scholarly journals Subsidizing Fuel-Efficient Cars: Evidence from China’s Automobile Industry

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 152-184
Author(s):  
Chia-Wen Chen ◽  
Wei-Min Hu ◽  
Christopher R. Knittel
Keyword(s):  
Automobile Industry ◽  
Marginal Cost ◽  
Substitution Effect ◽  
Purchase Behavior ◽  
Marginal Benefit ◽  
Subsidy Program ◽  
Vehicle Purchase ◽  
China's Automobile Industry

This paper examines the response of vehicle purchase behavior to China’s largest national subsidy program for fuel-efficient vehicles during 2010 and 2011. Using variation from the program’s eligibility cutoffs and the rollout of the subsidy program, the program is found to boost sales for subsidized vehicle models, but also to create a substitution effect within highly fuel-efficient vehicles. Estimates imply that ignoring the substitution effect would lead one to conclude that the program is welfare enhancing, whereas in fact the marginal cost of the program exceeds the marginal benefit by as much as 300 percent. (JEL D12, H25, L25, L62, O14, P23, P36)

China's Automobile Industry: Policies, Problems, and Prospects.

1996 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
pp. 104
Author(s):  
Samuel P. S. Ho ◽  
Eric Harwit
Keyword(s):  
Automobile Industry ◽  
China's Automobile Industry

Learn to be good or bad? Revisited observer effects of punishment: curvilinear relationship and network contingencies

2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 754-766 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhenxin Xiao ◽  
Maggie Chuoyan Dong ◽  
Xiaoxuan Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Automobile Industry ◽  
Distribution Network ◽  
Spillover Effect ◽  
Spillover Effects ◽  
Joint Effect ◽  
Curvilinear Relationship ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Channel Governance ◽  
Observer Effects ◽  
China's Automobile Industry

Purpose Although supplier-initiated punishment is widely used to manage distributors’ opportunism, its spillover effect on unpunished distributors (i.e. observers) within the same distribution network remains under-researched. Specifically, this paper aims to investigate the curvilinear effect of punishment severity on an observer’s opportunism, and how such an effect is contingent on the observer’s network position. Design/methodology/approach This paper uses regression analysis with survey data gathered from 218 distributors in China’s automobile industry. Findings Punishment severity has an inverted U-shaped effect on the observers’ opportunism, and such effect is weakened by both the observers’ network centrality and their degree of dependence on the supplier. Practical implications The findings should encourage suppliers to focus more on the spillover effects of punishment on observers. To this end, the supplier must deliberately initiate the appropriate level of punishment severity against its distributors because an inappropriate level of punishment severity (e.g. too lenient) may unexpectedly raise the unpunished observers’ level of opportunism. Moreover, the supplier should be fully aware that observers’ specific network positions may produce varying spillover effects of the punishment. Originality/value This study enriches the literature on channel governance by revealing the curvilinear mechanism through which punishment severity influences observers’ opportunism. By applying social learning theory to channel punishment research, this study unveils both the inhibitive learning and the imitative learning forces inherent in a single punishment event, and it delineates their joint effect on an observer’s opportunism. In addition, this study outlines the observer’s vertical and horizontal relationships within the distribution network and explores their contingent roles in determining the spillover effects of punishment.

Legislative Production in Comparative Perspective: Cross-Sectional Study of 42 Countries and Time-Series Analysis of the Japan Case

2008 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
KENTARO FUKUMOTO
Keyword(s):  
Time Series ◽  
Marginal Cost ◽  
Time Series Data ◽  
Cross Sectional Study ◽  
Series Data ◽  
Divided Government ◽  
Sectional Study ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Marginal Benefit ◽  
Legislative Production

AbstractLegislative scholars have debated what factors (e.g. divided government) account for the number of important laws a legislative body passes per year. This paper presents a monopoly model for explaining legislative production. It assumes that a legislature adjusts its law production so as to maximize its utility. The model predicts that socio-economic and political changes increase the marginal benefit of law production, whereas low negotiation costs and ample legislative resources decrease the marginal cost of law production. The model is tested in two ways. The first approach compares the legislatures of 42 developed and developing countries. The second analyzes Japanese lawmaking from 1949 to 1990, using an appropriate method for event count time series data. Both empirical investigations support the model's predictions for legislative production.

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