The King and the Crowd: Divine Right and Popular Sovereignty in the French Revolution

1996 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert G. Hamerton-Kelly
Author(s):  
Isaac Nakhimovsky

This chapter recounts how Fichte's theory of the state was profoundly shaped by his encounter with Rousseau, Sieyès, and Kant. Fichte developed a more radical version of the constitutional theory that had been advanced by Sieyès and Kant during the French Revolution, one that sought to improve upon Rousseau's description of constitutional government and to institutionalize his account of popular sovereignty. According to his many German admirers, it was Sieyès, and not his Jacobin opponents, who was the real inheritor of Rousseau, because the kind of egalitarian democracy demanded by Robespierre and others was unable to function as a government of laws in a modern European state. Fichte declared that he had produced the definitive statement of this Sieyèsian constitutionalism and claimed he had captured its true spirit by showing how it did not permanently exclude the possibility of far more egalitarian systems than those proposed by either Sieyès or Kant.


Author(s):  
Ruth Scurr

Though the French Revolution had a major impact on how people have talked about democracy ever since, the word was not initially central to revolutionary discourse, though it became more central when interest shifted from making government legitimate towards making it effective. When legitimacy was the key concern, popular sovereignty was a more important concept (though not one favoured by all revolutionary thinkers). Emphasis on will as the basis of legitimacy encouraged the view that the legislature was the most legitimate organ. ‘Democracy’ gained importance during the Terror, as discussion focussed on the challenge of making any form of authority in practice prevail over the people. Representation of the people and surveillance of government by the people were both mooted as solutions. In France (as elsewhere) democracy gained new negative associations in the course of the revolution, because democracy was experienced more as a problem than as a solution.


Author(s):  
Sanja Perovic

Freedom of expression and censorship are frequently cast in opposing but symmetrical terms. According to the conventional narrative, the right to free speech was acquired when first the American and then the French Revolution overthrew the repressive censorship apparatus of the ancien régime. However this account of increasing emancipation overlooks the important role played by the French Revolution in establishing a new definition of censorship that was both tolerant of free speech and repressive of political difference. This paper contends that precisely when political representation in the widest possible sense is at stake, freedom of speech cannot be reduced solely to a question of rights. It begins by revisiting the Directory period when the enlightened ideal of an unmediated public sphere openly clashed for the first time with the opposing ideal of an ‘unmediated’ or ‘popular’ sovereignty promoted by the radical press. It then focuses on the Conspiracy of Equals to show how the presumed neutrality of the liberal press was forged by repressing competing understandings of the right to free speech. Rather than assume that revolutionary propaganda is the ‘other’ of liberalism, this paper demonstrates the joint origins of both liberal and revolutionary understandings of free speech in the new censorship laws that attempted to separate the message from the medium of revolution.


1986 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jay Drydyk

It probably comes as a surprise to no one that Hegel's political philosophy is difficult to interpret. But his political thought clearly poses problems which the rest of his work does not (especially), and these problems arise from apparent political ambivalence on his part towards the French Revolution, towards monarchy, towards the doctrine of popular sovereignty, towards public opinion and press freedom - well, there is scarcely a reader of Hegel who could not add some additional topic to this already lengthy list. For instance, Hegel sometimes noted how crucial it is for a state to be decisive; every state needs a reservoir of decisiveness, supplied preferably by a monarch, who ‘has become the personality of the state,’ who ‘cuts short the weighing of the pros and cons between which it lets itself oscillate perpetually now this way and now that, and by saying “I will” make its decision and so inaugurates all activity and actuality.’


Author(s):  
Sefton D. Temkin

This chapter explores the childhood of Isaac Mayer Wise (1819–1900) and the political climate in which he had grown up. He was born in Steingrub, Bohemia in 1890. Of the first twenty-seven years of the man who said that he became a naturalized American amid these surroundings, very little is known, save that he was born into a fettered society; and its chains were heavier because they had been reimposed after a period of near freedom. The French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars had spread throughout Europe the aspiration for popular sovereignty and the rights of nationalities: the Congress of Vienna gave scant recognition to the new forces and set about restoring the ancien régime. The genius of those who set themselves to thwart the allied forces of liberalism and nationalism was Clemens von Metternich, Austrian Foreign Minister from 1809 till 1848. It was in the Austrian Empire where Wise lived that, despite Metternich’s awareness of the need for reform, his system operated to the worst effect.


2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucia Rubinelli

Historians and political theorists have long been interested in how the principle of people’s power was conceptualised during the French Revolution. Traditionally, two diverging accounts emerge, one of national and the other of popular sovereignty, the former associated with moderate monarchist deputies, including the Abbé Sieyes, and the latter with the Jacobins. This paper argues against this binary interpretation of the political thought of the French Revolution, in favour of a third account of people’s power, Sieyes’ idea of pouvoir constituant. Traditionally, constituent power has been viewed as a variation of sovereignty, but I show it to be an independent conceptualisation of people’s power. Sieyes’ political theory led him to criticise and refuse contemporary theories of sovereignty in favour of what he understood as a fully modern account of people’s power. Based on extensive research in the archives, I show how Sieyes opposed the deployment of sovereignty by the revolutionary Assemblies and recommended replacing it with the idea of constituent power.


1990 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Knee

AbstractThis article seeks to contribute to the debate on the ethical and political meaning of the French Enlightenment, more specifically concerning the religious implications of the idea of popular sovereignty as it is put in place at the time of the French Revolution. The study of the social status of religion in two thoughts elaborated before and after the Revolution shows the clear opposition between Rousseau's “civil religion” with its perspective of a moral regeneration of man, and Tocqueville's “democratic religion” with its liberal perspective. But it also reveals the ambivalence they share in their attempt to think through the problem of the “common soul” of a society where legitimacy rests only on its self-institution.


Author(s):  
Christopher Hobson

This chapter considers the monumental French Revolution, when fundamental changes in the nature of international politics intersected with the modern appearance of democracy as a political force. The chapter examines in depth the way the concept of democracy was used and contested during the revolution, and how two conceptions of popular sovereignty emerged. These developments directly challenged an international society composed of monarchs, and ultimately manifested themselves in the revolutionary wars. Revolutionary changes within France are considered in reference to the international context of ancient regime Europe, arguing that France became both ‘behaviourally’ and ‘ontologically’ dangerous to the existing order.


Author(s):  
Angélica Maria Bernal

This chapter locates a vision of democratic self-constitution beyond origins within Thomas Jefferson’s concept of a regenerative founding. It traces this alternate conception of founding to Jefferson’s writings while minister of France on the eve of the French Revolution, particularly those surrounding his 1789 letter to James Madison. It reevaluates the letter’s central question—“Whether one generation of men has a right to bind another”—and Jefferson’s answer: “that the earth belongs in usufruct to the living.” Constitutional scholarship has traditionally turned to this letter to find in it a critique of constitutionalism and an invitation to ongoing revolution. This chapter makes the case for a third interpretation that turns our attention to issues of originary authority, revolutionary founding, popular sovereignty, and constituent power, and argues that Jefferson provides a compelling argument against singularly binding origins and for ongoing constituent change within constitutional democracies.


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