Seasonality in wholesale Price of Rice

1960 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 97
Author(s):  
K. Krishna Murty
Keyword(s):  
Wholesale Price

scholarly journals Dynamic Adjustment Mechanism and Differential Game Model Construction of Mask Emergency Supply Chain Cooperation Based on COVID-19 Outbreak

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 1115
Author(s):  
Shufan Zhu ◽  
Kefan Xie ◽  
Ping Gui
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Production Technology ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Dynamic Adjustment ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Technology Investment ◽  
The Impact

Incorporating the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the mask supply chain into our framework and taking mask output as a state variable, our study introduces the differential game to study the long-term dynamic cooperation of a two-echelon supply chain composed of the supplier and the manufacturer under government subsidies. The study elaborates that government subsidies can provide more effective incentives for supply chain members to cooperate in the production of masks compared with the situation of no government subsidies. A relatively low wholesale price can effectively increase the profits of supply chain members and the supply chain system. The joint contract of two-way cost-sharing contract and transfer payment contract can promote production technology investment efforts of the supply chain members, the optimum trajectory of mask production, and total profit to reach the best state as the centralized decision scenario within a certain range. Meanwhile, it is determined that the profits of supply chain members in the joint contract can be Pareto improvement compared with decentralized decision scenario. With the increase of production technology investment cost coefficients and output self-decay rate, mask outputs have shown a downward trend in the joint contract decision model. On the contrary, mask outputs would rise with growing sensitivity of mask output to production technology investment effort and increasing sensitivity of mask demand to mask output.

scholarly journals Smart charging for electric vehicles to minimise charging cost

2017 ◽  
Vol 231 (6) ◽  
pp. 526-534 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yue Wang ◽  
David Infield ◽  
Simon Gill
Keyword(s):  
Electric Vehicle ◽  
Electric Vehicles ◽  
Distribution System ◽  
Power Flow ◽  
Optimal Power Flow ◽  
Low Voltage ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Heuristic Method ◽  
Domain Model ◽  
Smart Charging

This paper assumes a smart grid framework where the driving patterns for electric vehicles are known, time variations in electricity prices are communicated to householders, and data on voltage variation throughout the distribution system are available. Based on this information, an aggregator with access to this data can be employed to minimise electric vehicles charging costs to the owner whilst maintaining acceptable distribution system voltages. In this study, electric vehicle charging is assumed to take place only in the home. A single-phase Low Voltage (LV) distribution network is investigated where the local electric vehicles penetration level is assumed to be 100%. Electric vehicle use patterns have been extracted from the UK Time of Use Survey data with a 10-min resolution and the domestic base load is generated from an existing public domain model. Apart from the so-called real time price signal, which is derived from the electricity system wholesale price, the cost of battery degradation is also considered in the optimal scheduling of electric vehicles charging. A simple and effective heuristic method is proposed to minimise the electric vehicles’ charging cost whilst satisfying the requirement of state of charge for the electric vehicles’ battery. A simulation in OpenDSS over a period of 24 h has been implemented, taking care of the network constraints for voltage level at the customer connection points. The optimisation results are compared with those obtained using dynamic optimal power flow.

Implications of Price Matching in Supply Chain Negotiation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weixin Shang ◽  
Gangshu (George) Cai
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Price Matching ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Multiple Buyers ◽  
Wholesale Pricing

Problem definition: Few papers have explored the impact of price matching negotiation (PM), in which a channel matches its price with the resulting wholesale price bargained by another channel, on firms’ performances, consumer welfare, and social welfare, with and without supply chain coordination. Academic/practical relevance: Negotiation has been widely seen in determining both uniform and discriminatory wholesale prices, which affect outcomes of competitive supply chain practices. Methodology: To characterize the PM mechanism, we use game theory and Nash bargaining theory to compare PM with simultaneous negotiation (SN) through a common-seller two-buyer differentiated Bertrand competition model. Results: Our analysis reveals that PM can benefit the seller but hurt all buyers, which is at odds with some fair wholesale pricing clauses intending to protect buyers. Under coordination with side payments, however, all firms can conditionally benefit more from PM than from SN. Despite firms’ gains, PM leads to less consumer utility and social welfare compared with SN, unless the second buyer in PM is considerably less powerful than the first buyer. Coordination further worsens PM’s negative impact on consumer utility and social welfare. Moreover, the existence of a spot market can increase the wholesale price in PM, hurting buyers, consumers, and society. Furthermore, the qualitative results about PM remain robust under an alternative disagreement point for PM, multiple buyers, and other extensions. Managerial implications: This paper delivers insights on when price matching in supply chain wholesale price negotiation can benefit a seller, buyers, consumers, and society in a variety of scenarios. It advocates how managers can use PM to their own advantages and provides rationale to decision makers for policy regulations regarding wholesale pricing.

Supply Chain Coordination for E-Commerce: Risk Penalty vs. Flat Rate

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ju Myung Song ◽  
Yao Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Common Belief ◽  
Shipping Industry ◽  
Flat Rate

Problem definition: We study the coordination of an E-commerce supply chain between online sellers and third party shippers to meet random demand surges, induced by, for instance, online shopping holidays. Academic/practical relevance: Motivated by the challenge of meeting the unpredictable demand surges in E-commerce, we study shipping contracts and supply chain coordination between online sellers and third party shippers in a novel model taking into account the unique features of the shipping industry. Methodology: We compare two shipping contracts: the risk penalty (proposed by UPS) and the flat rate (used by FedEx), and analyze their impact on the seller, the shipper, and the supply chain. Results: Under information symmetry, the sophisticated risk penalty contract is no better than the simple flat rate contract for the shipper, against common belief. Although both the risk penalty and the flat rate can coordinate the supply chain, the risk penalty does so only if the shipper makes zero profit, but the flat rate can provide a positive profit for both. These results represent a new form of double marginalization and risk-sharing, in sharp contrast to the well-known literature on the classic supplier-retailer supply chain, where risk-sharing contracts (similar to the risk penalty) can bring benefits to all parties, but the single wholesale price contract (similar to the flat rate) can achieve supply chain coordination only when the supplier makes zero profit. We also find that only the online seller, but not the shipper, has the motivation to vertically integrate the seller-shipper supply chain. Under information asymmetry, however, the risk penalty brings more benefit to the shipper than the flat rate, but hurts the seller and the supply chain. Managerial implications: Our results imply that information plays an important role in the shipper’s choices of shipping contracts. Under information symmetry, the risk penalty is unnecessarily complex because the simple flat rate is as good as the risk penalty for the shipper; moreover, it is better for the seller-shipper coordination. However, under information asymmetry, the shipper faces additional shipping risk that can be offset by the extra flexibility of the risk penalty. Our study also explains and supports the recent practice of online sellers (e.g., Amazon.com and JD.com), but not shippers, to vertically integrate the supply chain by consistently expanding their shipping capabilities.

Polyculture de tilapia et Clarias en etang dans la commune de Pobè, sud-est du Benin.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kochikpa Ondodje
Keyword(s):  
Rural Areas ◽  
Eating Habits ◽  
National Level ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Fish Farms ◽  
Technical Standards ◽  
Pipe System ◽  
The Many ◽  
Modern Breeding

Abstract The SARL "Pobè Fish Farm" located in the South-East of Benin specializes in the production and sale of tilapia and Clarias. The farm has twenty two ponds of 200 m2 (10 m × 20 m) supplied with water by a pipe system from a natural and permanent stream. The water supply is via a concrete channel which did not allow the water to be renewed once the pond is full. Work has been carried out to allow a larger inflow of water and communication between the ponds. The operation of the farm is modeled on the types of agro-fish farms existing in Asia and encountered in Vietnam in particular; it aims to put theoretical knowledge into practice and on the other hand to contribute to the development of a sector still little known in Benin, despite the many hydroagricultural potentials with which this country is endowed. The species bred at national level are rustic and adapted to the environment and whose genetic performance has not been improved. In fact, only modern breeding following very precise technical standards can allow obtaining interesting results from the point of view of agronomic yield and financial profitability. Indeed, these fish from our ponds are very popular with the populations (the average wholesale price is 1000 FCFA/kg) and are already an integral part of eating habits both in rural areas and in cities.

Pricing and service decision of dual-channel operations in an O2O closed-loop supply chain

2017 ◽  
Vol 117 (8) ◽  
pp. 1567-1588 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lingcheng Kong ◽  
Zhiyang Liu ◽  
Yafei Pan ◽  
Jiaping Xie ◽  
Guang Yang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Return Rate ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Channel Conflict ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Dual Channel

Purpose The online direct selling mode has been widely accepted by enterprises in the O2O era. However, the dual-channel (online/offline, forward/backward) operations of the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) changed the relationship between manufacturers and retailers, thus resulting in channel conflict. The purpose of this paper is to take a dual-channel operations of CLSC as the research target, where a manufacturer sells a single product through a direct e-channel as well as a conventional retail channel; the retailer are responsible for collecting used products in the reverse supply chain and the manufacturer are responsible for remanufacturing. Design/methodology/approach The authors build a benchmark model of dual-channel price and service competition and take the return rate, which is considered to be related to the service level of the retailer, as the function of the service level to extend the model in the reverse SC. The authors then analyze the optimal pricing and service decision under centralization and decentralization, respectively. Finally, with the revenue-sharing factor, wholesale price and recycling price transfer payment coefficient as contract parameters, the paper also designs a revenue-sharing contract led by the manufacturer and explores in what situation the contract could realize the Pareto optimization of all players. Findings In the baseline model, the results show that optimal price and service level correlate positively in centralization; however, the relation relies on consumers’ price sensitivity in decentralization. In the extension model, the relationship between price and service level also relies on the relative value of increased service cost and remanufacturing saved cost. When the return rate correlates with the service level, a recycling transfer payment can elevate the service level and thus raise the return rate. Through analyzing the parameters in revenue-sharing contract, a point can be reached where lowering the wholesale price and raising the transfer payment coefficient will promote retailers to share revenue. Practical implications Many enterprises establish the dual-channel distribution system both online and offline, which need to understand how to resolve their channel conflict. The conflict is especially strong in CLSC with remanufacturing. The result helps the node enterprises realize the coordination of the dual-channel CLSC. Originality/value It takes into account the fact that there are two complementary relationships, such as online selling and offline delivery; used product recycling and remanufacturing. The authors optimize the strategy of product pricing and service level in order to solve channel conflict and double marginalization in the closed-loop dual-channel distribution network.

Revenue Sharing Contract of Green Supply Chain under Manufacturer Risk-Aversion

2014 ◽  
Vol 697 ◽  
pp. 482-487
Author(s):  
Shi Ying Jiang ◽  
Chun Yan Ma
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract

Background on two stages green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, considering the degree of risk aversion and product greenness, consumer preferences and other factors, the centralized decision-making game model and manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model are established.Then two game models are compared. The interaction of product greenness, wholesale price, product price,and risk aversion utility for manufacturers and retailers are also disscussed. Finally, the revenue sharing contract is applied to coordinate the green supply chain . The results show that:(1) In the centralized decision-making model, there is a critical value of the product green degree; (2)In manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model, the higher the green degree of the product, the higher the manufacturer's wholesale price,and the wholesale price increases as risk aversion degree of manufacturers improves;(3)The revenue sharing contract can coordinate this type of green supply chain under manufacturers risk-averse.

scholarly journals The spatial integration of potato wholesale markets of Uttarakhand in India

2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 20-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
A Kumar ◽  
R Mishra
Keyword(s):  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Likelihood Method ◽  
Spatial Integration ◽  
Market Information ◽  
Demand And Supply ◽  
Vector Error Correction ◽  
Vector Error ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Short Run ◽  
Price Demand

This paper analyzes the spatial integration of potato markets in Uttarakhand using monthly wholesale price for ten years. The maximum likelihood method of cointegration developed by Johansen (1988) was used in the study. The dynamics of short-run price responses were examined using vector error correction model (VECM). The results indicated that five potato markets reacted on the long-run cointegrating equations while the speed of price adjustment in the short-run was almost absent. Moreover, it was found that the longer the distance between the markets, the weaker the integration was. To increase the efficiency of potato markets in Uttarakhand, there is need to focus on building an improved market information system. This system should be able to disseminate timely market information about price, demand and supply of produce to enable producers, traders and consumers to make proper production and marketing decisions.SAARC J. Agri., 14(2): 20-30 (2016)

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