scholarly journals O Conteúdo Informacional das Transações no Mercado Futuro de Câmbio: uma investigação do caso brasileiro

2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 7
Author(s):  
Vanessa Neumann Sulzbach ◽  
João Mergulhão ◽  
Pedro L. Valls Pereira

The microstructure approach to exchange rates have received special attention in recent years, particularly because it highlights the existence of asymmetric information in this market. The Brazilian future FX market data provided from BM&F was used to test the private information effects of trading on prices. The structural VAR results confirm the existence of asymmetric information in this market, indicating that roughly 50% of all efficient price variation is due to the private information of the order flow. Additionally, the order flow observation allows the informed and uninformed arrival rates estimation, which we use to calculate the probability of information-based trade (PIN). High PIN value leads to wide spreads, which reduces the market liquidity. The PIN results about 1.53% indicate the liquidity of Brazilian future FX market is quite high, what impound fewer trading costs for the uninformed agents.

2021 ◽  
pp. 097491012110401
Author(s):  
Munazza Jabeen ◽  
Abdul Rashid

This article studies the effects of macroeconomic news announcements and order flow on exchange rates in Pakistan by considering both direct and indirect information channels during news announcements periods. For this purpose, it employs GARCH models by using real-time data on macroeconomic news, order flow, and exchange rates. The findings reveal that macroeconomic news directly, and indirectly affect Pak Rupee exchange rates. The results also show that the order flow drives fluctuations in Pak Rupee exchange rates indicating the role of trade signals and trading strategies of currency traders in the exchange rate determination. Hence, as part of an aggregated economic component and means of public and private information, macroeconomic news and order flow impact Pak Rupee exchange rates as an integrated determinant. When macroeconomic news strikes the foreign exchange market, it affects the decisions of market makers, influencing order flow, and then exchange rates.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yacine Hammami ◽  
Sabrine Kharrat

PurposeThe purpose of the paper is to show that order flows determine exchange rate dynamics because they carry information about nonfundamental factors besides macroeconomic fundamentals.Design/methodology/approachTo understand the role of nonfundamental factors in driving order flows, this study uses two approaches. Initially, Evans and Rime (2016) VAR framework is followed to study the incremental information transmitted by order flow compared to macroeconomic variables. Then, the study uses the settings in which Rime et al. (2010) conduct their empirical work, which gives the researcher more latitude in specifying the identity of the factors that drive order flows.FindingsThe findings evidence that order flows explain the dynamics of the TND/USD exchange rate. The results highlight that order flows convey information about technical strategies, the currency systematic factors and political risk. This study also documents the presence of a Ramadan effect in exchange rates and order flows.Originality/valueThis study makes four contributions to the literature. First, it complements the literature on the FX microstructure of emerging markets. The study investigates the information content carried by order flows, while the previous literature has focused solely on examining the explanatory power of order flows to explain exchange rates in emerging countries. The second contribution is that the study demonstrates formally that order flows determine exchange rates because they transmit information about nonfundamental factors. Third, this study is the first to examine whether order flows convey information about technical analysis. Four, the study relates order flow to nontraditional factors that are relevant to the Tunisian FX market.


Complexity ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Hong Cheng ◽  
Yingsheng Su ◽  
Jinjiang Yan ◽  
Xianyu Wang ◽  
Mingyang Li

Trade credit is widely used for its advantages. However, trade credit also brings default risk to the manufacturer due to the uncertain demand. And moral hazard may aggravate the default risk. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of moral hazard in trade credit and explore incentive contract under uncertain demand and asymmetric information. We consider a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a risk-neutral retailer ordering a single product from a risk-neutral manufacturer. Market demand is stochastic and is influenced by retailer’s sales effort which is his private information. Incentive theory is used to develop the principal-agent model and get the incentive contract from the manufacturer’s perspective. Results show that the retailer will reduce his effort level to get more profit and the manufacturer’s profit will be reduced, in the case of asymmetric information. Facing this result, the manufacturer will reduce the order quantity in incentive contract to lessen his losses. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate all these theoretical results and to draw managerial insights.


2008 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 467-488 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan Love ◽  
Richard Payne

AbstractIn textbook models of exchange rate determination, the news contained in public information announcements is directly impounded into prices with there being no role for trading in this process of information assimilation. This paper directly tests this theoretical result using transaction level exchange rate return and trading data and a sample of scheduled macroeconomic announcements. The main result of the paper is that even information that is publicly and simultaneously released to all market participants is partially impounded into prices via the key micro level price determinant—order flow. We quantify the role that order flow plays and find that approximately one third of price-relevant information is incorporated via the trading process.


2008 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 250-273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Esarey ◽  
Bumba Mukherjee ◽  
Will H. Moore

Private information characteristics like resolve and audience costs are powerful influences over strategic international behavior, especially crisis bargaining. As a consequence, states face asymmetric information when interacting with one another and will presumably try to learn about each others' private characteristics by observing each others' behavior. A satisfying statistical treatment would account for the existence of asymmetric information and model the learning process. This study develops a formal and statistical framework for incomplete information games that we term the Bayesian Quantal Response Equilibrium Model (BQRE model). Our BQRE model offers three advantages over existing work: it directly incorporates asymmetric information into the statistical model's structure, estimates the influence of private information characteristics on behavior, and mimics the temporal learning process that we believe takes place in international politics.


Author(s):  
Bidisha Chakrabarty ◽  
Pankaj K. Jain ◽  
Andriy Shkilko ◽  
Konstantin Sokolov

In November 2011, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission implemented the final provision of Rule 15c3-5 curbing unfiltered market access. The provision mandated that brokers verify their clients’ order flow for compliance with credit and capital thresholds before routing to market centers. We find that the new checks introduce latency to order flow and force some latency-sensitive strategies out of the market. As a result, liquidity providers are better able to revise their quotes in response to new information, adverse selection declines, and liquidity improves. Consistent with the notion that the market for liquidity provision is competitive, our results show that the benefit of lower adverse selection is transferred entirely to liquidity demanders in the form of lower trading costs. This paper was accepted by Karl Diether, finance.


Games ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 64
Author(s):  
Debdatta Saha ◽  
Prabal Roy Chowdhury

This paper examines a persuasion game between two agents with one-sided asymmetric information, where the informed agent can reveal her private information prior to playing a Battle-of-the-Sexes coordination game. There is a close connection between the extent of information revelation and the possibility of coordination failure; while, in the absence of any coordination failure, there exist equilibria with full disclosure, in the presence of strategic uncertainty in coordination there exists an equilibrium with no information revelation. We provide a purification argument for the non-existence result, as well demonstrate that it is robust to several extensions, including both-sided asymmetric information and imprecise information revelation.


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