Self-Defence and Its Limits in Marguerite Porete’s Mirror of Simple Souls

2019 ◽  
Vol 63 ◽  
pp. 129-151
Author(s):  
Justine L. Trombley
Author(s):  
Elizabeth A. Sheehy ◽  
Julie Stubbs ◽  
Julia Tolmie
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
pp. medethics-2020-107103
Author(s):  
Stephen David John ◽  
Emma J Curran

Lockdown measures in response to the COVID-19 pandemic involve placing huge burdens on some members of society for the sake of benefiting other members of society. How should we decide when these policies are permissible? Many writers propose we should address this question using cost-benefit analysis (CBA), a broadly consequentialist approach. We argue for an alternative non-consequentialist approach, grounded in contractualist moral theorising. The first section sets up key issues in the ethics of lockdown, and sketches the apparent appeal of addressing these problems in a CBA frame. The second section argues that CBA fundamentally distorts the normative landscape in two ways: first, in principle, it allows very many morally trivial preferences—say, for a coffee—might outweigh morally weighty life-and-death concerns; second, it is insensitive to the core moral distinction between victims and vectors of disease. The third section sketches our non-consequentialist alternative, grounded in Thomas Scanlon’s contractualist moral theory. On this account, the ethics of self-defence implies a strong default presumption in favour of a highly restrictive, universal lockdown policy: we then ask whether there are alternatives to such a policy which are justifiable to all affected parties, paying particular attention to the complaints of those most burdened by policy. In the fourth section, we defend our contractualist approach against the charge that it is impractical or counterintuitive, noting that actual CBAs face similar, or worse, challenges.


2014 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 214-225 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luca Grillo

In the litigious world of ancient Rome patroni were often torn between conflicting bonds of loyalty, and this is the dilemma that Cicero laments in the exordium of the Pro Plancio (5). Both the prosecutor, Laterensis, and the accused, Plancius, were personal friends, and Cicero bemoans the quandary: either upsetting Laterensis by comparing him unfavourably with Plancius, or letting down his client. A second problem for Cicero was that the prosecution also took the opportunity to impugn him as the creature of Pompey and Caesar, so that Cicero had to defend himself as much as his client. Two examples of sermocinatio (an imaginary dialogue with a personified entity) helped him to face these challenges: these sermocinationes are Cicero's main strategy for getting out of the conundrum but, in spite of their relevance to his line of argument, they have received very little attention. In this article, after a brief historical contextualization, I analyse each sermocinatio, arguing that Cicero cunningly sets aside the dilemma of comparing two friends by constructing an alternative comparison between Laterensis and himself, and that such a comparison, which is highly selective, re-establishes his own positive public image. The two sermocinationes, moreover, also display some meaningful textual references which have remained unnoticed: in the final part of this paper I set them against the backdrop of Plato's Crito and of Cicero's letter to Lentulus (Fam. 1.9), arguing that the reference to the Crito supports Cicero's strategy of contrasting himself with Laterensis and that comparison with Fam. 1.9 illuminates the connection between the Pro Plancio and Cicero's broader post reditum self-defence.


2017 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 442-458 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthoula Malkopoulou ◽  
Ludvig Norman

Militant democracy relies on the idea that democracies ought to defend themselves from anti-democratic forces by constitutionalising repressive measures. We offer a criticism of this view by highlighting the exclusionary elitism on which militant democracy is built. In doing this, we consider two competing models of democratic self-defence: the procedural and the social. We suggest that the procedural model, while avoiding the exclusionary and other pitfalls of militant democracy, is detached from socio-political realities and fails to offer a comprehensive vision of democratic stability. The largely neglected social model of democratic self defence avoids this problem; it combines proceduralism’s commitment to dissensus with a social-democratic logic in the design of democratic constitutions. We argue in favour of such a social democratic self-defence and further develop this model around the guiding principle of political and social non-domination.


1985 ◽  
Vol 126 (1714) ◽  
pp. 733
Author(s):  
Paul Griffiths ◽  
Sharon E. Kanach
Keyword(s):  

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