scholarly journals Utilitarian Aggregation with Heterogeneous Beliefs

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 112-123
Author(s):  
Antoine Billot ◽  
Xiangyu Qu

The utilitarian aggregation rule requires social utility and beliefs to be a convex combination of individual utilities and beliefs, respectively. Since, in the case of belief heterogeneity, the standard Pareto condition is incompatible with such a separate aggregation, a new condition, called the belief-proof Pareto condition, is proposed to alleviate occurrences of spurious agreement by restricting unanimity to beliefs that can be considered reasonable by society. Then, we show, in the Anscombe-Aumann and the Savage framework, that the belief-proof Pareto condition is equivalent to separate aggregation of individual beliefs and tastes. (JEL D11, D71, D83)

Games ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ananish Chaudhuri

We explore how subjects with heterogeneous beliefs respond to a surprise restart in a linear public goods game played for 20 rounds using either a “partners” or a “strangers” protocol. There are two restarts: one prior to Round 11 and another prior to Round 16. We elicit subject beliefs at the outset and classify subjects into three groups—Top, Middle, and Bottom—depending on their prior beliefs about their peers’ contributions to the public good. Then, we look at how these three groups respond, in terms of their beliefs and contributions, before and after the restart. We replicate the restart effect, but find that (i) it is much more pronounced for partner matching than for stranger matching and (ii) it is less pronounced in treatments with belief elicitation compared to control treatments where beliefs are not elicited. We also find that the restart has the effect of regenerating a sense of optimism among the subjects, which is reflected in increased contributions subsequently. This increase in contribution is driven mostly by those subjects who started the game with relatively more optimistic beliefs. Our results have implications for sustaining cooperation in social dilemma games.


2010 ◽  
Vol 69 (3) ◽  
pp. 173-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samantha Perrin ◽  
Benoît Testé

Research into the norm of internality ( Beauvois & Dubois, 1988 ) has shown that the expression of internal causal explanations is socially valued in social judgment. However, the value attributed to different types of internal explanations (e.g., efforts vs. traits) is far from homogeneous. This study used the Weiner (1979 ) tridimensional model to clarify the factors explaining the social utility attached to internal versus external explanations. Three dimensions were manipulated: locus of causality, controllability, and stability. Participants (N = 180 students) read the explanations expressed by appliants during a job interview. They then described the applicants on the French version of the revised causal dimension scale and rated their future professional success. Results indicated that internal-controllable explanations were the most valued. In addition, perceived internal and external control of explanations were significant predictors of judgments.


2013 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 209-218 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benoît Testé ◽  
Samantha Perrin

The present research examines the social value attributed to endorsing the belief in a just world for self (BJW-S) and for others (BJW-O) in a Western society. We conducted four studies in which we asked participants to assess a target who endorsed BJW-S vs. BJW-O either strongly or weakly. Results showed that endorsement of BJW-S was socially valued and had a greater effect on social utility judgments than it did on social desirability judgments. In contrast, the main effect of endorsement of BJW-O was to reduce the target’s social desirability. The results also showed that the effect of BJW-S on social utility is mediated by the target’s perceived individualism, whereas the effect of BJW-S and BJW-O on social desirability is mediated by the target’s perceived collectivism.


Author(s):  
R. R. Palmer

This chapter considers the prevailing notion in the eighteenth century that nobility was a necessary bulwark of political freedom. Whether in the interest of a more open nobility or of a more closed and impenetrable nobility, the view was the same. Nobility as such, nobility as an institution, was necessary to the maintenance of a free constitution. There was also a general consensus that parliaments or ruling councils were autonomous, self-empowered, or empowered by history, heredity, social utility, or God; that they were in an important sense irresponsible, free to oppose the King (where there was one), and certainly owing no accounting to the “people.” The remainder of the chapter deals with the uses and abuses of social rank and the problems of administration, recruitment, taxation, and class consciousness.


Author(s):  
Deepali Khurana ◽  
Raj Kumar ◽  
Sibel Yalcin

We define two new subclasses, $HS(k, \lambda, b, \alpha)$ and \linebreak $\overline{HS}(k, \lambda, b, \alpha)$, of univalent harmonic mappings using multiplier transformation. We obtain a sufficient condition for harmonic univalent functions to be in $HS(k,\lambda,b,\alpha)$ and we prove that this condition is also necessary for the functions in the class $\overline{HS} (k,\lambda,b,\alpha)$. We also obtain extreme points, distortion bounds, convex combination, radius of convexity and Bernandi-Libera-Livingston integral for the functions in the class $\overline{HS}(k,\lambda,b,\alpha)$.


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