Wholesale price and manufacturer profit with downstream bargaining for consumer returns

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 204
Author(s):  
Yertai Tanai ◽  
Emmanuel Dechenaux
Keyword(s):  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Consumer Returns

scholarly journals Coordinating a Supply Chain with Risk-Averse Agents under Demand and Consumer Returns Uncertainty

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jian Liu ◽  
Yong He
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Risk Attitude ◽  
Price Policy ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Coordination Problem ◽  
Consumer Returns ◽  
The Impact

This paper examines the optimal order decision in a supply chain when it faces uncertain demand and uncertain consumer returns. We build consumer returns model with decision-makers’ risk preference under mean-variance objective framework and discuss supply chain coordination problem under wholesale-price-only policy and the manufacturer’s buyback policy, respectively. We find that, with wholesale price policy, the supply chain cannot be coordinated whether the supply chain agents are risk-neutral or risk-averse. However, with buyback policy, the supply chain can be coordinated and the profit of the supply chain can be arbitrarily allocated between the manufacturer and the retailer. Through numerical examples, we illustrate the impact of stochastic consumer returns and the supply chain agents’ risk attitude on the optimal order decision.

scholarly journals Dynamic Adjustment Mechanism and Differential Game Model Construction of Mask Emergency Supply Chain Cooperation Based on COVID-19 Outbreak

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 1115
Author(s):  
Shufan Zhu ◽  
Kefan Xie ◽  
Ping Gui
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Production Technology ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Dynamic Adjustment ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Technology Investment ◽  
The Impact

Incorporating the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the mask supply chain into our framework and taking mask output as a state variable, our study introduces the differential game to study the long-term dynamic cooperation of a two-echelon supply chain composed of the supplier and the manufacturer under government subsidies. The study elaborates that government subsidies can provide more effective incentives for supply chain members to cooperate in the production of masks compared with the situation of no government subsidies. A relatively low wholesale price can effectively increase the profits of supply chain members and the supply chain system. The joint contract of two-way cost-sharing contract and transfer payment contract can promote production technology investment efforts of the supply chain members, the optimum trajectory of mask production, and total profit to reach the best state as the centralized decision scenario within a certain range. Meanwhile, it is determined that the profits of supply chain members in the joint contract can be Pareto improvement compared with decentralized decision scenario. With the increase of production technology investment cost coefficients and output self-decay rate, mask outputs have shown a downward trend in the joint contract decision model. On the contrary, mask outputs would rise with growing sensitivity of mask output to production technology investment effort and increasing sensitivity of mask demand to mask output.

scholarly journals Smart charging for electric vehicles to minimise charging cost

2017 ◽  
Vol 231 (6) ◽  
pp. 526-534 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yue Wang ◽  
David Infield ◽  
Simon Gill
Keyword(s):  
Electric Vehicle ◽  
Electric Vehicles ◽  
Distribution System ◽  
Power Flow ◽  
Optimal Power Flow ◽  
Low Voltage ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Heuristic Method ◽  
Domain Model ◽  
Smart Charging

This paper assumes a smart grid framework where the driving patterns for electric vehicles are known, time variations in electricity prices are communicated to householders, and data on voltage variation throughout the distribution system are available. Based on this information, an aggregator with access to this data can be employed to minimise electric vehicles charging costs to the owner whilst maintaining acceptable distribution system voltages. In this study, electric vehicle charging is assumed to take place only in the home. A single-phase Low Voltage (LV) distribution network is investigated where the local electric vehicles penetration level is assumed to be 100%. Electric vehicle use patterns have been extracted from the UK Time of Use Survey data with a 10-min resolution and the domestic base load is generated from an existing public domain model. Apart from the so-called real time price signal, which is derived from the electricity system wholesale price, the cost of battery degradation is also considered in the optimal scheduling of electric vehicles charging. A simple and effective heuristic method is proposed to minimise the electric vehicles’ charging cost whilst satisfying the requirement of state of charge for the electric vehicles’ battery. A simulation in OpenDSS over a period of 24 h has been implemented, taking care of the network constraints for voltage level at the customer connection points. The optimisation results are compared with those obtained using dynamic optimal power flow.

Implications of Price Matching in Supply Chain Negotiation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weixin Shang ◽  
Gangshu (George) Cai
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Price Matching ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Multiple Buyers ◽  
Wholesale Pricing

Problem definition: Few papers have explored the impact of price matching negotiation (PM), in which a channel matches its price with the resulting wholesale price bargained by another channel, on firms’ performances, consumer welfare, and social welfare, with and without supply chain coordination. Academic/practical relevance: Negotiation has been widely seen in determining both uniform and discriminatory wholesale prices, which affect outcomes of competitive supply chain practices. Methodology: To characterize the PM mechanism, we use game theory and Nash bargaining theory to compare PM with simultaneous negotiation (SN) through a common-seller two-buyer differentiated Bertrand competition model. Results: Our analysis reveals that PM can benefit the seller but hurt all buyers, which is at odds with some fair wholesale pricing clauses intending to protect buyers. Under coordination with side payments, however, all firms can conditionally benefit more from PM than from SN. Despite firms’ gains, PM leads to less consumer utility and social welfare compared with SN, unless the second buyer in PM is considerably less powerful than the first buyer. Coordination further worsens PM’s negative impact on consumer utility and social welfare. Moreover, the existence of a spot market can increase the wholesale price in PM, hurting buyers, consumers, and society. Furthermore, the qualitative results about PM remain robust under an alternative disagreement point for PM, multiple buyers, and other extensions. Managerial implications: This paper delivers insights on when price matching in supply chain wholesale price negotiation can benefit a seller, buyers, consumers, and society in a variety of scenarios. It advocates how managers can use PM to their own advantages and provides rationale to decision makers for policy regulations regarding wholesale pricing.

Supply Chain Coordination for E-Commerce: Risk Penalty vs. Flat Rate

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ju Myung Song ◽  
Yao Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Common Belief ◽  
Shipping Industry ◽  
Flat Rate

Problem definition: We study the coordination of an E-commerce supply chain between online sellers and third party shippers to meet random demand surges, induced by, for instance, online shopping holidays. Academic/practical relevance: Motivated by the challenge of meeting the unpredictable demand surges in E-commerce, we study shipping contracts and supply chain coordination between online sellers and third party shippers in a novel model taking into account the unique features of the shipping industry. Methodology: We compare two shipping contracts: the risk penalty (proposed by UPS) and the flat rate (used by FedEx), and analyze their impact on the seller, the shipper, and the supply chain. Results: Under information symmetry, the sophisticated risk penalty contract is no better than the simple flat rate contract for the shipper, against common belief. Although both the risk penalty and the flat rate can coordinate the supply chain, the risk penalty does so only if the shipper makes zero profit, but the flat rate can provide a positive profit for both. These results represent a new form of double marginalization and risk-sharing, in sharp contrast to the well-known literature on the classic supplier-retailer supply chain, where risk-sharing contracts (similar to the risk penalty) can bring benefits to all parties, but the single wholesale price contract (similar to the flat rate) can achieve supply chain coordination only when the supplier makes zero profit. We also find that only the online seller, but not the shipper, has the motivation to vertically integrate the seller-shipper supply chain. Under information asymmetry, however, the risk penalty brings more benefit to the shipper than the flat rate, but hurts the seller and the supply chain. Managerial implications: Our results imply that information plays an important role in the shipper’s choices of shipping contracts. Under information symmetry, the risk penalty is unnecessarily complex because the simple flat rate is as good as the risk penalty for the shipper; moreover, it is better for the seller-shipper coordination. However, under information asymmetry, the shipper faces additional shipping risk that can be offset by the extra flexibility of the risk penalty. Our study also explains and supports the recent practice of online sellers (e.g., Amazon.com and JD.com), but not shippers, to vertically integrate the supply chain by consistently expanding their shipping capabilities.

Polyculture de tilapia et Clarias en etang dans la commune de Pobè, sud-est du Benin.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kochikpa Ondodje
Keyword(s):  
Rural Areas ◽  
Eating Habits ◽  
National Level ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Fish Farms ◽  
Technical Standards ◽  
Pipe System ◽  
The Many ◽  
Modern Breeding

Abstract The SARL "Pobè Fish Farm" located in the South-East of Benin specializes in the production and sale of tilapia and Clarias. The farm has twenty two ponds of 200 m2 (10 m × 20 m) supplied with water by a pipe system from a natural and permanent stream. The water supply is via a concrete channel which did not allow the water to be renewed once the pond is full. Work has been carried out to allow a larger inflow of water and communication between the ponds. The operation of the farm is modeled on the types of agro-fish farms existing in Asia and encountered in Vietnam in particular; it aims to put theoretical knowledge into practice and on the other hand to contribute to the development of a sector still little known in Benin, despite the many hydroagricultural potentials with which this country is endowed. The species bred at national level are rustic and adapted to the environment and whose genetic performance has not been improved. In fact, only modern breeding following very precise technical standards can allow obtaining interesting results from the point of view of agronomic yield and financial profitability. Indeed, these fish from our ponds are very popular with the populations (the average wholesale price is 1000 FCFA/kg) and are already an integral part of eating habits both in rural areas and in cities.

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