguato bilanciamento tra l’obiettivo di superare la sterilità e l’infertilità da un lato e il rispetto della vita dall’altro, occorre assolutamente valorizzare il principio dell’art. 1 che qualifica soggetto titolare di diritti il concepito, al pari degli altri soggetti coinvolti nella vicenda procreativa”. ---------- This article is the review and comment of the Report of the Italian Minister of Health on the implementation of Law 40, February 19, 2004 on medically assisted procreation, submitted to the Parliament under article 15 paragraph 2. The Italian Pro-Life Movement (MpVI) to evaluate the data from time to time within ministerial documents has up to now submitted four reports to Parliament: the first in 2007, the second in 2009, the third in July 2011 and the fourth – subject of this article – in August 2012. The Ministerial Report focuses mainly on the realization of the desire of adults to have a child, according to the stated purpose of the law of “helping to resolve problems arising from human sterility or infertility”. Therefore the description of the path followed by various techniques and the connections between the various available data refer mainly to the adult couple. However, it is observed in the Report of the (MpVI), we shouldn’t neglect the article 1 of the Law indicating another key objective of the same Law which is: “to ensure the rights of all subjects involved including the human embryo”. So, the subjects we must take into account are not only the adults longing to have a child, but also the children from the first moment of their existence (just the event that the new techniques intend to be determined), that is, from the moment of conception. The articulated, documented and rich Report MpVI recalls briefly the system of Law – seriously altered by constitutional judgment 151/2009 – and the judicial interventions concerning it; it strongly emphasizes the great difference – as for the protection of the right to life of human embryo – between the death of the embryo after transfer into the genital tracts of women and his deliberate killing, direct, agreed that occurs when the embryo is not transferred to the genital tract of women is selected, but he is destroyed, made the object of experimentation, frozen, selected; it desputes the theory of the so-called “Weakened Law” dealing with the right to life of the unborn child; it focuses on the need to remove the causes hindering human procreation alternative to artificial procreation (in this regard is reported significant experience of the International Scientific Institute Paul VI on research on fertility and infertility human, working at the Policlinico Gemelli in Rome since 2003). Finally, the Report of MpVI concludes with some questions and work proposals addressed to the Minister of Health. There is no doubt, however, that the legal status of the human embryo should not be neglected in the annual Report of the Minister: “if about the implementation of the L. 40/2004 we want to achieve an appropriate balance between the objective of overcoming infertility and infertility on the one hand and respect for life on the other, it is essential to enhance the principle of article 1 that qualifies human embryo subject holder of human rights, like the other subjects involved in the medically assisted procreation”.


2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (5) ◽  
pp. 137-141
Author(s):  
Tadeusz Biesaga

The article rejects various attempts to negate the subjectivity of human embryo, formulated among others in the Polish debate entitled 'Stem cells - life for life?' and organised by the Ministry of Scientific Research and Information Technology in 2003 and 2004. The Author thinks that the proposal to treat a human embryo as a deceased donor of organs, is wrong both in the field of embryology and philosophical anthropology. It is also wrong to question the subjectivity of human embryo using various criteria of growth (developed nervous system, brain, consciousness, participation in the life of society and looking after one's own interests). For these criteria do not define humanity but describe human being in various phases of expressions of his/her human nature. That is why it is not acceptable to make the right to life conditional on the stage and degree of the actualization of humanity. Furthermore, one cannot justify the deprivation of the subjectivity of human embryo because of medical progress and the so-called good of humankind. The acceleration of progress cannot be done at the cost of life of some group of human beings.


2004 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 213-218
Author(s):  
Tadeusz Biesaga

The article rejects various attempts to negate the subjectivity of human embryo, formulated among others in the Polish debate entitled “Mother cells - life for a life?” and organized by the Ministry of Scientific Research and Information Technology in 2003 and 2004. The author thinks that the proposal to treat a human embryo as a deceased donor of organs is wrong both in the field of embryology and philosophical anthropology. It is also wrong to question the subjectivity of human embryo using various criteria of growth (developed nervous system, brain, consciousness, participation in the life of society, and looking after one's own interests). These criteria do not define humanity but describe a human being in various phases of expressions of his/her human nature. That is why it is not acceptable to make the right to life conditional on the stage and degree of the actualization of humanity. Furthermore, one cannot justify the deprivation of the subjectivity of human embryos because of medical progress and the so-called good of humankind. The acceleration of progress cannot be done at the cost of the life of some group of human beings.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-32

The relevance of the work is determined by the fact that the right to life belongs to the basic constitutional human rights, therefore, its observance and protection is the duty of the state. Despite its undeniable importance, today the right to life anywhere in the world is not really ensured in sufficient quantities. The constitutional consolidation of the right to life raises a number of issues related to the concept, nature, legislative and practical implementation of this right. It should be noted that various aspects of the human right to life were considered in the scientific works of G.B. Romanovsky, O.G. Selikhova, T.M. Fomichenko, A.B. Borisova, V.A. Ershov and other Russian authors. The aim of the study is to study and comparative analysis of the legal content of the constitutional norm that defines the right to life, to comprehend and identify possible problems of the implementation of this right. To achieve this goal, this article discusses relevant issues of ensuring the right to life, proclaimed by Article 20 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and Article 27 of the Constitution of Azerbaijan Republic. The results of a comparative analysis of these constitutional norms and the relevant norms of industry law allow us to determine, that there is no contradiction between Article 20 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the norms of the criminal legislation of the Russian Federation, which imply the death penalty as an exceptional measure of punishment, because a moratorium has been imposed on the death penalty in the Russian Federation since April 16, 1997. However, after the abolition of the death penalty in the criminal legislation of the Republic of Azerbaijan in 1998, there was a discrepancy between parts II and III of Article 27 of the Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the criminal legislation of Azerbaijan Republic that requires the introduction of the necessary changes in the content of the analyzed constitutional norm. The value of the work is determined by the fact that the introduction of appropriate changes will contribute to the further improvement of the Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the effective implementation of the right to life of everyone.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 97-108
Author(s):  
Dinda Izzati

Evidently, a few months after the Jakarta Charter was signed, Christian circles from Eastern Indonesia submitted an ultimatum, if the seven words in the Jakarta Charter were still included in the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution, then the consequence was that they would not want to join the Republic of Indonesia. The main reason put forward by Pastor Octavian was that Indonesia was seen from its georaphical interests and structure, Western Indonesia was known as the base of Islamic camouflage, while eastern Indonesia was the basis for Christian communities. Oktavianus added that Christians as an integral part of this nation need to realize that they also have the right to life, religious rights, political rights, economic rights, the same rights to the nation and state as other citizens, who in fact are mostly Muslims. This paper aims to determine and understand the extent to which the basic assumptions of the Indonesian people view the role of Islam as presented in an exclusive format.


2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (63) ◽  
pp. 216
Author(s):  
O. Sovgyria ◽  
A. Yanchuk

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 193
Author(s):  
Mei Susanto ◽  
Ajie Ramdan

ABSTRAKPutusan Nomor 2-3/PUU-V/2007 selain menjadi dasar konstitusionalitas pidana mati, juga memberikan jalan tengah (moderasi) terhadap perdebatan antara kelompok yang ingin mempertahankan (retensionis) dan yang ingin menghapus (abolisionis) pidana mati. Permasalahan dalam penelitian ini adalah bagaimana kebijakan moderasi pidana mati dalam putusan a quo dikaitkan dengan teori pemidanaan dan hak asasi manusia dan bagaimana kebijakan moderasi pidana mati dalam RKUHP tahun 2015 dikaitkan dengan putusan a quo. Penelitian ini merupakan penelitian doktrinal, dengan menggunakan bahan hukum primer dan sekunder, berupa peraturan perundang-undangan, literatur, dan hasil-hasil penelitian yang relevan dengan objek penelitian. Penelitian menyimpulkan, pertama, putusan a quo yang memuat kebijakan moderasi pidana mati telah sesuai dengan teori pemidanaan khususnya teori integratif dan teori hak asasi manusia di Indonesia di mana hak hidup tetap dibatasi oleh kewajiban asasi yang diatur dengan undang-undang. Kedua, model kebijakan moderasi pidana mati dalam RKUHP tahun 2015 beberapa di antaranya telah mengakomodasi amanat putusan a quo, seperti penentuan pidana mati di luar pidana pokok, penundaan pidana mati, kemungkinan pengubahan pidana mati menjadi pidana seumur hidup atau penjara paling lama 20 tahun. Selain itu masih menimbulkan persoalan berkaitan dengan lembaga yang memberikan pengubahan pidana mati, persoalan grasi, lamanya penundaan pelaksanaan pidana mati, dan jenis pidana apa saja yang dapat diancamkan pidana mati.Kata kunci: kebijakan, KUHP, moderasi, pidana mati. ABSTRACTConstitutional Court’s Decision Number 2-3/PUU-V/2007, in addition to being the basis of the constitutionality of capital punishment, also provides a moderate way of arguing between retentionist groups and those wishing to abolish the death penalty (abolitionist). The problem in this research is how the moderation policy of capital punishment in aquo decision is associated with the theory of punishment and human rights and how the moderation policy of capital punishment in the draft Criminal Code of 2015 (RKUHP) is related with the a quo decision. This study is doctrinal, using primary and secondary legal materials, in the form of legislation, literature and research results that are relevant to the object of analysis. This study concludes, firstly, the aquo decision containing the moderation policy of capital punishment has been in accordance with the theory of punishment, specificallyy the integrative theory and the theory of human rights in Indonesia, in which the right to life remains limited by the fundamental obligations set forth in the law. Secondly, some of the modes of moderation model of capital punishment in RKUHP of 2015 have accommodated the mandate of aquo decision, such as the determination of capital punishment outside the main punishment, postponement of capital punishment, the possibility of converting capital punishment to life imprisonment or imprisonment of 20 years. In addition, it still raises issues regarding the institutions that provide for conversion of capital punishment, pardon matters, length of delay in the execution of capital punishment, and any types of crime punishable by capital punishment. Keywords: policy, criminal code, moderation, capital punishment.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document