scholarly journals On the Origins of the Very First Principle as Infinite: The Hierarchy of the Infinite in Damascius and Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-152
Author(s):  
Tiziano F. Ottobrini

This paper discusses the theoretical relationship between the views of Damascius and those of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. While Damascius’ De principiis is a bold treatise devoted to investigating the hypermetaphysics of apophatism, it anticipates various theoretical positions put forward by Dionysius the Areopagite. The present paper focuses on the following. First, Damascius is the only ancient philoso­pher who systematically demonstrates the first principle to be infinite (traditional Greek thought tended to regard the arkhē as finite). Second, Damascius modifies the concept and in several important passages shows the infinite to be superior and prior to the finite (previously this assumption was held only by Melissus and, sporadically, by Gregory of Nyssa and Plotinus). Third, Damascius’ theory of being (infinite, endless and ultrarational) is the strongest ancient articulation of the nature of the One which is a clear prefiguration of the negative theology developed by Dionysius the Areopagite.

2021 ◽  
Vol 114 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-117
Author(s):  
Michael Motia

AbstractRobert Orsi’s argument that religion, more than a system of “meaning making,” is a “network of relationships between heaven and earth” helps us understand what is at stake in imitation for early Christians. The question for Orsi is not, “What does it mean to imitate Paul?” as much as it is, “In what kind of relationship is one engaged when one imitates Paul?” Christians argue over both what to imitate (Who is Paul?) and how to imitate (How should Christians relate to Paul in order to be like him or to render him present?). The what has received lots of scholarly attention; this paper focuses on the how. I compare the range of possibilities of how to imitate Paul by focusing on three influential accounts of mimesis: Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (ekstasis), John Chrysostom (ekphrasis), and Gregory of Nyssa (epektasis).


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 189-236
Author(s):  
Alexander Treiger

Abstract The present article reports the discovery of a previously unknown ninth-century Arabic paraphrase of Dionysius the Areopagite and demonstrates that this paraphrase was accessible to al-Ġazālī (and, probably, to other authors, notably the Brethren of Purity). It also proves that this paraphrase was produced by the same translator as the Doxography of Pseudo-Ammonius. The doctrinal content of the Arabic Dionysian paraphrase is then analyzed in relation to Arabic Neoplatonic texts as well as al-Ġazālī’s writings. The influence of Gregory of Nyssa and John of Damascus on some Arabic philosophical texts (notably al-Kindī’s Book of Definitions) is also considered. The origin of “Interpositional Neoplatonism” (i.e., the kind of Neoplatonism that interposes an intermediate hypostasis between the First Principle and the Intellect) is examined. The Appendix discusses the relationship between the Doxography of Pseudo-Ammonius and Hippolytus of Rome’s Refutatio omnium haeresium.


2019 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 2-19
Author(s):  
Christos Ath. Terezis ◽  

This study is a comparative investigation of Proclus’ and Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite’s positions about “remaining” as demonstrative of the ontological monism. Focusing the attention, first of all, to the Neoplatonist philosopher, who represents polytheism, it comes that “remaining” indicates the state of standstill and unchangeability of those beings which are able to function as productive principles. Thus, a transcendental and a productive plane are identified, a parameter which combines the apophatic with the affirmative approaches. The theory about “unparticipated-participated-participating” brings to the light a middle phase between “remaining” and “procession”, in order the relation “one-multitude” to develop. In Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, “remaining” appears in two planes: a) the transcendent One, which does not take part in the production process, b) the One which includes all the beings in the form of archetypical reasons. Note that this is not an eternal co-existence or an ontological identification of the beings with the One’s substance or a transition from the first One to the second, as Proclus suggests. Pseudo-Dionysius just describes the providential function of the One, which is manifested owing to its goodness. In conclusion, the main difference between the two thinkers is how they conceive the notion of “metaphysical multitude”: in Proclus, it indicates a hierarchy of beings, while, in Pseudo-Dionysius, it expresses the inner richness of the unity. In both the worldviews though, the ontological prospect which is formed is actually an optimistic one.


Verbum Vitae ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 1007-1024
Author(s):  
Tomasz Stępień

The writings of Corpus Dionysiacum present a concept of life which is different from the one that we profess nowadays. Its view is backed up mainly by the Platonic tradition, which since the times of Plato has tended to see life as an intellectual principle. Therefore, in the Neoplatonic system we can find the conviction that life, in its fullest sense, is intellectual and at its peak is a vision of the One. In the system of Proclus, life, apart from being a principle, is also a god and the main principle of the whole world of intellectual and intellective gods. Pseudo-Dionysius in his writings exploits the concept of the unparticipable and participable principle, and since God is for him Trinity completely beyond participation and knowledge, the divine names play the role of participable henads. However, for Dionysius, names are neither hypostases nor living gods, which is clearly visible in case of the name of Life. All things participate in the name of life and in this name God is the only principle of life in the universe. However, life is not a property to own, but rather a constant struggle to approach the Trinity. Therefore, by committing a sin, an angel or a man loses life, which in the case of a man can be regained through sacramental activity. An analysis of the thoughts of Pseudo-Dionysius reveals a conception of life which is unified contrary to its shattered modern understanding. While biological, mental, moral lives fundamentally differ for us, for Dionysius those are merely aspects of the same thing, and therefore in his view life can be lost and regained not only in the metaphorical, but also the ontological sense.


1996 ◽  
Vol 89 (4) ◽  
pp. 355-371 ◽  
Author(s):  
John N. Jones

In recent decades, the theology of Dionysius the Areopagite (pseudo-Dionysius) has recaptured the attention of a number of scholars. These scholars address Dionysius's importance for the history of philosophy, for Christian aesthetics and liturgical and biblical symbols, and for postmodern theology. Much of this attention focuses on the brief and historically influentialThe Mystical Theology, written ca. 500 CE. For scholars, however, this text, like the God of which it speaks, seems to embody contradictions. I s there a consistent logic in the text, or is it deliberately inconsistent? In this essay, I shall analyze passages throughout the Dionysian corpus in order to interpret the sometimes dense expressions ofMystical Theologyand uncover the logical structure of Dionysius's negative theology. I shall suggest that Dionysius's primary task is to deny that God is a particular being. By identifying the patterns of language used to speak of beings, Dionysius can identify both affirmative and negative language that avoids such patterns and hence is appropriate for speech about God. This interpretation demands close attention to the distinction between particular assertions or denials and the assertion or denial of all beings. By focusing on this distinction and on the higher status of negative over affirmative theology, I shall show, against the dominant trend in Dionysian scholarship, that this negative theology logically coheres; it is neither self-negating nor logically contradictory.


Religions ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (8) ◽  
pp. 488
Author(s):  
William Franke

This paper leverages the Christian tradition of negative theology (Gregory of Nyssa, Dionysius the Areopagite, Eriugena, Eckhart, Cusanus) in order to think past the impasses of identitarian politics and culture. It essentially bears on Christianity and on literary imagination by valorizing their focus on the mystery of who we are beyond all divisive identities and on how an orientation to negative-theological transcendence can save us from a toxic obsession with identities in a postmodern, postcolonial, post-gender society.


2018 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 9-29
Author(s):  
MACIEJ MANIKOWSKI

Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagita is one of the most interesting theologians and philosophers of the Middle Ages. He was, probably, a Christian neoplatonist, a Syrian monk, who lived and worked in a circle of the latest neoplatonist school, e.g. Proclus and/or Damascius. He was called the Father of Christian apophatic mystics. His concept of mystical experience shows two fundamental aspects. Pseudo-Dionysius points (and this is traditional to mystical experience), that this kind of experience starts from the purifi cation, and through the illumination, culminates in union with the First Principle. The mystical experience, in Pseudo-Dionysius also compatible with contemplation, is – on the one hand – triple movement of the soul (the straight, the circle, and the spiral) and – on the other hand – is the deifi cation of man, the union with God in His Energies, but not in His Essence. The deifi cation is the transformation of the human nature – he is still a human, a creation, but is transformed like – in patristic tradition – God became the man, so the man can become God, but only in deifi cation.


Author(s):  
Ursula Coope

The Neoplatonists have a perfectionist view of freedom: an entity is free to the extent that it succeeds in making itself good. Free entities are wholly in control of themselves: they are self-determining, self-constituting, and self-knowing. Neoplatonist philosophers argue that such freedom is only possible for nonbodily things. The human soul is free insofar as it rises above bodily things and engages in intellection, but when it turns its desires to bodily things, it is drawn under the sway of fate and becomes enslaved. This book discusses this notion of freedom, and its relation to questions about responsibility. It explains the important role of notions of self-reflexivity in Neoplatonist accounts of both freedom and responsibility. Part I sets out the puzzles Neoplatonist philosophers face about freedom and responsibility and explains how these puzzles arise from earlier discussions. Part II looks at the metaphysical underpinnings of the Neoplatonist notion of freedom (concentrating especially on the views of Plotinus and Proclus). In what sense (if any) is the ultimate first principle of everything (the One) free? If everything else is under this ultimate first principle, how can anything other than the One be free? What is the connection between freedom and nonbodiliness? Part III looks at questions about responsibility, arising from this perfectionist view of freedom. Why are human beings responsible for their behaviour, in a way that other animals are not? If we are enslaved when we act viciously, how can we be to blame for our vicious actions and choices?


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