scholarly journals The Impact of Institutional Investors on Corporate Governance: A View of Swiss Pension Funds in a Changing Financial Environment

2008 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 307-327 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thierry Theurillat ◽  
Jose Corpataux ◽  
Olivier Crevoisier
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Pension Funds ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Financial Environment

scholarly journals Large pension funds and the corporate governance practices of Brazilian companies

2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 76-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rodrigo Miguel de Oliveira ◽  
Ricardo Pereira Câmara Leal ◽  
Vinicio de Souza Almeida
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Pension Funds ◽  
Brazilian Government ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
Political Views ◽  
Governance Practices ◽  
Corporate Governance Quality ◽  
The Impact

We do not find any consistent evidence that the presence of the largest Brazilian pension funds as relevant shareholders is associated to higher corporate governance scores by public Brazilian companies. Even though companies with institutional investors as relevant shareholders presented a higher average corporate governance score than other companies, they were also larger and had greater past profitability than other companies, which are common attributes of firms with better corporate governance according to the literature. The impact of Brazilian institutional investors on the corporate governance quality of their investees is either negligible or cannot be captured by the proxies we employed. Finally, we note that these two pension funds may represent the policy and political views of the incumbent Brazilian government and that the actions of their board appointees may or not reflect what is understood as good corporate governance practices.

scholarly journals Executive salary stickiness, institutional investors and innovation investment -- Based on the empirical data of listed companies

2021 ◽  
Vol 292 ◽  
pp. 02013
Author(s):  
Ding xin
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Empirical Data ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Private Enterprises ◽  
Positive Correlation ◽  
Corporate Innovation ◽  
Enterprise Innovation ◽  
The Impact

This paper takes China’s A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2019 as the research object, and empirically tests the impact of executive compensation stickiness on enterprise innovation investment. It is found that executive compensation stickiness is positively correlated with the innovation investment of corporate and it is more significant in private enterprises. In addition, Institutional investors participate in corporate governance to play a positive governance effect, and strengthen the positive correlation between the stickiness of executive compensation and corporate innovation investment.

scholarly journals Predicting corporate voting outcomes for shareholder sponsored proposals

2014 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 742-758 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander H. Gnutti ◽  
John D. Martin ◽  
J. Douglas Ramsey
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Labor Unions ◽  
Firm Size ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Pension Funds ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Share Ownership ◽  
Shareholder Proposals ◽  
The Impact

We analyze voting support for shareholder sponsored corporate governance proposals. Specifically, we study the impact of institutional share ownership, board structure, firm size, historical share performance, and proposal sponsor on the proportion of yes votes received. We use data from 253 shareholder proposals that came to a vote in 2013 for our analysis. Among our findings are the following: (1) pension funds sponsored 14 of the 20 proposals receiving the highest level of voting support while individuals and labor unions sponsored 16 of the 20 proposals receiving the lowest voting support; (2) firms with a classified board received higher proposal support than those without a classified board; (3) firms with a higher percentage of institutional ownership received greater voter support, and (4) firm size was inversely related to voting support

Exercising the ‘governance option’: labour’s new push to reshape financial capitalism

2019 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 891-916 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen F Diamond
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
Pension Funds ◽  
Common Stock ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Progressive Change ◽  
Financial Capitalism

Abstract New forms of stockholder activism call into question longstanding assumptions underpinning our system of corporate governance. Scholarship has largely failed to explain the basis for these new forms and, in particular, the differences among activists. Activists are not one undifferentiated mass. Both small activist hedge funds and large union-sponsored or -influenced pension funds use governance mechanisms to influence corporate behaviour. Pension funds, however, have a different set of incentives than hedge funds. The beneficiaries of these funds cannot easily switch between consumption and investment by buying or selling their holdings in firms. Thus, instead, institutional investors exercise an embedded ‘governance option’ found within shares of common stock to engage with firms. Organised labour, in particular, now uses its influence in pension funds to motivate progressive change by corporations. This form of activism has the potential to alter the balance of power between workers and capitalists in the era of financial capitalism.

The Impact of Public Pension Funds and Other Limited Partners on the Governance of Venture Capital Funds

2019 ◽  
Vol 09 (01) ◽  
pp. 1940003
Author(s):  
Vladimir Atanasov ◽  
Thomas Hall ◽  
Vladimir Ivanov ◽  
Katherine Litvak
Keyword(s):  
Venture Capital ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Pension Fund ◽  
Pension Funds ◽  
Public Pension ◽  
Venture Capitalists ◽  
Detailed Data ◽  
Triple Difference ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Investment Choices

We examine whether the reinvestment choices of public pension funds (PPFs) affect the governance of venture capital funds. We start with a hand-collected dataset of litigation against venture capitalists (VCs) that provides significant shocks to the reputation of VCs. We combine that information with detailed data on limited partner investments in VCs provided by LP Source and test whether PPFs respond differently to the litigation shocks compared to other types of limited partners. Our triple-difference framework reveals that VCs who were defendants in lawsuits suffer a significant subsequent decline in investment by university endowments and several other types of institutional investors, but experience an increase in the investment share of PPFs. Pension funds are about three times more likely to re-invest in post-lawsuit funds offered by litigated VCs. The additional pension fund investments thus partially compensate for the shortfall in post-lawsuit fundraising caused by the exodus of other investors. Our results indicate that the investment choices of PPF managers reduce the effectiveness of reputational penalties imposed by other limited partners in venture capital funds.

scholarly journals Corporate governance and investments

2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 294-311
Author(s):  
Wei Wang
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Pension Funds ◽  
Free Cash Flow ◽  
Public Pension ◽  
Debt Overhang ◽  
Fundamental Information ◽  
Director Ownership ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Physical Investment ◽  
D Investment

We investigate the impact of corporate governance on physical and R&D investments in a Seemingly Unrelated Regressing (SUR) system. Marginal q’s are estimated using firm fundamental information for physical and R&D investments separately. We find that takeover pressure boosts both physical and R&D investments, public pension funds ownership has a U-shaped relation with physical investment, and greater director ownership is associated with lower physical investment and higher R&D investment. As far as investment distortions are concerned, takeover pressure mitigates the free cash flow problem and exacerbates the debt overhang problem, while public pension funds stockholding and director ownership alleviates the debt overhang for physical investment, and R&D investment, respectively.

scholarly journals Different board structures and R&D: Evidence from Japanese corporation

2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 171-201
Author(s):  
Takahiro Nishi
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Panel Data ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Board Composition ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Specific Relationship ◽  
The Impact ◽  
D Investment

This study examines the effect of different board style and ownership, and board composition on R&D investment in Japanese corporation. I explore how different board structure contribute to R&D investment in varied way and the impact of different type of governance on R&D investment incorporation. I analyze it with 2010-2014 panel data regarding Japanese corporate governance. I found that different type of corporate governance make impacts on R&D in corporations indicating the specific relationship between corporate governance and R&D, not explained by agency theory. This study observed that Board composed of insider avoid interference of institutional investors by caring about investor’s interests.

scholarly journals Lender representatives on board of directors and internationalization in firms: an institutionalized agency perspective

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vidya Sukumara Panicker ◽  
Rajesh Srinivas Upadhyayula ◽  
Sumit Mitra
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Institutional Environment ◽  
Anglo Saxon ◽  
Strategic Decisions ◽  
Time Period ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Domestic Banks ◽  
The Impact

AbstractFrom an agency perspective, the Anglo-Saxon features of corporate governance are predominantly explored by various studies in extant literature. However, it has recently been established that diverse and unique institutional configurations exist in different economies across the world and hence, the attitude of different actors within a firm, as shaped by institutional logics, can vary. Our study applies the institutionalized agency perspective to understand how the behaviour of different actors, within firms in the Indian institutional context, are shaped, consequently determining their roles in the strategic decisions of firms. We examine the representation of lenders in the board of directors, which is a characteristic of corporate governance in India. Our sample for this study consists of 985 unique Indian firms and 5513 firm year observations across the 2006–2017 time-period. We find a negative association between the proportion of lender representatives on board of directors and internationalization of firms. In addition, we also find that family ownership positively moderates this relation, whereas foreign institutional investors and domestic banks and financial institutional investors moderate this relationship negatively. In this manner, we explore the impact of institutional environment on a very specific actor (lenders) and their representatives towards internationalization.

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