scholarly journals On Plurality Voting and Runoff Elections: Information Aggregation under Divided Majority

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacque Gao
Keyword(s):  
Partial Information ◽  
Information Aggregation ◽  
Full Information ◽  
Positive Probability ◽  
Runoff Elections

This article compares Plurality Voting (PV) and two forms of Runoff Elections (RE) in a setting in which (i) there are two majority-preferred alternatives, (ii) a strong minority backs a third alternative which would make the majority strictly worse off, and (iii) some of the majority voters are uninformed about the "correct" majority alternative. I show that in the informative equilibrium in Majority Runoff Elections (MRE), uninformed majority voters vote randomly with strictly positive probability, achieving partial information aggregation, while they always abstain in Automatic Runoff Elections (ARE), achieving full information aggregation and strictly improving the majority's welfare. However, uninformed majority voters do not abstain in PV, resulting in less information aggregation than in both MRE and ARE.

scholarly journals On Plurality Voting and Runoff Elections: Information Aggregation under Divided Majority

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacque Gao
Keyword(s):  
Partial Information ◽  
Information Aggregation ◽  
Full Information ◽  
Positive Probability ◽  
Runoff Elections

This article compares Plurality Voting (PV) and two forms of Runoff Elections (RE) in a setting in which (i) there are two majority-preferred alternatives, (ii) a strong minority backs a third alternative which would make the majority strictly worse off, and (iii) some of the majority voters are uninformed about the "correct" majority alternative. I show that in the informative equilibrium in Majority Runoff Elections (MRE), uninformed majority voters vote randomly with strictly positive probability, achieving partial information aggregation, while they always abstain in Automatic Runoff Elections (ARE), achieving full information aggregation and strictly improving the majority's welfare. However, uninformed majority voters do not abstain in PV, resulting in less information aggregation than in both MRE and ARE.

scholarly journals On Plurality Voting and Runoff Elections: Information Aggregation under Divided Majority

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacque Gao
Keyword(s):  
Partial Information ◽  
Information Aggregation ◽  
Full Information ◽  
Positive Probability ◽  
Runoff Elections

This article compares Plurality Voting (PV) and two forms of Runoff Elections (RE) in a setting in which (i) there are two majority-preferred alternatives, (ii) a strong minority backs a third alternative which would make the majority strictly worse off, and (iii) some of the majority voters are uninformed about the "correct" majority alternative. I show that in the informative equilibrium in Majority Runoff Elections (MRE), uninformed majority voters vote randomly with strictly positive probability, achieving partial information aggregation, while they always abstain in Automatic Runoff Elections (ARE), achieving full information aggregation and strictly improving the majority's welfare. However, uninformed majority voters do not abstain in PV, resulting in less information aggregation than in both MRE and ARE.

scholarly journals Inter-identity amnesia for neutral episodic self-referential and autobiographical memory in Dissociative Identity Disorder: An assessment of recall and recognition

PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. e0245849
Author(s):  
Rosemary J. Marsh ◽  
Martin J. Dorahy ◽  
Chandele Butler ◽  
Warwick Middleton ◽  
Peter J. de Jong ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Free Recall ◽  
Memory Impairment ◽  
Partial Information ◽  
Dissociative Identity Disorder ◽  
The Other ◽  
Full Information ◽  
Autobiographical Memories ◽  
Memory Transfer ◽  
Study Participants ◽  
Diagnostic Criterion

Amnesia is a core diagnostic criterion for Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID), however previous research has indicated memory transfer. As DID has been conceptualised as being a disorder of distinct identities, in this experiment, behavioral tasks were used to assess the nature of amnesia for episodic 1) self-referential and 2) autobiographical memories across identities. Nineteen DID participants, 16 DID simulators, 21 partial information, and 20 full information comparison participants from the general population were recruited. In the first study, participants were presented with two vignettes (DID and simulator participants received one in each of two identities) and asked to imagine themselves in the situations outlined. The second study used a similar methodology but with tasks assessing autobiographical experience. Subjectively, all DID participants reported amnesia for events that occurred in the other identity. On free recall and recognition tasks they presented a memory profile of amnesia similar to simulators instructed to feign amnesia and partial information comparisons. Yet, on tests of recognition, DID participants recognized significantly more of the event that occurred in another identity than simulator and partial information comparisons. As such, results indicate that the DID performance profile was not accounted for by true or feigned amnesia, lending support to the idea that reported amnesia may be more of a perceived than actual memory impairment.

Why do these quite different best-choice problems have the same solutions?

2004 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 398-416 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen M. Samuels
Keyword(s):  
Poisson Process ◽  
Process Model ◽  
Partial Information ◽  
Stopping Rule ◽  
Good Explanation ◽  
Full Information ◽  
Choice Problem ◽  
Best Choice Problem ◽  
Current Observation ◽  
Information Problem

The full-information best-choice problem, as posed by Gilbert and Mosteller in 1966, asks us to find a stopping rule which maximizes the probability of selecting the largest of a sequence of n i.i.d. standard uniform random variables. Porosiński, in 1987, replaced a fixed n by a random N, uniform on {1,2,…,n} and independent of the observations. A partial-information problem, imbedded in a 1980 paper of Petruccelli, keeps n fixed but allows us to observe only the sequence of ranges (max - min), as well as whether or not the current observation is largest so far. Recently, Porosiński compared the solutions to his and Petruccelli's problems and found that the two problems have identical optimal rules as well as risks that are asymptotically equal. His discovery prompts the question: why? This paper gives a good explanation of the equivalence of the optimal rules. But even under the lens of a planar Poisson process model, it leaves the equivalence of the asymptotic risks as somewhat of a mystery. Meanwhile, two other problems have been shown to have the same limiting risks: the full-information problem with the (suboptimal) Porosiński-Petruccelli stopping rule, and the full-information ‘duration of holding the best’ problem of Ferguson, Hardwick and Tamaki, which turns out to be nothing but the Porosiński problem in disguise.

scholarly journals Transparency, asymmetric information and cooperation

2020 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 267-294
Author(s):  
Gianna Lotito ◽  
Matteo Migheli ◽  
Guido Ortona
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Behaviour ◽  
Partial Information ◽  
Relative Performance ◽  
The Other ◽  
Competitive Environment ◽  
Full Information ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Per Se

Abstract We inquire experimentally whether asymmetric information in competitive settings and competition per se influence individual social behaviour. Participants perform a task and are remunerated according to two schemes, a non-competitive and a competitive one, then they play a standard public goods game. In the first scheme participants earn a flat remuneration, in the other they are ranked according to their performance and remunerated accordingly. Information about ranking and income before the game is played varies across three different treatments. We find that competition per se does not affect the amount of contribution. The time spent to choose how much to contribute is negatively correlated with the decision of cooperating fully. The main result is that full information about the relative performance in the competitive environment enhances the cooperation, while partial information reduces it.

scholarly journals Optimal Two-Part Tariff Licensing in a Differentiated Mixed Duopoly

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 279-288
Author(s):  
Jing Wang ◽  
Fangbai Yang
Keyword(s):  
Partial Information ◽  
The Other ◽  
Mixed Duopoly ◽  
Full Information ◽  
Development Cost ◽  
Optimal Behavior ◽  
Equilibrium Strategies ◽  
Potential Competitor ◽  
Information Difference

Abstract This paper considers the two-part tariff licensing by an innovating firm to its potential competitor in a differentiated mixed duopoly, in which one firm sets a quantity and the other firm charges a price. Based on the development cost incurred by the rival, we derive the optimal behavior of the firms under full information case and partial information case respectively. Information difference on the equilibrium strategies is also investigated.

scholarly journals Deterrence Effects of Enforcement Schemes: An Experimental Study

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marina Agranov ◽  
Anastasia Buyalskaya
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Ethical Behavior ◽  
Partial Information ◽  
Full Information ◽  
Information Structures ◽  
Elicitation Method ◽  
Incentive Compatible ◽  
Private And Public ◽  
Undesirable Behavior

Private and public organizations are interested in finding effective ways to reduce crime and promote ethical behavior without investing heavy resources into monitoring and compliance. In this paper, we experimentally study how revealing different information about a fine distribution affects deterrence of an undesirable behavior. We use a novel incentive-compatible elicitation method to observe subjects lying (the undesirable behavior) and quantify the extent to which this behavior responds to information structures. We find that punishment schemes that communicate only partial information (the minimum fine in particular) are more effective than full information schemes at deterring lying. We explore the mechanism driving this result and link it to subjects’ beliefs about their own versus the average expected fine in treatments with partial information. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis.

scholarly journals Fair and Efficient Resource Allocation with Partial Information

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Halpern ◽  
Nisarg Shah
Keyword(s):  
Resource Allocation ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Partial Information ◽  
Fundamental Problem ◽  
Full Information ◽  
Indivisible Goods ◽  
Preference Information ◽  
Efficient Resource

We study the fundamental problem of allocating indivisible goods to agents with additive preferences. We consider eliciting from each agent only a ranking of her k most preferred goods instead of her full cardinal valuations. We characterize the amount of preference information that must be elicited in order to satisfy envy-freeness up to one good and approximate maximin share guarantee, two widely studied fairness notions. We also analyze the multiplicative loss in social welfare incurred due to the lack of full information with and without fairness requirements.

REGIME SWITCHING TERM STRUCTURE MODEL UNDER PARTIAL INFORMATION

2011 ◽  
Vol 14 (02) ◽  
pp. 265-294 ◽  
Author(s):  
HIDENORI FUTAMI
Keyword(s):  
Interest Rate ◽  
Term Structure ◽  
Regime Switching ◽  
Regime Shift ◽  
Partial Information ◽  
Market Price ◽  
Full Information ◽  
Bond Price ◽  
Term Structure Model ◽  
The Interest Rate

In this study, we attempt to calculate the term structure of the interest rate under partial information using a model in which the mean reversion level of the short rate changes in accordance with a regime shift in the economy. Under partial information, an investor observes the history of only the short rate and not a regime shift; hence, calculating the term structure of the interest rate is reduced to the problem of filtering the current regime from observable short rates. Therefore, we calculate it using the filtering theory that estimates a stochastic process from noisy observations, and investigate the effects of the regime shift under partial information on the market price of risk and the volatility of a bond price compared with those under full information, in which the regime is assumed to be observable. We find that, under partial information, the regime-shift risk converts into the diffusion risk. As a result, we find that both the market price of diffusion risk and the volatility of a bond price under partial information become stochastic, even though these under full information are constant.

Strong Innovation and its Applications to Information Diffusion Modelling in Finance

2002 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 383-402
Author(s):  
T. Toronjadze
Keyword(s):  
Stock Price ◽  
Information Diffusion ◽  
Utility Maximization ◽  
Partial Information ◽  
Innovation Process ◽  
Full Information ◽  
Diffusion Modelling ◽  
Price Process ◽  
The Mean ◽  
Mean Variance

Abstract We consider the mean-variance hedging and utility maximization problems under partial information for diffusion models of the stock price process. The special feature of this paper is that we construct a strong innovation process for the stock price process which allows us to reduce the partial information case to the full information one.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document