Practicing Feminism in South Korea: The Women’s Movement against Sexual Violence

Asian Women ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Heike Hermanns
Social Change ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 199-214
Author(s):  
Uma Chakravarti

In this article, I will examine the arc of violence that women in India have been historically subjected to, as well as new arenas in which violence is now manifesting itself. The focus is on four arenas in which violence against women, especially sexual violence, needs to be located as each of these have specific features that are associated with the manner in which impunity operates, thereby invisibilising violence, and the long road traversed by the women’s movement in challenging that violence. The four arenas are: first, the home where violence is enacted in the intimate sphere of the family; second, the streets and fields where caste and class power provide impunity to the perpetrators; third, villages and regions where communal and targetted violence have been enacted, often with administrative and state complicity, especially in recent decades; and fourth, the borderlands where impunity is sought to be derived from special laws that the security state has put into operation to control turbulent populations.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Ki-young Shin

The #MeToo movement has shaken Korea over the last two years (Hasunuma and Shin 2019). Prosecutor Seo Ji-hyun's public testimony in January 2018 charged a former Ministry of Justice official with sexual harassment and catalyzed the #MeToo movement. Hundreds of Korean women came forward and spoke up about being sexually abused by powerful men. Social media platforms were flooded with hashtags such as #WithYou to support the movement and to express solidarity with victims of sexual violence. Women have taken to the streets for months demanding government action to prevent and punish sexual violence.


2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 860-877
Author(s):  
Kalika Mehta ◽  
Avantika Tiwari

AbstractThe aftermath of protests triggered by a brutal gang-rape in New Delhi in December 2012 was archetypal of the broader women’s movement in post-independence India. The primary demands of the social movement to address sexual violence against women were wrapped in the language of rights-based reforms in criminal law provisions. The state responded to the social mobilization in the form of criminal law amendments, while blindsiding key recommendations from feminist groups. This Article revisits pertinent Law Commission reports, subsequent criminal law reforms, and case law on sexual violence against women to analyze how the negotiations between the women’s movement and the State on the seemingly irreconcilable demands of sexual autonomy and punishment for sexual violence. We take account of the intended and unintended consequences of this reliance on criminal law as one of the primary tools in the arsenal of Indian women’s movements. We argue that engagement on the plane of criminal law to address sexual violence against women is a case of limited imagination at best and counter-productive at its worst. This approach of the movement and feminist groups is to react to the “crime” of sexual violence after the fact, leading to distraction from much warranted structural responses. We argue that this approach makes it harder to conceptualize and implement more forward-looking relational models of responsibility that are necessary to address the structural injustice of systemic sexual violence against women.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Hun Young Lee

<p>It is argued in existing Korean criminological literature that penal populism has strongly influenced the criminal justice system over the last two decades in South Korea (‘SK’, hereafter). Their contention is based on the evidence of punitive penal policies formulated around sex offences against children since the 2000s. These policies include increased minimum sentencing for sex offenders, increased maximum terms of imprisonment, sex offender registration and community notification, electronic monitoring, and chemical castration.  However, imprisonment rates in SK, one of the main indicators of punitiveness in other countries, rapidly decreased in the 2000s and have since then been stable. Moreover, the imprisonment rates in this country are significantly lower than those of other societies where penal populism has occurred, including the US, England, and New Zealand. Why, then, do criminologists in SK argue that penal populism has flourished in SK at a time when imprisonment rates are not sufficiently high to invoke punitiveness, let alone the downward (and stabilising) trend of imprisonment rates?  The purpose of this thesis is to explain the punitive penal developments in SK since the 2000s, by drawing upon Pratt’s (2007) penal populism theory. Firstly, the contention in Korean criminology that penal populism has strongly operated and impacted the penal landscape in SK is empirically demonstrated. This demonstration is based on analyses of newspaper articles, social media, legislative bills, and minutes of the National Assembly with regard to sexual violence against children.  This is followed by an explanation of the specific form of penal populism in SK, which is focused exclusively around sexual violence against children. The explanation draws on a social analysis of why and how the sensibilities of South Koreans toward children and the safety of children have changed over recent decades. The main argument here is that the socio-cultural value of children created under the tradition of Confucian familialism in SK has significantly increased through immense social, economic, and structural changes. These changes were brought about by a compressed process of industrialisation, which began as early as the 1960s, and the transition to late-modern society from the 1990s onwards.  Lastly, this thesis seeks to explain the apparent contradiction between penal populism and the rapid decrease of the imprisonment rate in the 2000s in SK. I argue here that the rapid decrease of the imprisonment rate at that time was primarily caused by the changed patterns of pardon, parole, and remand within the context of the criminal justice reforms driven by the two progressive governments between 1998 and 2007. In addition, during the CJS reforms, ‘independence of the judiciary’ was upheld as the most important value, which regulated institutional arrangements in regard to sentencing in particular. Within these arrangements, the judiciary has been able to resist the impact of penal populism, which also contributed to the decrease of the imprisonment rate in the 2000s in this country.</p>


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