<p>The powers enshrined in mental health legislation go directly to fundamental principles central to any caring and democratic society. The tension and dilemma that exists is, on the one hand, the importance of respect for an individual’s right to make decision’s affecting his/her own life to, on the other, the recognition that there are people with mental disabilities that may be vulnerable to abuse and/or neglect and who throughout their lives or at particular times need care and/or treatment, which they may not seek or be able to consent to themselves. In any society it is through case law and statute that an attempt is made to resolve this tension and to ensure that individual rights are not infringed and that those who need care and treatment receive what is in their best interest. Thus a change in such legislation requires the most rigorous of examination and must be judged on the grounds that it a) does not infringe accepted principles such as those of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention, b) is based on sound ethical principles and does not conflict with the established law of the country, and c) it is practicable and achieves the right balance with respect to the potential tension described above. As practising clinicians (one working in an acute psychiatric service the other in a district learning disability service) we are not in a position expertly to judge the first of these but we believe we can contribute to the second and the third. In this paper we consider specifically the reasons for, and the consequences that follow, the failure on the Government’s part to accept the central importance of decision-making capacity assessment in any new mental health legislation.</p><p>The Green Paper proposals for a new Mental Health Act for England and Wales have now been published. A broad definition of ‘mental disorder’ has been retained, a new system of tribunals is to be established and compulsory treatment in the community would become lawful. However, it rejects the recommendation of the expert committee chaired by Professor Richardson that the assessment of an individual’s decision-making capacity should be a determining factor in the use of compulsory detention. Given this, it does not address the relationship between this legislation and the proposed Mental Incapacity Act. The failure to recognise the central place of decision-making capacity in a modern Mental Health Act is, we believe, a serious omission as it is a reflection of a failure to acknowledge that the basic principle of autonomy is central to such legislation.</p>
Code of Practice 1999: navigating before reform of the Mental Health Act 1983
