1. “On My Own”? Executive Orders and the Executive Branch

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Keyword(s):  
Executive Branch ◽  
Executive Orders

By Executive Order

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Rudalevige
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
The United States ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Federal Agencies ◽  
Presidential Power ◽  
Executive Order ◽  
Personal Power ◽  
Executive Orders

The president of the United States is commonly thought to wield extraordinary personal power through the issuance of executive orders. In fact, the vast majority of such orders are proposed by federal agencies and shaped by negotiations that span the executive branch. This book provides the first comprehensive look at how presidential directives are written — and by whom. The book examines more than five hundred executive orders from the 1930s to today — as well as more than two hundred others negotiated but never issued — shedding vital new light on the multilateral process of drafting supposedly unilateral directives. The book draws on a wealth of archival evidence from the Office of Management and Budget and presidential libraries as well as original interviews to show how the crafting of orders requires widespread consultation and compromise with a formidable bureaucracy. It explains the key role of management in the presidential skill set, detailing how bureaucratic resistance can stall and even prevent actions the chief executive desires, and how presidents must bargain with the bureaucracy even when they seek to act unilaterally. Challenging popular conceptions about the scope of presidential power, the book reveals how the executive branch holds the power to both enact and constrain the president's will.

Eisenhower’s executive privilege and the public interest

2019 ◽  
pp. 54-84
Author(s):  
Kevin M. Baron
Keyword(s):  
Public Interest ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Freedom Of Information ◽  
Government Information ◽  
Executive Orders ◽  
White House ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Creation

This chapter delves into the depths of one of the most important developments within modern American politics, the creation and institutionalization of executive privilege. In facing a fervent Congress in the grips of McCarthyism, Eisenhower issued a letter denying testimony to the Senate for the Army-McCarthy hearings. His letter included a memo from Attorney General Brownell that claimed the president had an inherent constitutional privilege to deny information to Congress or the public if it was in the public interest and for national security. This action institutionalized the Cold War Paradigm in the executive branch and created an extra-constitutional power for the president. Eisenhower issued several executive orders concerning classification and public dissemination of government information, along with the creation of the Office of Strategic Information (OSI) within the Commerce Department to oversee these policies. Eisenhower claimed historic precedent to justify his inherent constitutional power, regardless, it showed a learned response that changed executive power. Congress would respond in 1955 by creating the Special Subcommittee on Government Information chaired by Rep. John Moss, given jurisdiction for oversight on all executive branch information policies and practices. With the issue of freedom of information institutionalized in Congress, a 12-year legislative power struggle would unfold between Congress and the White House ending with the passage of the Freedom of Information Act in 1966.

“Dear John”

2021 ◽  
pp. 166-200
Author(s):  
Andrew Rudalevige
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Executive Orders ◽  
Good Management ◽  
Unilateral Action

This chapter presents a new data set of more than two hundred executive orders never signed by the president. However that is interpreted — as good management or as gridlock — something that could have been done “with the stroke of a pen” was not. Here, too, quantitative and archival analysis pair to help us understand why. The results highlight the fact that unilateral action has costs, which at some point outweigh the benefits. Those costs may be rung up in Congress, or the courts, or by public opinion. But as the exploration here shows, they may also be imposed by the executive branch.

The Administrative Presidency, Waivers, and the Affordable Care Act

2020 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 633-646 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael K. Gusmano ◽  
Frank J. Thompson
Keyword(s):  
Affordable Care Act ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Executive Orders ◽  
Work Requirement ◽  
Signing Statements ◽  
Policy Goals ◽  
Guidance Documents ◽  
The Affordable Care Act ◽  
High Level ◽  
Trump Administration

Abstract Within the American system of shared power among institutions, the executive branch has played an increasingly prominent policy role relative to Congress. The vast administrative discretion wielded by the executive branch has elevated the power of the president. Republican and Democratic presidents alike have employed an arsenal of administrative tools to pursue their policy goals: high-level appointments, administrative rule making, executive orders, proclamations, memoranda, guidance documents, directives, dear colleague letters, signing statements, reorganizations, funding decisions, and more. Presidents Obama and Trump employed most of these tools in an effort to shape the implementation and outcomes of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) during its first decade. This article focuses on the Obama and Trump administrations' use of comprehensive waivers to shape ACA implementation. The Obama administration had mixed success using waivers to convince Republican states to expand Medicaid. Compared to Obama, the Trump administration has found it harder to accomplish its policy goals through waivers, but if the courts support the Trump administration's work requirement and 1332 waiver initiatives, it would enable the president to use waivers to achieve an ever broader set of goals, including program retrenchment.

scholarly journals Use of Executive Orders in Nigeria by the Executive Branch of Government in Time of Emergency

2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 669-678
Author(s):  
Oluwapelumi Odunayo Osadola ◽  
Phebe Oluwatoni Ojo
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
United States Of America ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
The United States ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
The Other ◽  
Executive Order ◽  
Legal Regime ◽  
Executive Orders ◽  
Fourth Republic

Executive Orders are not invoked as a matter of course by the President or Governors heading the Executive Cabinet. These orders are exercisable when heads of the executive branch of government see for their needfulness and for smooth running of their governmental programmes or policies. Every Executive order must carry the force of law for it to be valid or to be duly recognised by the other branches of government which if not, the latter may question its constitutionality. The advantages of executive orders are very innumerable to mention however it has been said that the use of executive orders have assaulted the concept of separation of powers which is embedded in the 1999 Nigerian Constitution (as amended)as adopted from the United States of America. This paper focuses on the meaning and historical antecedent of executive orders in Nigeria, legal regime or statutory provisions of executive orders in Nigeria, executive orders versus doctrine of separation of power, challenges of executive orders under the 1999 constitution (as amended), praxis of executive orders under the Nigeria fourth republic and lastly is the conclusion and recommendations made thereto. To achieve these, the writers will make use of relevant materials at their disposal.

scholarly journals The Use of Executive Orders and Proclamations to Create Immigration Policy: Trump in Historical Perspective

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michele Waslin
Keyword(s):  
Immigration Policy ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
The United States ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Executive Summary ◽  
Advocacy Organizations ◽  
Executive Orders ◽  
Executive Authority ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Immigration

Executive Summary This article examines presidential immigration policy making through executive orders (EOs) and proclamations. Donald Trump’s overall volume of EOs has been remarkably similar to that of other presidents, while his number of proclamations has been relatively high. His immigration-related EOs and proclamations, however, diverge from those of his predecessors in several ways. Of the 56 immigration-related EOs and 64 proclamations issued since 1945, Trump has issued 10 and nine, respectively. Overall, about 1 percent of all EOs and proclamations during this period have been immigration related, compared to 8 percent of Trump’s EOs and 2.4 percent of Trump’s proclamations. In a sharp departure from previous presidents, a greater share of his EOs and proclamations have been substantive policy-making documents intended to restrict admissions of legal immigrants and increase enforcement along the border and in the interior of the United States. This article explores Trump’s unorthodox use of executive tools to make immigration policy, circumventing Congress and even members of his own administration. It recommends that: Congress should hold oversight hearings and should consider revoking or modifying EOs and proclamations that have been issued pursuant to the authority provided to the president by Congress, as opposed to those based on the executive’s constitutional authority. Advocacy organizations should continue to challenge the president’s executive actions, the insufficient process and consultation leading to them, their statutory or constitutional justification, and their impact. Congress should take an inventory of the immigration authorities it has delegated, both explicitly and implicitly, to the executive branch and determine when this authority can and should be limited. Congress should pass legislation to update and reform the US immigration system, and thus clarify its intentions regarding US immigration law, policy, and executive authority in this area.

scholarly journals Assessing the Relationship between Presidential Rhetorical Simplicity and Unilateral Action

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 90-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Olds
Keyword(s):  
Moving Average ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Presidential Rhetoric ◽  
Initial Attempt ◽  
Empirical Examination ◽  
Executive Orders ◽  
Unilateral Action ◽  
Moving Average Representation ◽  
Relative Decline ◽  
Intellectual Leadership

Research from Shogan (2007) and Lim (2008) on the executive branch proposes that the American presidency has adopted an anti-intellectual approach to leadership, such that there is a concerted rejection of thoughtful political discourse from the president. This has been reflected by what appears to be a relative decline in both the linguistic and substantive complexity of presidential rhetoric. Shogan’s (2007) work, while focused on examining whether Republicans are more apt to employ anti-intellectual leadership than Democrats, raises an additional topic worthy of empirical examination: the potential relationship between anti-intellectual leadership and unilateral action from the president. If anti-intellectual leadership is a defiant form of leadership that opts to publicly demonstrate the rejection of external expertise, the usage of anti-intellectual rhetoric from the president might be able to predict the usage of unilateral action. On the other hand, anti-intellectual rhetoric might be used as a straightforward and quick means to explain unilateral action, such that change in the level of unilateral action can predict the usage of simplistic rhetoric. Unfortunately, no one has yet to empirically test whether rhetorical simplicity predicts unilateral action, unilateral action predicts rhetorical simplicity, or there is a multi-directional relationship present. This project makes an initial attempt to remedy this gap in the literature. The project contrasts the monthly average simplicity level of the presidential weekly public address with the monthly number of executive orders emanating from the executive branch, using information spanning between February 1993 and May 2015. The initial findings from the vector autoregression and moving average representation analyses suggest that prior change in rhetorical simplicity predicts the usage of executive orders, and that an increase in rhetorical simplicity helps produce an increase in the number of executive orders offered by the president.

Part III Structure of State Government, 11 The State Executive Branch

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Williams Robert F
Keyword(s):  
State Government ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
State Legislature ◽  
The State ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Executive Orders ◽  
State Constitutions ◽  
Executive Agencies ◽  
Executive Officers

This chapter discusses the differences between the state executive branch created by state constitutions and the federal executive. In many states there is a plural or fragmented executive, with more than one state-wide elected official in addition to the governor, such as the attorney general, treasurer, commissioner of education, etc. Such additional executive officers perform constitutional functions separate and apart from the governor's constitutional functions. State executive officials such as the governor do not exercise plenary authority like that of the legislature. Rather, their authority is delegated either in the state constitution or by statute. A governor's use of executive orders is therefore limited to implementing constitutional or statutory powers. The chapter discusses the variety of gubernatorial veto powers, together with the judicial involvement in controversies over the exercise of this power. This judicial involvement is particularly important with respect to the item veto power. Further, some state constitutions create executive agencies, and specify their powers (often including quasi-executive, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial powers), thereby divesting the state legislature of authority in those subject areas.

scholarly journals LAW-MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN COMPARISON WITH CERTAIN ASPECTS OF PRESIDENTIAL LAW-MAKING IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

2016 ◽  
pp. 0-0
Author(s):  
Александр Ваньков ◽  
Aleksandr Vankov
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Russian Federation ◽  
United States Of America ◽  
The United States ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Executive Orders ◽  
Legal Study ◽  
Russian President ◽  
The Russian Federation ◽  
Law Making

The article is primarily aimed at the types of presidential actions in the United States of America. The author considers various types of actions issued by the President of the United States and categorizes those actions by their form, including executive orders, proclamations, administrative orders, presidential memoranda, determinations, notices, reorganization plans, etc. Particularly the article is focused on executive orders of the American head of executive branch as they are the most significant regulations. In addition, the article touches upon the types of regulations issued by the President of the Russian Federation apart from decrees and orders, such as instructions and directives. This paper contains comparative legal study based on contemporary legislative material from two substantially different legal systems, offers grounds for legitimacy and admissibility of broad presidential rulemaking powers including issuing of regulations which types or forms are not directly specified in the constitution, explores the nature of instructions of the Russian President. However, the author advocates the idea that presidential administrative actions should not be considered as non-legal actions, and issuing by this officer regulations, including those which types are not defined by a constitution, could only be done in case those regulations comply with the laws.

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