scholarly journals Two Remarks on Blackwell's Theorem

2008 ◽  
Vol 45 (02) ◽  
pp. 580-586 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ehud Lehrer ◽  
Eran Shmaya
Keyword(s):  
Decision Maker ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Decision Problem ◽  
Partial Information ◽  
The Other ◽  
Actual State ◽  
Information Structures ◽  
Comparison Of Experiments ◽  
Classical Characterization ◽  
Blackwell's Theorem

In a decision problem with uncertainty a decision maker receives partial information about the actual state via an information structure. After receiving a signal, he is allowed to withdraw and gets zero profit. We say that one structure is better than another when a withdrawal option exists if it may never happen that one structure guarantees a positive profit while the other structure guarantees only zero profit. This order between information structures is characterized in terms that are different from those used by Blackwell's comparison of experiments. We also treat the case of a malevolent nature that chooses a state in an adverse manner. It turns out that Blackwell's classical characterization also holds in this case.

scholarly journals Two Remarks on Blackwell's Theorem

2008 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 580-586 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ehud Lehrer ◽  
Eran Shmaya
Keyword(s):  
Decision Maker ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Decision Problem ◽  
Partial Information ◽  
The Other ◽  
Actual State ◽  
Information Structures ◽  
Comparison Of Experiments ◽  
Classical Characterization ◽  
Blackwell's Theorem

In a decision problem with uncertainty a decision maker receives partial information about the actual state via an information structure. After receiving a signal, he is allowed to withdraw and gets zero profit. We say that one structure is better than another when a withdrawal option exists if it may never happen that one structure guarantees a positive profit while the other structure guarantees only zero profit. This order between information structures is characterized in terms that are different from those used by Blackwell's comparison of experiments. We also treat the case of a malevolent nature that chooses a state in an adverse manner. It turns out that Blackwell's classical characterization also holds in this case.

Syntactic, semantic and information structures of floating quantifiers

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryo Otoguro ◽  
Liselotte Snijders
Keyword(s):  
Noun Phrase ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Phrase Structure ◽  
Noun Phrases ◽  
The Other ◽  
Information Structures ◽  
Recent Proposal ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Floating Quantifiers ◽  
The One

Quantifiers canonically attach to nouns or noun phrases as modifiers to specify the amount or number of the entity expressed by the noun. However, it has been observed that quantifiers can be positioned outside of the noun phrase. These so-called floating quantifiers (FQs) exhibit intriguing syntactic and semantic characteristics. On the one hand, they appear to have a closerelationship with a noun; semantically they quantify a noun in the same way as non-floating quantifiers, and quite often they exhibit agreement with the noun. On the other hand, their phrase structure distribution is very similar to that of VP-adverbs. In this paper, we argue that the distribution of FQs is constrained not purely by syntax, but also by information structure. We show that FQs play a focus role whereas modified nouns are reference-oriented topic expressions. Building upon Dalrymple and Nikolaeva’s (2011) recent proposal, we formulate the interaction between syntactic, semantic and information structure features of FQs within LFG’s projection architecture.

The Value of Information in the Hold-Up Problem

2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Pfeiffer
Keyword(s):  
Information System ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Value Of Information ◽  
The Other ◽  
Information Control ◽  
Ceteris Paribus ◽  
Head Office ◽  
Specific Investments ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Central Management

Abstract In the literature, the information structure of the hold-up problem is typically assumed to be exogenous. In this paper, we introduce an additional stage at which the head office may grant individual divisions access to an information system before they undertake their specific investments. Although more information ceteris paribus enhances each divisions’ profits, more information can reduce divisions’ investments and destroy synergies for the other division that would have been generated by the investments. If this negative effect dominates, then information can be harmful for the entire company. Hence, information control can be a subtle force to deal with the hold-up problem to a certain extent. In this paper we analyze those conditions under which information is either harmful or beneficial for central management.

Stability Analysis of Supply Chain Cooperation Contract under Asymmetric Information

2010 ◽  
Vol 44-47 ◽  
pp. 794-798 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xin Ma
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Transition Period ◽  
Information Economics ◽  
Real Life ◽  
The Other ◽  
Game Equilibrium ◽  
The Stability

The stability of cooperation contract is the result of abandon opportunistic behavior in the process of repeated games among the enterprise and the other subjects in the supply chain from long-term interests, and is also the foundation of healthy development for the whole supply chain. But in real life cooperation contract instability everywhere for a variety of reasons, such as ethical considerations, institutional factors, cultural factors and special reasons during the transition period and so on. From the perspective of information economics and game theory, the main game process of cooperation between enterprise and the other subjects in supply chain is not only the game of information, but also the game of interests. Information structure and the interesting structure are the important factors for the subjects of the game of the implementation of decisions and the basic contractual constraints for cooperative game equilibrium. Cooperation behaviors among the enterprise and the other subjects in the supply chain were studied on the basis of game theory, and the stability of cooperation contract is also being discussed in this paper.

THE DS/AHP METHOD UNDER PARTIAL INFORMATION ABOUT CRITERIA AND ALTERNATIVES BY SEVERAL LEVELS OF CRITERIA

2012 ◽  
Vol 11 (02) ◽  
pp. 307-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
LEV V. UTKIN ◽  
NATALIA V. SIMANOVA
Keyword(s):  
Linear Programming ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Decision Problem ◽  
Partial Information ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Ahp Method ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Finite Set ◽  
Linear Programming Problems ◽  
Decision Alternatives

An extension of the DS/AHP method is proposed in the paper. It takes into account the fact that the multi-criteria decision problem might have several levels of criteria. Moreover, it is assumed that expert judgments concerning the criteria are imprecise and incomplete. The proposed extension also uses groups of experts or decision makers for comparing decision alternatives and criteria. However, it does not require assigning favorability values for groups of decision alternatives and criteria. The computation procedure for processing and aggregating the incomplete information about criteria and decision alternatives is reduced to solving a finite set of linear programming problems. Numerical examples explain in detail and illustrate the proposed approach.

scholarly journals Resolving Time Inconsistency of Decision Problem with Non-expectation Operator: From Internal Conflict to Internal Harmony by Strategy of Self-Coordination

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiangyu Cui ◽  
Duan Li ◽  
Yun Shi
Keyword(s):  
Decision Maker ◽  
Decision Problem ◽  
Hyperbolic Discounting ◽  
Time Inconsistency ◽  
Internal Conflict ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Short Run ◽  
Time Inconsistent

When a stochastic decision problem is time inconsistent, the decision maker would be puzzled by his conflicting decisions optimally derived from his time-varying preferences at different time instants (with different time horizons). While the long-run self (LR) of the decision maker pursues the long-term optimality, the short-run selves (SRs) of the decision maker at different time instants bow to short-term temptations. While the literature began to recognize the importance to strike a balance between LR's and SRs' interests, the existing results are not applicable to situations where the decision maker's preferences involve non-expectation operators. We propose an operable unified two-tier dual-self game model with commitment by punishment, which can cope with general time inconsistent stochastic decision problems with both expectation and non-expectation operators in the objective function. By attaching punishment terms to both the preferences of LR and SRs which quantitatively evaluate the internal conflict among different selves, our game model aligns the interests of the LR and SRs to a certain degree. The equilibrium strategy, termed strategy of self-coordination, achieves some degree of internal harmony among various selves. We successfully apply the model to the investment and consumption problem with quasi-hyperbolic discounting and the dynamic mean-variance portfolio selection problem.

scholarly journals Inter-identity amnesia for neutral episodic self-referential and autobiographical memory in Dissociative Identity Disorder: An assessment of recall and recognition

PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. e0245849
Author(s):  
Rosemary J. Marsh ◽  
Martin J. Dorahy ◽  
Chandele Butler ◽  
Warwick Middleton ◽  
Peter J. de Jong ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Free Recall ◽  
Memory Impairment ◽  
Partial Information ◽  
Dissociative Identity Disorder ◽  
The Other ◽  
Full Information ◽  
Autobiographical Memories ◽  
Memory Transfer ◽  
Study Participants ◽  
Diagnostic Criterion

Amnesia is a core diagnostic criterion for Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID), however previous research has indicated memory transfer. As DID has been conceptualised as being a disorder of distinct identities, in this experiment, behavioral tasks were used to assess the nature of amnesia for episodic 1) self-referential and 2) autobiographical memories across identities. Nineteen DID participants, 16 DID simulators, 21 partial information, and 20 full information comparison participants from the general population were recruited. In the first study, participants were presented with two vignettes (DID and simulator participants received one in each of two identities) and asked to imagine themselves in the situations outlined. The second study used a similar methodology but with tasks assessing autobiographical experience. Subjectively, all DID participants reported amnesia for events that occurred in the other identity. On free recall and recognition tasks they presented a memory profile of amnesia similar to simulators instructed to feign amnesia and partial information comparisons. Yet, on tests of recognition, DID participants recognized significantly more of the event that occurred in another identity than simulator and partial information comparisons. As such, results indicate that the DID performance profile was not accounted for by true or feigned amnesia, lending support to the idea that reported amnesia may be more of a perceived than actual memory impairment.

Postnikov “Invariants” in 2004

2005 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-155
Author(s):  
Julio Rubio ◽  
Francis Sergeraert
Keyword(s):  
Decision Problem ◽  
The Other ◽  
Topological Spaces ◽  
Exact Nature ◽  
Other Hand

Abstract The very nature of the so-called Postnikov invariants is carefully studied. Two functors, precisely defined, explain the exact nature of the connection between the category of topological spaces and the category of Postnikov towers. On one hand, these functors are in particular effective and lead to concrete machine computations through the general machine program Kenzo. On the other hand, the Postnikov “invariants” will be actual invariants only when an arithmetical decision problem – currently open – will be solved; it is even possible this problem is undecidable.

The United States and Iran

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ray Takeyh
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
National Security ◽  
Decision Maker ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Other ◽  
Order Effects ◽  
Optimal Outcome ◽  
Third Order ◽  
National Interests ◽  
Taking Action

Implementing deterrent and compellent strategies are among the most critical tasks of the national security decision maker. However, as the case of U.S.-Iranian relations since 1979 demonstrates, deterring another state from taking action—especially if it considers those steps to be in its national interests—or compelling it to adopt policies in line with one’s own preferences but which represent a setback to the goals of the other state can be a difficult proposition. In addition, the Iran relationship demonstrates howthe use of deterrent and compellent instruments must be weighed against costs and other second- and third-order effects which may cause the policymaker to accept a less than optimal outcome in order to avoid greater complications in other areas.

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