Ought a Four-Dimensionalist To Believe in Temporal Parts?
2009 ◽
Vol 39
(4)
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pp. 619-646
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I borrow the title of this paper, slightly amended, from Parsons’ recent ‘Must a Four-Dimensionalist Believe in Temporal Parts?’ Four-dimensionalism, as I use the term, is the view that persisting objects have four dimensions: they are four-dimensional ‘worms’ in space-time. This view is contrasted with three-dimensionalism, the view that persisting objects have three-dimensions and are wholly present at each moment at which they exist. The most common version of four-dimensionalism is perdurantism, according to which these four-dimensional objects are segmented into temporal parts — shorter lived objects that compose the four-dimensional whole in just the same way that the segments of real earth worms compose the whole worm.
2002 ◽
Vol 50
◽
pp. 223-252
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Keyword(s):
2000 ◽
Vol 09
(06)
◽
pp. 669-686
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1924 ◽
Vol 22
(2)
◽
pp. 189-199
Keyword(s):
Keyword(s):
2016 ◽
Vol 31
(04n05)
◽
pp. 1650010