scholarly journals Self-partner inclusion predicts performance of romantically involved individuals in a body-scaled action-anticipation task

PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. e0251425
Author(s):  
Cédric A. Bouquet ◽  
Melissa Lafleur ◽  
Virginie Quintard ◽  
Stéphane Jouffre ◽  
Yannick Wamain ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Romantic Love ◽  
Two Dimensions ◽  
Romantic Partner ◽  
The Self ◽  
Integration Process ◽  
Passionate Love ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Cognitive States ◽  
Pass Through ◽  
Third Person Perspective

Previous research has shown that romantic relationships can lead to the cognitive inclusion of a romantic partner into one’s own self-representation, resulting in blurred boundaries between self and intimate other. Recent work suggests that this self-other integration process encompasses the two dimensions of the self–the conceptual and the bodily self. In line with this, it has been proposed that romantic love is associated with cognitive states that blur or reduce the saliency of self-boundaries in the bodily domain. The present study tested this hypothesis by investigating the influence of the self-other integration process in romantic love on passability judgments of door-like apertures, an action-anticipation task that rests on the representation of bodily boundaries. Romantically involved and single participants estimated whether they could pass through apertures of different widths. Moreover, inclusion of romantic partner in the self was assessed using the Inclusion of Other in the Self (IOS) scale. The pattern of correlation and the ratio between participants’ shoulder width and aperture judgments did not differ between romantically involved participants and singles. However, our results revealed that in romantically involved participants, the relationship between individuals’ shoulder width and aperture judgements was moderated by IOS scores. A greater inclusion of romantic partner in the self was associated with a weaker prediction of aperture judgment by participants’ shoulder width. A similar moderating effect of the intensity of romantic feelings (as measured by the passionate love scale) on shoulder width-aperture judgment relationship was found. IOS scores, but not romantic feelings, also moderated aperture judgments made for another individual (third person perspective). Together, these findings are consistent with the view that inclusion of romantic partner in the self triggers cognitive states affecting self-boundaries in the bodily domain.

Distinct Regions of the Medial Prefrontal Cortex Are Associated with Self-referential Processing and Perspective Taking

2007 ◽  
Vol 19 (6) ◽  
pp. 935-944 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arnaud D'Argembeau ◽  
Perrine Ruby ◽  
Fabienne Collette ◽  
Christian Degueldre ◽  
Evelyne Balteau ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Prefrontal Cortex ◽  
Medial Prefrontal Cortex ◽  
Perspective Taking ◽  
Imaging Study ◽  
Two Dimensions ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Referential Processing ◽  
Third Person Perspective

The medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) appears to play a prominent role in two fundamental aspects of social cognition, that is, self-referential processing and perspective taking. However, it is currently unclear whether the same or different regions of the MPFC mediate these two interdependent processes. This functional magnetic resonance imaging study sought to clarify the issue by manipulating both dimensions in a factorial design. Participants judged the extent to which trait adjectives described their own personality (e.g., “Are you sociable?”) or the personality of a close friend (e.g., “Is Caroline sociable?”) and were also asked to put themselves in the place of their friend (i.e., to take a third-person perspective) and estimate how this person would judge the adjectives, with the target of the judgments again being either the self (e.g., “According to Caroline, are you sociable?”) or the other person (e.g., “According to Caroline, is she sociable?”). We found that self-referential processing (i.e., judgments targeting the self vs. the other person) yielded activation in the ventral and dorsal anterior MPFC, whereas perspective taking (i.e., adopting the other person's perspective, rather than one's own, when making judgments) resulted in activation in the posterior dorsal MPFC; the interaction between the two dimensions yielded activation in the left dorsal MPFC. These findings show that self-referential processing and perspective taking recruit distinct regions of the MPFC and suggest that the left dorsal MPFC may be involved in decoupling one's own from other people's perspectives on the self.

scholarly journals MASCULINITY AS AN IDENTITY AND AS A CLUSTER OF TRAITS

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-158
Author(s):  
Renata Zieminska
Keyword(s):  
Gender Identity ◽  
Social Norms ◽  
Male Gender ◽  
The Self ◽  
Simple Idea ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Binary Model ◽  
Third Person ◽  
First Person Perspective ◽  
Third Person Perspective

The paper presents the concept of masculinity within the non-binary and multilayered model of gender/sex traits. Within that model, masculinity is not a simple idea, but rather is fragmented into many traits in diverse clusters. The experience of transgender men and men with intersex traits suggests that self-determined male gender identity is a mega trait that is sufficient for being a man. However, masculinity is not only psychological, as the content of the psychological feeling of being a man refers to social norms about how men should be and behave. And male coded traits are described as traits that frequently occur within the group of people identifying as men. Therefore, I claim that there are two interdependent ideas in the concept of masculinity: the self-determined male gender identity (first-person perspective) and a cluster of traits coded as male (third-person perspective). Within non-binary model the interplay between the two interdependent ideas allows to include borderline masculinities.

Neural Representations of Self versus Other: Visual-Spatial Perspective Taking and Agency in a Virtual Ball-tossing Game

2006 ◽  
Vol 18 (6) ◽  
pp. 898-910 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicole David ◽  
Bettina H. Bewernick ◽  
Michael X. Cohen ◽  
Albert Newen ◽  
Silke Lux ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Perspective Taking ◽  
Neural Substrates ◽  
The Self ◽  
Neural Basis ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Visual Spatial ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Posterior Parietal ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
Spatial Perspective Taking

Human self-consciousness relies on the ability to distinguish between oneself and others. We sought to explore the neural correlates involved in self-other representations by investigating two critical processes: perspective taking and agency. Although recent research has shed light on the neural processes underlying these phenomena, little is known about how they overlap or interact at the neural level. In a two-factorial functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiment, participants played a ball-tossing game with two virtual characters (“avatars”). During an active/agency (ACT) task, subjects threw a ball to one of the avatars by pressing a button. During a passive/nonagency (PAS) task, they indicated which of the other avatars threw the ball. Both tasks were performed from a first-person perspective (1PP), in which subjects interacted from their own perspective, and a third-person perspective (3PP), in which subjects interacted from the perspective of an avatar with another location in space. fMRI analyses revealed overlapping activity in medial prefrontal regions associated with representations of one's own perspective and actions (1PP and ACT), and overlapping activity in temporal-occipital, premotor, and inferior frontal, as well as posterior parietal regions associated with representation of others' perspectives and actions (3PP and PAS). These findings provide evidence for distinct neural substrates underlying representations of the self and others and provide support for the idea that the medial prefrontal cortex crucially contributes to a neural basis of the self. The lack of a statistically significant interaction suggests that perspective taking and agency represent independent constituents of self-consciousness.

Exploring the Behavioral, Experiential, and Conceptual Dimensions of the Self

2016 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 180-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulrich Weger ◽  
Andreas Meyer ◽  
Johannes Wagemann
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
First Person ◽  
The Core ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Behavioral Expression ◽  
Geometrical Shapes ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Current Article ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
Level Of Experience

Abstract. The self has become a prominent field of research in psychology but despite its eminent first-person character, it is typically studied from a third-person perspective. Such a third-person approach is well suited to enquire into the behavioral expression of the sense of selfhood but it does not capture the core experience – the so-called qualia nature – of the self. In the current article we illuminate the challenges that a predominant third-person approach poses to an understanding of the self. We outline two levels of analysis that can complement and enrich a third-person, behavior-focused view, namely the level of experience and the level of conceptual insight. Both these additional levels are accessible via a first-person mode of enquiry and can reveal a degree of richness about the self that reaches beyond a third-person approach. We here provide a methodological justification for such a qualitative mode of enquiry, as well as a synopsis of findings from our own first-person research which involved introspective reports of the authors’ experiences during meditation on geometrical shapes, words, and short phrases.

The Self-Awareness of the Mind: Phenomenal World and the Mind Beyond

Diogenes ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 16-25
Author(s):  
Ja-Kyoung Han
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Phenomenal World ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
The World ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Third Person ◽  
Conceptual Language

What we regard as real are the objects of the phenomenal world which we perceive. We regard those that we see objectively, as in the third person perspective, as real. What then is the mind that perceives the world? Is it possible for us to realize the very mind that perceives the world? This article discusses the existence of the world perceived by the mind in order to deal with the existence of the mind which perceives the world and the knowability of the mind. Phenomenal world is a perceptual world which is a fictitious world constructed by our conceptual language system. And the base of the fictitious phenomenal world, the object itself, is emptiness. The emptiness is the emptiness of the mind that perceives and constructs the world. Thus, the awareness of the emptiness of the world is the self-awareness of the mind. Since the emptiness of my mind is the same emptiness of all other beings, the mind is the capacity to sympathize with the whole world, the universal mind, One-mind. Every man is aware of oneself as One-mind. “Gong-juk-young-ji” or the “original enlightenment” of Buddhism is the self-awareness of the mind as emptiness.

The Pathogenic and Therapeutic Potential of the Gaze of the Other in the Clinic of “Eating Disorders”

2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 291-297
Author(s):  
Cecilia Maria Esposito ◽  
Giovanni Stanghellini
Keyword(s):  
Eating Disorders ◽  
Therapeutic Potential ◽  
The Self ◽  
Self Control ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Gaze ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
Embodied Self ◽  
Body Subject

Building on the optical-coenaesthetic disproportion model of so-called eating disorders, this paper provides a framework for the psychotherapy of people affected by these conditions. This model characterizes “eating disorders” as disorders of embodiment and identity, where a sense of unfamiliarity with one’s own flesh, experienced as shifting and incomprehensible, leads to an impairment in the constitution of the Self and thus of one’s own identity. Since there is a deficit of the coenaesthetic experience of the embodied Self, greater importance is assumed by body perception conveyed from without. To these persons, their corporeality is principally given as a body-object “to be seen” from a third-person perspective, rather than as a body-subject “to be felt” from a first-person perspective. The Other’s look serves as an optical prosthesis to cope with dis-coenaesthesia and as a device through which these persons can define themselves. They are unable to accept the hiatus between “being a body” and “having a body,” constitutively present in every human being, forcibly trying to recouple it, and finally ending up objectifying themselves to succeed. The external foundation of the Self thus takes the form of a constriction one can never be completely free of. Psychotherapy should thus accompany persons affected by eating disorders in their encounter with the miscarried dialectic between feeling oneself from within and seeing oneself from without through the gaze of the Other, so keenly feared by people desperately in search of self-control. Tactfully, the clinician accompanies the patient in taking a stance towards her symptom as the outcome of this miscarried dialectics, which is one premise for overcoming it. The clinician’s gaze becomes the herald of recognition, allowing the patient to feel accepted in terms of her individuality. Feeling themselves touched by a gaze that waives its alienating potential in order to signify acceptance reactivates the identity-forming dialectics. Their body is thus revealed as the receiver of gazes, but also rediscovers its own possibility for self-determination starting out from these gazes. This intersubjective resonance between the clinician’s gaze and the patient reactivates the identity-making dialectics between body-subject and body-object, creating the relational premises for overcoming the symptom.

scholarly journals The Seven Selves of Dementia

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iris Bomilcar ◽  
Elodie Bertrand ◽  
Robin G. Morris ◽  
Daniel C. Mograbi
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Self Identity ◽  
Making Sense ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
External Objects ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Psychosocial Influences ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
Embodied Self

The self is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, encompassing a variety of cognitive processes and psychosocial influences. Considering this, there is a multiplicity of “selves,” the current review suggesting that seven fundamental self-processes can be identified that further our understanding of the experience of dementia. These include (1) an embodied self, manifest as corporeal awareness; (2) an agentic self, related to being an agent and influencing life circumstances; (3) an implicit self, linked to non-conscious self-processing; (4) a critical self, which defines the core of self-identity; (5) a surrogate self, based on third-person perspective information; (6) an extended self, including external objects or existences that are incorporated into the self; and, finally, (7) an emergent self, a property of the self-processes that give rise to the sense of a unified self. These are discussed in relation to self-awareness and their use in making sense of the experience of dementia.

Causal determinism and a totally global fatalism from the third-person perspective

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoyang Yu
Keyword(s):  
Human Brain ◽  
Human Language ◽  
Causal Determinism ◽  
The Third ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Neural Substrate ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
Physical Laws ◽  
The Third Person

The human brain and the human language are precisely constructed together by evolution/genes, so that in the objective world, a human brain can tell a story to another brain in human language which describes an imagined multiplayer game; in this story, one player of the game represents the human brain itself. It’s possible that the human kind doesn’t really have a subjective world (doesn’t really have conscious experience). An individual has no control even over her choices. Her choices are controlled by the neural substrate. The neural substrate is controlled by the physical laws. So, her choices are controlled by the physical laws. So, she is powerless to do anything other than what she actually does. This is the view of fatalism. Specifically, this is the view of a totally global fatalism, where people have no control even over their choices, from the third-person perspective. And I just argued for fatalism by appeal to causal determinism. Psychologically, a third-person perspective and a new, dedicated personality state are required to bear the totally global fatalism, to avoid severe cognitive dissonance with our default first-person perspective and our original personality state.

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