Genocide as International Crime: Corpus Delicti Analysis

2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (7) ◽  
pp. 0-0
Author(s):  
Георгий Русанов ◽  
Gyeorgiy Rusanov

This paper is devoted to the issues of international criminal responsibility for the crime of genocide. The author explores the corpus delicti of it and draws attention to the problem of bringing the guilty persons to international responsibility. The author examines in detail individual acts constituting the corpus delicti: the murder of members of any national, ethnic, racial or religious group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to the members of such group, deliberate creation of such living conditions which are meant for total or partial physical destruction of the group; imposing measures intended to prevent childbirth within the group; forcible transfer of children from one human group to another. Special attention is paid to the problem of describing the individual elements of an act. The author supports all theoretical conclusions by examples from the practice of the International Criminal Court.

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (6) ◽  
pp. 318-321
Author(s):  
Алина Шамсетдинова ◽  
Alina Shamsetdinova

Consideration of the circumstances, exempt from international responsibility, provided in accordance with the Statute of the International Criminal Court. It raises the question of relevance in considering the process of establishing this institution, and especially the use of grounds for exemption from international criminal responsibility.


2013 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 829-864 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Gillett

In 2010 in Kampala, Uganda, the States Parties to the International Criminal Court (ICC) adopted a set of amendments to the Rome Statute that define the elements and trigger mechanisms of the crime of aggression. However, significant questions remain as to what was actually agreed upon in Kampala, including with respect to the parameters of the crime itself. These questions, which include the applicability of exceptions for humanitarian intervention and anticipatory self-defence, affect not only the potential criminal responsibility of individuals charged with the crime of aggression, but also the interests of States in whether their acts are considered to amount to aggression or not. This article explores the anatomy of the crime of aggression and highlights issues that remain to be resolved.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 34
Author(s):  
Thaís Multiterno ◽  
Camila Monteiro Santos Stohrer

<p class="resumo"><strong>Resumo:</strong> O presente trabalho foi desenvolvido com o objetivo de verificar a possibilidade do dano ambiental de grande proporção classificado como Ecocídio ser punido pelo Tribunal Penal Internacional.  Para tanto, faz-se algumas considerações sobre o histórico, conceito e princípios do Direito Ambiental. Na presente pesquisa analisa-se também o Direito Penal, alguns princípios que tem relação aos crimes ambientais e a responsabilidade penal da pessoa física e da pessoa jurídica. Estuda-se, por fim o Tribunal Penal Internacional, sua competência para julgamento, o dano ambiental como Ecocídio e a possibilidade deste ser considerado crime contra a humanidade e ser punido pelo TPI. A justificativa do tema se dá em razão da sua atualidade, e também da necessidade de uma punição mais severa em relação aos crimes ambientais de grande extensão. Para encetar a investigação foi utilizado o método indutivo a ser operacionalizado com as técnicas do referente, das categorias, dos conceitos operacionais e da pesquisa de fontes documentais, resultando em uma fonte de pesquisa para os operadores do Direito.</p><p class="resumo"><strong>Palavras-chave</strong>: Direito Ambiental. Dano Ambiental. Direito Penal. Ecocídio. Tribunal Penal Internacional.</p><h3>THE GREAT PROPORTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE AS ECOCIDITY AND THE POSSIBILITY OF PUNISHMENT BY THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT</h3><div><p class="abstract"><strong>Abstract:</strong> The present work was developed with the objective of verifying the possibility of environmental damage of great proportion classified as Ecocídio to be punished by the International Criminal Court. Therefore, some considerations about the history, concept and principles of Environmental Law are made. The present research also analyzes the Criminal Law, some principles that have relation with environmental crimes and the criminal responsibility of the individual and the legal person. The International Criminal Court, its jurisdiction for judgment, the environmental damage as Ecocídio, and the possibility of it being considered a crime against humanity and being punished by the ICC, is being studied. The justification for the theme is due to its relevance, and also the need for a more severe punishment in relation to environmental crimes of great extent. To begin the investigation, the inductive method was used to be used with reference techniques, categories, operational concepts and the search of documentary sources, resulting in a research source for legal operators.</p></div>


2012 ◽  
Vol 61 (2) ◽  
pp. 325-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Finnin

AbstractThe Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is the first international instrument that includes a general provision on the mental element required before criminal responsibility for an international crime attaches (Article 30). This article analyses that provision from a comparative perspective, drawing on common law and civil law understandings of intent. It analyses the jurisprudence and commentary concerning Article 30 in detail, and attempts to draw some conclusions as to what aspects of the common law and civil law concepts of intent are covered by it.


1970 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Mohammed

The road to developing an international institutional capacity to prosecute crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide has been a long one, and has in many ways concluded with the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC). By looking at the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), as well as the ICC, this paper traces the evolution of the concept of individual criminal responsibility to its present incarnation. It argues that while the ICC presents its own unique ‘added value’ to the prosecution of international criminals, its application of justice continues to be biased by the influence of powerful states.


2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (5) ◽  
pp. 1261-1278 ◽  
Author(s):  
Milan Kuhli ◽  
Klaus Günther

Without presenting a full definition, it can be said that the notion of judicial lawmaking implies the idea that courts create normative expectations beyond the individual case. That is, our question is whether courts' normative declarations have an effect which is abstract and general. Our purpose here is to ask about judicial lawmaking in this sense with respect to international criminal courts and tribunals. In particular, we will focus on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). No other international criminal court or tribunal has issued so many judgments as the ICTY, so it seems a particularly useful focus for examining the creation of normative expectations.


2012 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara Goy

For more than 15 years the two ad hoc Tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), have interpreted the requirements of different forms of individual criminal responsibility. It is thus helpful to look at whether and to what extent the jurisprudence of the ICTY/ICTR may provide guidance to the International Criminal Court (ICC). To this end, this article compares the requirements of individual criminal responsibility at the ICTY/ICTR and the ICC. The article concludes that, applied with caution, the jurisprudence of the ICTY/ICTR – as an expression of international law – can assist in interpreting the modes of liability under the ICC Statute. ICTY/ICTR case law seems to be most helpful with regard to accessorial forms of liability, in particular their objective elements. Moreover, it may assist in interpreting the subjective requirements set out in Article 30 ICC Statute.


2015 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 349-371 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALICIA GIL GIL ◽  
ELENA MACULAN

AbstractThe jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court (ICC) up to the Lubanga judgment showed definite interpretive trends on the modes of principal liability. This article aims first to make a critical assessment of these trends by focusing on methodological and substantive aspects. On the one hand, the practice of having resort to theories derived from Continental legal systems, albeit legitimate, is based on a methodology that raises some concerns as to the selection and (mis)interpretation of such theories. On the other hand, the Court has clearly adopted a wide interpretation of some critical elements in which the different modes of principal liability are grounded. This choice has caused a significant expansion of the scope of principal liability as well as a breach of the principles of legality and of individual criminal responsibility. In our opinion, the underpinning of these interpretations is a flawed understanding of the criteria for distinguishing between principals and accessories.This perspective has been overturned by the Katanga judgment, on which the second part of this article will focus. This judgment correctly argues that the distinction between perpetrators and accomplices is grounded only on the autonomous or vicarious character of their contribution to the offence. Furthermore, it follows a partly different approach as to both the methodology and the interpretation of the constitutive elements of principal liability. In our view, this approach better fits both the relevant statutory provision and the basic principles of criminal law.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 107 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 107 governs the transfer of the person following completion of the sentence. When a released prisoner is not a national of the State of enforcement, and is not authorized to remain there, two possible scenarios arise: transfer to a State ‘which is obliged to receive him or her’ and transfer to a State ‘which agrees to receive him or her’. Transfer of a released person to a third State upon completion of sentence will invariably require agreement. Absent such agreement, the individual will remain in the State of enforcement. In deciding upon transfer, the wishes of the released prisoner are to be taken into account.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 101 sets out the principle of speciality, which is part of the customary law governing extradition between States. The rationale for the principle of speciality ‘is to protect State sovereignty’. For this reason, the rule is limited to the scenarios in which the person is arrested and is surrendered as a result of a request submitted by the Court to the State. It is inapplicable if the suspect has appeared voluntarily. The State that surrenders the individual to the Court may be asked to waive the rule of speciality if the Court seeks to proceed with respect to crimes that were not part of the original request for surrender.


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