Naked Exclusion with Private Offers
2016 ◽
Vol 8
(4)
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pp. 174-194
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Keyword(s):
We consider a seller's ability to deter potential entrants by offering exclusive contracts to downstream buyers. Previous literature has shown that this can be a profitable strategy if there is a coordination failure on the part of the buyers or if the seller can make discriminatory “divide-and-conquer” offers. This literature assumes that all offers are public. We show that if buyers cannot observe each other's offers and have passive or wary out-of-equilibrium beliefs, the divide-and-conquer exclusion strategy fails. Equilibria in which the incumbent obtains exclusion due to a coordination failure, on the other hand, exist for all out-of-equilibrium beliefs. (JEL D43, D83, D86, L13, L22, L40)
2009 ◽
Vol 12
(03)
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pp. 545-566
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Keyword(s):
1999 ◽
Vol 173
◽
pp. 249-254
Keyword(s):
1969 ◽
Vol 27
◽
pp. 6-7
Keyword(s):
1980 ◽
Vol 38
◽
pp. 30-33
2005 ◽
Vol 19
(3)
◽
pp. 129-132
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Keyword(s):