Scottish Common Sense in Germany, 1768-1800. A Contribution to the History of Critical Philosophy (review)

1989 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 486-488
Author(s):  
Rudolf Malter
Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
László Kocsis ◽  
Adam Tamas Tuboly

AbstractOur main goal in this paper is to present and scrutinize Reichenbach’s own naturalism in our contemporary context, with special attention to competing versions of the concept. By exploring the idea of Reichenbach’s naturalism, we will argue that he defended a liberating, therapeutic form of naturalism, meaning that he took scientific philosophy (or philosophy of nature, Naturphilosophie) to be a possible cure for bad old habits and traditional ways of philosophy. For Reichenbach, naturalistic scientific philosophy was a well-established form of liberation. We do not intend to suggest that Reichenbach acted as an inventor of naturalism; nonetheless, invoking the term and the idea of ‘naturalism’ is more than a simple rhetorical strategy for rehabilitating Reichenbach as a forerunner of this field. We think that his ideas can make a valuable contribution to contemporary debates, and that he presents an interesting case among the other scientifically oriented proponents of his time. After presenting a short reconstruction of the meaning of naturalism—or, more appropriately, naturalisms—in order to be able to correctly situate Reichenbach within his own as well as a systematic context, we discuss Reichenbach’s naturalism against the background of his scientific philosophy, his views on the relation of common-sense knowledge to science, and his efforts at popularization. To delve deeper into this topic, we present a case study to show how Reichenbach argued that in both scientific and philosophical discussions (assuming their naturalistic continuity), it is necessary to move from the request and value of truth to probability. And, finally, we argue that the liberation of knowledge and nature was a socio-political program for Reichenbach, who talked about his own scientific philosophy as “a crusade.” By emphasizing this aspect of Reichenbach’s naturalism, we may be in a better position to situate him in the history of analytic philosophy in general, and in the yet-to-be-written narrative of the naturalistic movement in particular.


2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Silvia Santos ◽  
Maria Hurtado-Ortiz ◽  
Laurenne Lewis ◽  
Julia Ramirez-Garcia

This study examined the validity of the Implicit Model of Illness Questionnaire (IMIQ - Schiaffino & Cea, 1995) when used with Latino college students (n = 156; 34% male, 66% female) who are at-risk for developing diabetes due to family history of this disease. An exploratory principal-axis factor analysis yielded four significant factors – curability, personal responsibility, symptom variability/seriousness, and personal attributions – which accounted for 35% of variance and reflected a psychosocial-biomedical common sense perspective of diabetes. Factor-based analyses revealed differences in diabetes illness beliefs based on students’ age, generational status, acculturation orientation, and disease experience of the afflicted relative.


1984 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-39
Author(s):  
Roger D. Spegele

The history of recent efforts to establish a science of international politics may be usefully viewed as elaborate glosses on David Hume's powerful philosophical programme for resolving, reconciling or dissolving a variety of perspicuous dualities: the external and the internal, mind and body, reason and experience. Philosophers and historians of ideas still dispute the extent to which Hume succeeded but if one is to judge by the two leading ‘scientific’ research programmes1 for international politics—inductivism and naive falsificationism —these dualities are as unresolved as ever, with fatal consequences for the thesis of the unity of the sciences. For the failure to reconcile or otherwise dissolve such divisions shows that, on the Humean view, there is at least one difference between the physical (or natural) sciences. and the moral (or social) sciences: namely, that while the latter bear on the internal and external, the former are concerned primarily with the external. How much this difference matters and how the issue is avoided by the proponents of inductivism and naïve falsification is the subject matter of this paper.


2001 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-217
Author(s):  
David Sidorsky

The search for moral objectivity has been constant throughout the history of philosophy, although interpretations of the nature and scope of objectivity have varied. One aim of the pursuit of moral objectivity has been the demonstration of what may be termed its epistemological thesis, that is, the claim that the truth of assertions of the goodness or rightness of moral acts is as legitimate, reliable, or valid as the truth of assertions involving other forms of human knowledge, such as common sense, practical expertise, science, or mathematics. Another aim of the quest for moral objectivity may be termed its pragmatic formulation; this refers to the development of a method or procedure that will mediate among conflicting moral views in order to realize a convergence or justified agreement about warranted or true moral conclusions. In the ethical theories of Aristotle, David Hume, and John Dewey, theories that represent three of the four variants of ethical naturalism (defined below) that are surveyed in this essay, the epistemological thesis and the pragmatic formulation are integrated or combined. The distinction between these two elements is significant for the present essay, however, since I want to show that linguistic naturalism, the fourth variant I shall examine, has provided a demonstration of the epistemological thesis about moral knowledge, even if the pragmatic formulation has not been successfully realized.


Author(s):  
Roger T. Ames

Perhaps the most important international relationship in the twenty-first century is that between America and China. Given the often delicate and sometimes underproductive history of the relationship between America and China broadly, this chapter argues that American pragmatism might serve as a vocabulary to promote a positive dialogue between these cultures at a moment in history when such a conversation is imperative. These commonalities provide a language introducing Confucian philosophy to the Western academy and also an external perspective from which to examine the presuppositions of our own worldview and common sense. The chapter compares the central Confucian notion of relationally constituted persons (ren 仁)— or human “becomings”—with Dewey’s technical term, “individuality.” It explores the centrality of moral imagination in Confucian role ethics and in Deweyan ethics and also concludes that these two traditions share the idea of a human-centered religiousness.


2005 ◽  
Vol 77 (4) ◽  
pp. 291-307
Author(s):  
Ernest C. Lucas

A discussion of the history of interpretation of three passages in Daniel (3:17; 2:31-45; 9:24-27) is used as the basis for some initial reflections on how it is possible to accept a ‘hermeneutic of unfolding’ which involves the participation of the reader while maintaining that a text has an inherent meaning. It is suggested that a distinction can be made between this ‘meaning’ and the differing ‘significances’ that a text may have for particular readers. Michael Polanyi’s ‘post-critical’ philosophy of knowledge, which involves the personal participation of the knower in the act of understanding, is outlined briefly. It is argued that his concepts of ‘tacit knowledge’, ‘indwelling’ and ‘imaginative sympathy’, and the roles they play in gaining knowledge, provide support for the approach to a hermeneutic of unfolding proposed earlier in the paper.


Author(s):  
Dorothea E. Olkowski

Although grounded in the history of philosophy, Gilles Deleuze’s work does not begin with first principles but grasps the philosophical terrain in the middle. This method overthrows subject–object relations in order to initiate a philosophy of difference and chance that is not derived from static conceptions of being. It is a philosophy of the event, a state where sense arises independently of lived experience or scientific fact. The event is a sign without a signifier-signified relationship; a form of content that consists of a complex of forces that are not separable from their form of expression; an assemblage or body without organs, not the organized ego; time, intensity and duration instead of space; in short, a world in constant motion consisting of becomings and encounters that common sense concepts do not grasp. This radical philosophical project is rendered most clearly in Deleuze (and his collaborator Guattari’s concept of the ‘rhizome’). The rhizome is a multiplicity of connections without the unity that could pinpoint or identify a subject or an object. Any point of the rhizome can and must be connected to any other, though in no fixed order and without homogeneity. It can break or rupture at any point, yet old connections will start up again or new connections will be made; the rhizome’s connections thus have the character of a map, not a structural or generative formation. The rhizome, then, is not a model, but consists of lines of escape from from rooted, tree-like structures that open up the route for encounters and makes philosophy into cartography, that is, the mapping of concepts.


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