scholarly journals The Problem of Freedom as Selbstbildung in the Debate between Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger

Eidos ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 201-230
Author(s):  
Pablo Facundo Ríos Flores
Author(s):  
Julio Quesada

Mi ensayo ha querido explicar genealógicamente y de forma contextualizada el desencuentro entre Ernst Cassirer y Martin Heidegger en Davos, y la deriva de éste hacia el nazismo desde los presupuestos de su filosofía existencial. ¿Qué papel juega el antisemitismo espiritual en la crítica heideggeriana al neokantismo y la fenomenología trascendental? ¿Por qué la fenomenología de Edmund Husserl es "una monstruosidad"? ¿Por qué Kant se convierte en batalla y campo de batalla de la Kulturkampf? ¿Por qué se lee a Heidegger como se lee? ¿Qué sentido tiene la práctica de la historia de la filosofía en el “final” de la filosofía?My essay wanted to explain genealogically and in a contextualized way the disagreement between Cassirer and Heidegger in Davos, and its drift towards Nazism from the budgets of their existential philosophy. What role does spiritual anti-Semitism play in the Heideggerian critique of neo-Kantianism and transcendental phenomenology? Why is Husserl's phenomenology "a monstrosity"? Why does Kant become the battle and battlefield of the Kulturkampf? Why do you read Heidegger as you read? What is the meaning of the practice of the history of philosophy in the “final” of philosophy?


Author(s):  
Baylee Brits

Mathesis universalis is perhaps the ultimate formal system. The fact that the concept ties together truth, possibility, and formalism marks it as one of the most important concepts in Western modernity. “Mathesis” is Greek (μάθησις) for “learning” or “science.” The term is sometimes used to simply mean “mathematics”; the planet Mathesis, for instance, is named after the discipline of mathematics. It is philosophically significant when rendered as “mathesis universalis,” combining a Latinized version of the Greek μάθησις (learning) with the Latin universalis (universal). The most significant modern philosophers to develop the term were René Descartes (1596–1650) and Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716), who used it to name a formal system that could support a project of scientia generalis (Descartes) or the ars combinatoria (Leibniz). In each case, mathesis universalis is a universal method. In this sense it does not constitute the content of the sciences but provides the formal system that undergirds no less than the acquisition and veracity of knowledge itself. Although mathesis universalis is only rarely mentioned in the literature of Descartes and Leibniz, philosophers including Edmund Husserl, Ernst Cassirer, and Martin Heidegger considered it one of the key traits of modernity, breaking with the era of substance (Rabouin) or resemblance (Foucault) to signal a new period defined by formalism and quantification. Thus, in the 20th century, the scant and often contradictory literature on mathesis actually produced by the great philosophers of the Enlightenment comes to take on an importance that far exceeds the term’s original level of systematic elaboration. The term mathesis universalis was rarely used by either Descartes or Leibniz, and the latter used many different terms to refer to the same concept. The complexity and subtlety of the term, combined with difficulties in establishing a rigorous systematic interpretation, has meant that mathesis universalis is often used vaguely or to encompass all scientific method. It is a difficult concept to account for, because although many philosophers and literary theorists will casually refer to it, often in its abbreviated form (Lacan references mathesis in opposition to poesis to contrast the procedures of the sciences and the arts, for instance), there is not a great deal of consistent theoretical elaboration of the term in literary and cultural theory. Although mathesis universalis is not simply an avatar of mathematics, it is difficult to establish exactly where maths ends and mathesis begins, so to speak. The distinction is murky in both Descartes’s and Leibniz’s work, and this ambiguity would become a key controversy surrounding the term in the 20th century, with Bertrand Russell arguing that the significance of symbolic logic to mathesis universalis prevented it from being a “premier” science. Along with Russell, Ernst Cassirer and Louis Couturat would contest the relation between symbolic logic and the symbolic algebra of mathesis universalis, providing the terms of the debate for 20th-century philosophical work on ontology. Mathesis universalis was also a source of debate and controversy in the 20th century because it provided a node from which to examine the status of scientific truth. It is the work of 20th-century philosophers that expanded the significance of the term, using it to exemplify aspects of Enlightenment thought that many philosophers wished to react against, namely the aspiration to a universal science and the privileging of formal systems as avenues to truth. In this respect, the term is associated with Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and especially Michel Foucault, whose extensive work on the “classical episteme” provided a popular method of characterizing the development and enduring features of Enlightenment science. Although Foucault’s rendering of mathesis universalis as a “science of calculation” in The Order of Things (1970) is the most commonly used definition in literary and cultural studies, debates centering on Leibniz’s work in the early 20th century suggest that critics still took divergent approaches to the definition and significance of the term. It is Foucault who has popularized the contraction of the term to “mathesis.”


Dialogue ◽  
1973 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 660-669
Author(s):  
Robert Nadeau

La Bibliothèque des Archives de Philosophic comprend maintenant un ouvrage où l'on trouve la traduction française de quatre textes importants pour l'historien du savoir. Le texte central est celui du Collogue Cassirer-Heidegger qui eut lieu à Davos en mars 1929, où les deux philosophes confrontèrent leur lecture de Kant. Les trios autres textes ont pour but de mettre un peu mieux en lumière le sens de cette confrontation: il s'agit1. du résumé anonyme des « Conférences du Professeur Martin Heidegger sur la Critique de la Raison Pure de Kant et sur la tâche d'une fondation de la Métaphysique » et du résumé des « Conférences du Professeur Ernst Cassirer »;2. du compte rendu fait par Cassirer du Kant-Buch de Heidegger;3. du compte rendu fait par Heidegger du deuxième volume de la Philosophie der symbolischen Formen de Cassirer.


Author(s):  
Vincenzo Ferrone

This chapter examines the debate between Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger over the question “What is man?”—and thus, indirectly, the authentic meaning of Immanuel Kant's philosophy—and relates it to Pope Benedict XVI's views on the complex relationship between Christianity and Enlightenment culture. What was at stake in the Cassirer–Heidegger debate was the very existence of the Enlightenment and the legitimacy of its epistemological foundation. Cassirer accepted the need to redefine the relationship between the a priori and experience, in view of an idealistic conception of Kantian transcendentalism that was both more complex and problematic. His position remained firmly within the universalistic tradition of Enlightenment humanism. Heidegger, on the other hand, saw the Enlightenment as the final phase of the vilified trajectory of Western metaphysics that had resulted in the enthronement of man. The chapter also considers the Catholic Church's anti-Enlightenment positions.


2004 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-248 ◽  
Author(s):  
PETER ELI GORDON

The 1929 ‘Davos encounter’ between Martin Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer has long been viewed by intellectual historians as a paradigmatic event not only for its philosophical meaning but also for its apparently cultural-political ramifications. But such interpretations easily lend legitimacy to a broader and recently ascendant intellectual-historical trend that would reduce philosophy to an allegorical expression of ostensibly more ‘real’ or instrumentalist meanings. However, as this essay tries to show, the core of the dispute between Cassirer and Heidegger is irreducibly philosophical: the Davos debate brought into focus the emergent themes of the so-called “Kant-crisis” of the 1920s, and cast new light upon neo-Kantian doctrines as to the status of objectivity and the possibility for intersubjective consensus in both knowledge and ethics. The Davos encounter cannot be retroactively decided on political or cultural grounds, since it concerns just that unresolved tension between transcendentalism and hermeneutics that is itself constitutive of intellectual history as a discipline.


Author(s):  
Francisco Antonio de Vasconcelos

O objetivo do presente ensaio é modesto. Com ele queremos apenas destacar alguns pontos, segundo nós importantes, referentes à discussão da qual participaram vários filósofos do século XX a respeito do problema da metafísica na filosofia kantiana. Deve-se tomar Kant como o responsável pela destruição da metafísica? Ou, ao contrário, ele deve ser considerado um pensador metafísico por excelência? Na intenção de encontrar clareza para o enfrentamento dessas questões, o diálogo com autores como Henri Bergson, Ernst Wundt, Martin Heidegger e Ernst Cassirer é algo inevitável para quem tem interesse pela temática.


Author(s):  
Ernst Cassirer ◽  
Martin Heidegger ◽  
André Rodrigues Ferreira Perez

Tradução de André Rodrigues Ferreira Perez da Davoser Disputation zwischen Ernst Cassirer und Martin Heidegger, com apresentação de Rafael Rodrigues Garcia.


2008 ◽  
Vol 43 (04) ◽  
pp. 328-340
Author(s):  
Oversatt Av Lars Petter Storm Torjussen

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