John Rawls, the twentieth century political liberal and arch-foe of utilitarianism, has resurrected the moral methodology of contractualism on the battleground of normative ethics. Rawls’ theory illuminates both the power and the weaknesses of all theories of contractualism in normative ethics.In this paper, I examine what Rawls believes contractualism can accomplish in ethics. Then I examine one crucial aspect of Rawls’ contractualism — the notion of fairness. Next, I argue that Rawls begs the question of the choice of principles against utilitarianism. One way in which question-begging occurs is by forsaking any real conception of bargaining agents, substituting instead many abstract instantiations of one non-envious, mildly self-interested, impartial agent. Rawls claims that it is of “great importance” (141-142) that agents in the social contract achieve unanimity. In reality, the contract stipulates unamimity among its agents, instead of the opposite, where unanimity follows from consensus over fair principles. The veil of ignorance does not guarantee impartiality, but instead, it precludes choosing utilitarian principles. Finally, I test the adequacy of Rawlsian contractualism by applying it to an important problem in modern medicine involving justice, viz., the just allocation of scarce medical resources.
Liberalism, commodification, and justice