Employer Consolidation and Wages: Evidence from Hospitals

2021 ◽  
Vol 111 (2) ◽  
pp. 397-427
Author(s):  
Elena Prager ◽  
Matt Schmitt

We test whether wage growth slows following employer consolidation by examining hospital mergers. We find evidence of reduced wage growth in cases where both (i) the increase in concentration induced by the merger is large and (ii) workers’ skills are industry-specific. In all other cases, we fail to reject zero wage effects. We consider alternative explanations and find that the observed patterns are unlikely to be explained by merger-related changes besides labor market power. Wage growth slowdowns are attenuated in markets with strong labor unions, and wage growth does not decline after out-of-market mergers that leave local employer concentration unchanged. (JEL G34, I11, J22, J24, J31, J42, R32)

ILR Review ◽  
1997 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Norman K. Thurston

The author analyzes how mandatory employer provision of health insurance in Hawaii, which became law in 1974, affected workers' wages, employment, and insurance coverage. Between 1970 and 1990, the Hawaiian industries most affected by the mandate had slower wage growth than other Hawaiian industries, but more rapid wage growth than the same industries in the nation as a whole. The author speculates that the effects of unmeasured economy-wide positive demand shocks eclipsed the wage effects of the law. Hawaii's employment growth exceeded that of the country as a whole, but the percentage of Hawaiian workers employed less than 20 hours per week (and thus exempt from the law) was significantly higher than the national average. Insurance coverage for Hawaiian workers of all classes (including those exempt from the act)—and, indeed, for workers and nonworkers of all ages—significantly exceeded the national average in the early 1990s.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Lipsitz ◽  
Evan Starr

We exploit the 2008 Oregon ban on noncompete agreements (NCAs) for hourly-paid workers to provide the first evidence on the impact of NCAs on low-wage workers. We find that banning NCAs for hourly workers increased hourly wages by 2%–3% on average. Since only a subset of workers sign NCAs, scaling this estimate by the prevalence of NCA use in the hourly-paid population suggests that the effect on employees actually bound by NCAs may be as great as 14%–21%, though the true effect is likely lower due to labor market spillovers onto those not bound by NCAs. Whereas the positive wage effects are found across the age, education, and wage distributions, they are stronger for female workers and in occupations where NCAs are more common. The Oregon low-wage NCA ban also improved average occupational status in Oregon, raised job-to-job mobility, and increased the proportion of salaried workers without affecting hours worked. This paper was accepted by Lamar Pierce, organizations.


2003 ◽  
Vol 33 (130) ◽  
pp. 51-75
Author(s):  
Raul Zelik

The persecution of labor unionists by paramilitarian groups, the policy of deregulation of the labor market, and the criminalization of labor unions in the public sector seem to pursue the same strategy, Its aim is the weakening or disappearance of organizations that resist a policy which is friendly to (transnational) capital. The 200 murders that are committed every year against Colombian unionists, in that sense, are not only a result of civil war, The article reads the violence in Colombia as an appearance of globalization process.


Author(s):  
Mari Holm Ingelsrud

<div class="page" title="Page 1"><div class="layoutArea"><div class="column"><p><span>This article investigates the probability of turnover to three destinations following hospital merg- ers: within the hospital sector, out of the hospital sector, and out of work. It is hypothesized that mergers increase turnover to nonemployment among employees with poor health and increase turnover to employment outside of the hospital sector among healthy employees. Discrete-time survival analyses show that mergers increase turnover within the hospital sector for all employ- ees, regardless of health. Turnover to other sectors and out of work does not increase. Possible explanations for the limited turnover out of the sector associated with mergers are aspects of the Norwegian labor market such as the institution of employee participation, low unemployment, and labor shortages within hospitals. </span></p></div></div></div>


2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 342-361
Author(s):  
Kihong Park ◽  
Jesus Hernandez Arce

Abstract Most prior research on labor market mismatch was constrained by the unavailability of data on skill mismatch and also the absence of panel data which would provide controls for unmeasured heterogeneity. This paper makes use of the panel element of Korea Labor & Income Panel Survey (KLIPS) data and identifies the wage effects of educational mismatch and skill mismatch both separately and jointly. It clearly shows that only a small proportion of the wage effect of educational mismatch is accounted for by skill mismatch, suggesting a relatively weak relation between educational mismatch and skill mismatch. In the analysis appropriate panel methodology produces much weaker estimates of the relevant coefficients than the pooled OLS model. This result indicates that unobserved individual-specific characteristics play a substantial role in the way in which mismatch effects are determined.


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