scholarly journals Deterrence Effects of Enforcement Schemes: An Experimental Study

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marina Agranov ◽  
Anastasia Buyalskaya
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Ethical Behavior ◽  
Partial Information ◽  
Full Information ◽  
Information Structures ◽  
Elicitation Method ◽  
Incentive Compatible ◽  
Private And Public ◽  
Undesirable Behavior

Private and public organizations are interested in finding effective ways to reduce crime and promote ethical behavior without investing heavy resources into monitoring and compliance. In this paper, we experimentally study how revealing different information about a fine distribution affects deterrence of an undesirable behavior. We use a novel incentive-compatible elicitation method to observe subjects lying (the undesirable behavior) and quantify the extent to which this behavior responds to information structures. We find that punishment schemes that communicate only partial information (the minimum fine in particular) are more effective than full information schemes at deterring lying. We explore the mechanism driving this result and link it to subjects’ beliefs about their own versus the average expected fine in treatments with partial information. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis.

scholarly journals Two Remarks on Blackwell's Theorem

2008 ◽  
Vol 45 (02) ◽  
pp. 580-586 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ehud Lehrer ◽  
Eran Shmaya
Keyword(s):  
Decision Maker ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Decision Problem ◽  
Partial Information ◽  
The Other ◽  
Actual State ◽  
Information Structures ◽  
Comparison Of Experiments ◽  
Classical Characterization ◽  
Blackwell's Theorem

In a decision problem with uncertainty a decision maker receives partial information about the actual state via an information structure. After receiving a signal, he is allowed to withdraw and gets zero profit. We say that one structure is better than another when a withdrawal option exists if it may never happen that one structure guarantees a positive profit while the other structure guarantees only zero profit. This order between information structures is characterized in terms that are different from those used by Blackwell's comparison of experiments. We also treat the case of a malevolent nature that chooses a state in an adverse manner. It turns out that Blackwell's classical characterization also holds in this case.

scholarly journals On Plurality Voting and Runoff Elections: Information Aggregation under Divided Majority

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacque Gao
Keyword(s):  
Partial Information ◽  
Information Aggregation ◽  
Full Information ◽  
Positive Probability ◽  
Runoff Elections

This article compares Plurality Voting (PV) and two forms of Runoff Elections (RE) in a setting in which (i) there are two majority-preferred alternatives, (ii) a strong minority backs a third alternative which would make the majority strictly worse off, and (iii) some of the majority voters are uninformed about the "correct" majority alternative. I show that in the informative equilibrium in Majority Runoff Elections (MRE), uninformed majority voters vote randomly with strictly positive probability, achieving partial information aggregation, while they always abstain in Automatic Runoff Elections (ARE), achieving full information aggregation and strictly improving the majority's welfare. However, uninformed majority voters do not abstain in PV, resulting in less information aggregation than in both MRE and ARE.

scholarly journals Inter-identity amnesia for neutral episodic self-referential and autobiographical memory in Dissociative Identity Disorder: An assessment of recall and recognition

PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. e0245849
Author(s):  
Rosemary J. Marsh ◽  
Martin J. Dorahy ◽  
Chandele Butler ◽  
Warwick Middleton ◽  
Peter J. de Jong ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Free Recall ◽  
Memory Impairment ◽  
Partial Information ◽  
Dissociative Identity Disorder ◽  
The Other ◽  
Full Information ◽  
Autobiographical Memories ◽  
Memory Transfer ◽  
Study Participants ◽  
Diagnostic Criterion

Amnesia is a core diagnostic criterion for Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID), however previous research has indicated memory transfer. As DID has been conceptualised as being a disorder of distinct identities, in this experiment, behavioral tasks were used to assess the nature of amnesia for episodic 1) self-referential and 2) autobiographical memories across identities. Nineteen DID participants, 16 DID simulators, 21 partial information, and 20 full information comparison participants from the general population were recruited. In the first study, participants were presented with two vignettes (DID and simulator participants received one in each of two identities) and asked to imagine themselves in the situations outlined. The second study used a similar methodology but with tasks assessing autobiographical experience. Subjectively, all DID participants reported amnesia for events that occurred in the other identity. On free recall and recognition tasks they presented a memory profile of amnesia similar to simulators instructed to feign amnesia and partial information comparisons. Yet, on tests of recognition, DID participants recognized significantly more of the event that occurred in another identity than simulator and partial information comparisons. As such, results indicate that the DID performance profile was not accounted for by true or feigned amnesia, lending support to the idea that reported amnesia may be more of a perceived than actual memory impairment.

Why do these quite different best-choice problems have the same solutions?

2004 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 398-416 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen M. Samuels
Keyword(s):  
Poisson Process ◽  
Process Model ◽  
Partial Information ◽  
Stopping Rule ◽  
Good Explanation ◽  
Full Information ◽  
Choice Problem ◽  
Best Choice Problem ◽  
Current Observation ◽  
Information Problem

The full-information best-choice problem, as posed by Gilbert and Mosteller in 1966, asks us to find a stopping rule which maximizes the probability of selecting the largest of a sequence of n i.i.d. standard uniform random variables. Porosiński, in 1987, replaced a fixed n by a random N, uniform on {1,2,…,n} and independent of the observations. A partial-information problem, imbedded in a 1980 paper of Petruccelli, keeps n fixed but allows us to observe only the sequence of ranges (max - min), as well as whether or not the current observation is largest so far. Recently, Porosiński compared the solutions to his and Petruccelli's problems and found that the two problems have identical optimal rules as well as risks that are asymptotically equal. His discovery prompts the question: why? This paper gives a good explanation of the equivalence of the optimal rules. But even under the lens of a planar Poisson process model, it leaves the equivalence of the asymptotic risks as somewhat of a mystery. Meanwhile, two other problems have been shown to have the same limiting risks: the full-information problem with the (suboptimal) Porosiński-Petruccelli stopping rule, and the full-information ‘duration of holding the best’ problem of Ferguson, Hardwick and Tamaki, which turns out to be nothing but the Porosiński problem in disguise.

scholarly journals Transparency, asymmetric information and cooperation

2020 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 267-294
Author(s):  
Gianna Lotito ◽  
Matteo Migheli ◽  
Guido Ortona
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Behaviour ◽  
Partial Information ◽  
Relative Performance ◽  
The Other ◽  
Competitive Environment ◽  
Full Information ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Per Se

Abstract We inquire experimentally whether asymmetric information in competitive settings and competition per se influence individual social behaviour. Participants perform a task and are remunerated according to two schemes, a non-competitive and a competitive one, then they play a standard public goods game. In the first scheme participants earn a flat remuneration, in the other they are ranked according to their performance and remunerated accordingly. Information about ranking and income before the game is played varies across three different treatments. We find that competition per se does not affect the amount of contribution. The time spent to choose how much to contribute is negatively correlated with the decision of cooperating fully. The main result is that full information about the relative performance in the competitive environment enhances the cooperation, while partial information reduces it.

Eco-Labels: Modeling the Consumer Side

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 187-207
Author(s):  
Klaas van 't Veld
Keyword(s):  
Social Psychology ◽  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Market Research ◽  
Large Body ◽  
Spillover Effects ◽  
Relative Importance ◽  
Private Benefits ◽  
Public Benefits ◽  
Complex Picture ◽  
Private And Public

The theoretical literature analyzing eco-label programs has focused mainly on how intricate interactions between firms, eco-label certifiers, and regulators shape these programs’ economic and environmental outcomes. Far less attention has been paid to the consumer side, which has typically been modeled very simply. Meanwhile, empirical researchers in behavioral economics, social psychology, and market research have accumulated a large body of empirical evidence that paints a rich, complex picture of that consumer. In this review, I survey a range of these empirical findings, as well as attempts by theorists to incorporate them in their models. The survey is organized around three themes: ( a) varieties of consumer ignorance, ( b) context dependence of consumer motivations, and ( c) motivational spillover effects across time and people. I also touch on the relative importance of private and public benefits of eco-label programs and on the debate over whether the private benefits should even be counted in welfare.

scholarly journals Optimal Two-Part Tariff Licensing in a Differentiated Mixed Duopoly

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 279-288
Author(s):  
Jing Wang ◽  
Fangbai Yang
Keyword(s):  
Partial Information ◽  
The Other ◽  
Mixed Duopoly ◽  
Full Information ◽  
Development Cost ◽  
Optimal Behavior ◽  
Equilibrium Strategies ◽  
Potential Competitor ◽  
Information Difference

Abstract This paper considers the two-part tariff licensing by an innovating firm to its potential competitor in a differentiated mixed duopoly, in which one firm sets a quantity and the other firm charges a price. Based on the development cost incurred by the rival, we derive the optimal behavior of the firms under full information case and partial information case respectively. Information difference on the equilibrium strategies is also investigated.

scholarly journals On Plurality Voting and Runoff Elections: Information Aggregation under Divided Majority

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacque Gao
Keyword(s):  
Partial Information ◽  
Information Aggregation ◽  
Full Information ◽  
Positive Probability ◽  
Runoff Elections

This article compares Plurality Voting (PV) and two forms of Runoff Elections (RE) in a setting in which (i) there are two majority-preferred alternatives, (ii) a strong minority backs a third alternative which would make the majority strictly worse off, and (iii) some of the majority voters are uninformed about the "correct" majority alternative. I show that in the informative equilibrium in Majority Runoff Elections (MRE), uninformed majority voters vote randomly with strictly positive probability, achieving partial information aggregation, while they always abstain in Automatic Runoff Elections (ARE), achieving full information aggregation and strictly improving the majority's welfare. However, uninformed majority voters do not abstain in PV, resulting in less information aggregation than in both MRE and ARE.

scholarly journals Fair and Efficient Resource Allocation with Partial Information

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Halpern ◽  
Nisarg Shah
Keyword(s):  
Resource Allocation ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Partial Information ◽  
Fundamental Problem ◽  
Full Information ◽  
Indivisible Goods ◽  
Preference Information ◽  
Efficient Resource

We study the fundamental problem of allocating indivisible goods to agents with additive preferences. We consider eliciting from each agent only a ranking of her k most preferred goods instead of her full cardinal valuations. We characterize the amount of preference information that must be elicited in order to satisfy envy-freeness up to one good and approximate maximin share guarantee, two widely studied fairness notions. We also analyze the multiplicative loss in social welfare incurred due to the lack of full information with and without fairness requirements.

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