How language does (and does not) relate to theory of mind: A longitudinal study of syntax, semantics, working memory and false belief

2005 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lance Slade ◽  
Ted Ruffman
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Changzhi Zhao ◽  
Siyuan Shang ◽  
Alison M. Compton ◽  
Genyue Fu ◽  
Liyang Sai

This study used longitudinal cross-lagged modeling to examine the contribution of theory of mind (ToM), executive function (EF) to children’s lying development and of children’s lying to ToM and EF development. Ninety-seven Chinese children (initial Mage = 46 months, 47 boys) were tested three times approximately 4 months apart. Results showed that the diverse desire understanding and knowledge access understanding components of ToM, as well as the inhibitory control component of EF predicted the development of children’s lying, while the diverse belief understanding and false belief understanding components of ToM, and the working memory component of EF did not predict development of children’s lying. Meanwhile, children’s lying predicted development of children’s belief-emotion understanding components of ToM, but not any other ToM components, or EF components. These findings provide longitudinal evidence for the relation between ToM, EF, and children’s lying during the preschool years.


2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annalisa Valle ◽  
Davide Massaro ◽  
Ilaria Castelli ◽  
Antonella Marchetti

This study explores the development of theory of mind, operationalized as recursive thinking ability, from adolescence to early adulthood (N= 110; young adolescents = 47; adolescents = 43; young adults = 20). The construct of theory of mind has been operationalized in two different ways: as the ability to recognize the correct mental state of a character, and as the ability to attribute the correct mental state in order to predict the character’s behaviour. The Imposing Memory Task, with five recursive thinking levels, and a third-order false-belief task with three recursive thinking levels (devised for this study) have been used. The relationship among working memory, executive functions, and linguistic skills are also analysed. Results show that subjects exhibit less understanding of elevated recursive thinking levels (third, fourth, and fifth) compared to the first and second levels. Working memory is correlated with total recursive thinking, whereas performance on the linguistic comprehension task is related to third level recursive thinking in both theory of mind tasks. An effect of age on third-order false-belief task performance was also found. A key finding of the present study is that the third-order false-belief task shows significant age differences in the application of recursive thinking that involves the prediction of others’ behaviour. In contrast, such an age effect is not observed in the Imposing Memory Task. These results may support the extension of the investigation of the third order false belief after childhood.


2011 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alicia Callejas ◽  
Gordon L. Shulman ◽  
Maurizio Corbetta

2021 ◽  
pp. 016502542199286
Author(s):  
Sunae Kim ◽  
Susanne Kristen-Antonow ◽  
Beate Sodian

The metarepresentational aspect of early pretend play (make-believe activities where children create or participate in creating a new situation different from a real one) has been theoretically debated. In the present longitudinal study of N = 83 children, we tested for predictive relations of shared attention at 12–18 months, implicit false belief (FB) at 18 months, and pretend production at 18 months, as well as comprehension at 24 months. We also tested for long-term predictive relations of pretense production and comprehension with theory of mind (ToM) at the age of 4–5 years. Only pretense production directed toward others (but not self) was specifically related to infancy measures of shared attention. Early pretense, either production or comprehension, was not related to implicit FB or later ToM measures. The findings are discussed in terms of different theoretical accounts of early pretense.


2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 500-510 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Putko ◽  
Agata Złotogórska

Abstract The main objective of this study was to examine whether children’s ability to justify their action predictions in terms of mental states is related, in a similar way as the ability to predict actions, to such aspects of executive function (EF) as executive control and working memory. An additional objective was to check whether the frequency of different types of justifications made by children in false-belief tasks is associated with aforementioned aspects of EF, as well as language. The study included 59 children aged 3-4 years. The ability to predict actions and to justify these predictions was measured with false-belief tasks. Luria’s hand-game was used to assess executive control, and the Counting and Labelling dual-task was used to assess working memory capacity. Language development was controlled using an embedded syntax test. It was found that executive control was a significant predictor of the children’s ability to justify their action predictions in terms of mental states, even when age and language were taken into account. Results also indicated a relationship between the type of justification in the false-belief task and language development. With the development of language children gradually cease to justify their action predictions in terms of current location, and they tend to construct irrelevant justifications before they begin to refer to beliefs. Data suggest that executive control, in contrast to language, is a factor which affects the development of the children’s ability to justify their action predictions only in its later phase, during a shift from irrelevant to correct justifications.


Author(s):  
Santiago Vernucci ◽  
Yesica Aydmune ◽  
María Laura Andrés ◽  
Débora Inés Burin ◽  
Lorena Canet‐Juric

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