Stackelberg equilibria in a continuous-time vertical contracting model with uncertain demand and delayed information
2014 ◽
Vol 51
(A)
◽
pp. 213-226
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Keyword(s):
We consider explicit formulae for equilibrium prices in a continuous-time vertical contracting model. A manufacturer sells goods to a retailer, and the objective of both parties is to maximize expected profits. Demand is an Itô-Lévy process, and to increase realism, information is delayed. We provide complete existence and uniqueness proofs for a series of special cases, including geometric Brownian motion and the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, both with time-variable coefficients. Moreover, explicit solution formulae are given, so these results are operational. An interesting finding is that information that is more precise may be a considerable disadvantage for the retailer.
Keyword(s):
1996 ◽
Vol 04
(06)
◽
pp. 515-535
◽
2011 ◽
Vol 48
(02)
◽
pp. 295-312
◽
Keyword(s):
2019 ◽
Vol 20
(04)
◽
pp. 2050023
◽
1986 ◽
Vol 23
(02)
◽
pp. 409-417
◽