Pre-contest Communication Incentives

2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mustafa Yildirim
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Psychological Strength

AbstractTo demonstrate resolution and psychological strength, players often engage in pre-contest communication by publicly stating their desire to win an upcoming contest. Existing explanations for this phenomenon revolve around incomplete information and signaling. In this paper, I offer a complementary explanation that does not rely on signaling. Within a complete information setup, I show that players may have an incentive for pre-contest communication if, in addition to an audience (reputational) cost when the statement does not materialize, the players also incur an audience reward (credibility gain) when the statement materializes.

scholarly journals Spillovers and R&D Incentive under Incomplete Information

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 50-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rittwik Chatterjee ◽  
Srobonti Chattopadhyay ◽  
Tarun Kabiraj
Keyword(s):  
Distribution Function ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
General Distribution ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Stage Game ◽  
Alternative Scenarios

Spillovers of R&D outcome affect the R&D decision of a firm. The present paper discusses the R&D incentives of a firm when the extent of R&D spillover is private information to each firm. We construct a two-stage game involving two firms when the firms first decide simultaneously whether to invest in R&D or not, then they compete in quantity. Assuming general distribution function of firm types we compare R&D incentives of firms under alternative scenarios based on different informational structures. The paper shows that while R&D spillovers reduce R&D incentives under complete information unambiguously, however, it can be larger under incomplete information. JEL Classification: D43, D82, L13, O31

scholarly journals Distance Metrics of D Numbers

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liguo Fei ◽  
Yuqiang Feng
Keyword(s):  
Number Theory ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Distance Function ◽  
Distance Measure ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Belief Function ◽  
Distance Metrics ◽  
Modeling Methods ◽  
The Difference ◽  
D Numbers

Belief function has always played an indispensable role in modeling cognitive uncertainty. As an inherited version, the theory of D numbers has been proposed and developed in a more efficient and robust way. Within the framework of D number theory, two more generalized properties are extended: (1) the elements in the frame of discernment (FOD) of D numbers do not required to be mutually exclusive strictly; (2) the completeness constraint is released. The investigation shows that the distance function is very significant in measuring the difference between two D numbers, especially in information fusion and decision. Modeling methods of uncertainty that incorporate D numbers have become increasingly popular, however, very few approaches have tackled the challenges of distance metrics. In this study, the distance measure of two D numbers is presented in cases, including complete information, incomplete information, and non-exclusive elements

Incomplete Information in Multidimensional Databases

2003 ◽  
pp. 282-309 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cirtis E. Dyreson ◽  
Torben Bach Pedersen ◽  
Christian S. Jensen
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Multidimensional Data ◽  
Uncertain Information ◽  
Real World Data ◽  
Multidimensional Database ◽  
Simple Strategy ◽  
Multidimensional Databases ◽  
Derived Data ◽  
Base Data

While incomplete information is endemic to real-world data, current multidimensional data models are not engineered to manage incomplete information in base data, derived data, and dimensions. This chapter presents several strategies for managing incomplete information in multidimensional databases. Which strategy to use is dependent on the kind of incomplete information present, and also on where it occurs in the multidimensional database. A relatively simple strategy is to replace incomplete information with appropriate, complete information. The advantage of this strategy is that all multidimensional databases can manage complete information. Other strategies require more substantial changes to the multidimensional database. One strategy is to reflect the incompleteness in computed aggregates, which is possible only if the multidimensional database allows incomplete values in its hierarchies. Another strategy is to measure the amount of incompleteness in aggregated values by tallying how much uncertain information went into their production.

AMERICAN OPTIONS AND INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (06) ◽  
pp. 1950035 ◽  
Author(s):  
ERIK EKSTRÖM ◽  
MARTIN VANNESTÅL
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
American Options ◽  
Lower Boundary ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Call Option ◽  
Standard Case ◽  
Underlying Process ◽  
Parameter Values ◽  
American Put

We study the optimal exercise of American options under incomplete information about the drift of the underlying process, and we show that quite unexpected phenomena may occur. In fact, certain parameter values give rise to stopping regions very different from the standard case of complete information. For example, we show that for the American put (call) option it is sometimes optimal to exercise the option when the underlying process reaches an upper (lower) boundary.

Game Theory and Other Modeling Approaches

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank C. Zagare ◽  
Branislav L. Slantchev
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
International Relations ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Third Wave ◽  
Extensive Form ◽  
Interactive Decision Making ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Almost All

Game theory is the science of interactive decision making. It has been used in the field of international relations (IR) for over 50 years. Almost all of the early applications of game theory in international relations drew upon the theory of zero-sum games, but the first generation of applications was also developed during the most intense period of the Cold War. The theoretical foundations for the second wave of the game theory literature in international relations were laid by a mathematician, John Nash, a co-recipient of the 1994 Nobel Prize in economics. His major achievement was to generalize the minimax solution which emerged from the first wave. The result is the now famous Nash equilibrium—the accepted measure of rational behavior in strategic form games. During the third wave, from roughly the early to mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, there was a distinct move away from static strategic form games toward dynamic games depicted in extensive form. The assumption of complete information also fell by the wayside; games of incomplete information became the norm. Technical refinements of Nash’s equilibrium concept both encouraged and facilitated these important developments. In the fourth and final wave, which can be dated, roughly, from around the middle of the 1990s, extensive form games of incomplete information appeared regularly in the strategic literature. The fourth wave is a period in which game theory was no longer considered a niche methodology, having finally emerged as a mainstream theoretical tool.

Implementation Errors and Incomplete Information

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rafael Portillo ◽  
Filiz Unsal ◽  
Stephen O’Connell ◽  
Catherine Pattillo
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Low Income ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Structural Features ◽  
New Keynesian ◽  
Low Income Countries ◽  
Keynesian Model ◽  
Policy Frameworks

This chapter shows that limited effects of monetary policy can reflect shortcomings of existing policy frameworks in low-income countries rather than (or in addition to) the structural features often put forward in policy and academic debates. The chapter focuses on two pervasive issues: lack of effective frameworks for implementing policy, so that short-term interest rates display considerable unintended volatility, and poor communication about policy intent. The authors introduce these features into an otherwise standard New Keynesian model with incomplete information. Implementation errors result from insufficient accommodation to money demand shocks, creating a noisy wedge between actual and intended interest rates. The representative private agent must then infer policy intentions from movements in interest rates and money. Under these conditions, even exogenous and persistent changes in the stance of monetary policy can have weak effects, even when the underlying transmission (as might be observed under complete information) is strong.

scholarly journals Linkboost: A Link Prediction Algorithm to Solve the Problem of Network Vulnerability in Cases Involving Incomplete Information

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Chengfeng Jia ◽  
Jie Ma ◽  
Qi Liu ◽  
Yu Zhang ◽  
Hua Han
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Prediction Algorithm ◽  
Network Vulnerability ◽  
Limited Information ◽  
Research Attention ◽  
Network Information ◽  
Imbalanced Class Distribution ◽  
High Degree ◽  
Attack Strategy

The vulnerability of network information systems has attracted considerable research attention in various domains including financial networks, transportation networks, and infrastructure systems. To comprehensively investigate the network vulnerability, well-designed attack strategies are necessary. However, it is difficult to formulate a global attack strategy as the complete information of the network is usually unavailable. To overcome this limitation, this paper proposes a novel prediction algorithm named Linkboost, which, by predicting the hidden edges of the network, can complement the seemingly missing but potentially existing connections of the network with limited information. The key aspect of this algorithm is that it can deal with the imbalanced class distribution present in the network data. The proposed approach was tested on several types of networks, and the experimental results indicated that the proposed algorithm can successfully enhance the destruction rate of the network even with incomplete information. Furthermore, when the proportion of the missing information is relatively small, the proposed attack strategy relying on the high degree nodes performs even better than that with complete information. This finding suggests that the nodes important to the network structure and connectivity can be more easily identified by the links added by Linkboost. Therefore, the use of Linkboost can provide useful insight into the operation guidance and design of a more effective attack strategy.

scholarly journals Outsourcing under incomplete information

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tarun Kabiraj ◽  
Uday Bhanu Sinha
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Fixed Cost ◽  
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Bayesian Equilibrium ◽  
Plant Level

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to show that outsourcing can occur as outcome of a separating or pooling perfect Bayesian equilibrium although it is not profitable under complete information. Therefore, asymmetric information can itself be a reason for outsourcing. Design/methodology/approach The present paper constructs a model of two firms interacting in the product market under asymmetric information where one firm has private information about its technological capability, and it has the option to produce inputs in-house or buy inputs from an input market. However, using outsourced inputs involves a fixed cost at the plant level. The model solves for perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Findings There are situations when under complete information, outsourcing of the input will not occur, but, under incomplete information, either only the low-cost type or both high and low-cost types will go for outsourcing, and there always exist reasonable beliefs supporting these equilibria. In particular, when the fixed cost is neither too small not too large, a separating equilibrium occurs in which the low-cost type outsources inputs from the input market but the high-cost type produces in-house; hence, outsourcing signals the firm’s type. Outsourcing by only the high-cost type firm will never occur in equilibrium. Originality/value That incomplete or asymmetric information can itself be a reason for strategic outsourcing is never identified in the literature. The present paper is an attempt to fill this gap and raise the issue of outsourcing in an incomplete information environment.

Incomplete information and iterated strict dominance

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian W Bach ◽  
Andrés Perea
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Solution Concept ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Common Belief ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Response Sets ◽  
Best Response ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient

Abstract The solution concept of iterated strict dominance for static games with complete information recursively deletes choices that are inferior. Here, we devise such an algorithm for the more general case of incomplete information. The ensuing solution concept of generalized iterated strict dominance is characterized in terms of common belief in rationality as well as in terms of best response sets. Besides, we provide doxastic conditions that are necessary and sufficient for modelling complete information from a one-person perspective.

scholarly journals Nonlinear Dynamics in a Cournot Duopoly with Different Attitudes towards Strategic Uncertainty

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luciano Fanti ◽  
Luca Gori ◽  
Mauro Sodini
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Complex Dynamics ◽  
Expected Utility Theory ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Strategic Uncertainty ◽  
Cournot Duopoly ◽  
Coexistence Of Attractors ◽  
Critical Lines ◽  
Over Time

This paper analyses the dynamics of a duopoly with quantity-setting firms and different attitudes towards strategic uncertainty. By following the recent literature on decision making under uncertainty, where the Choquet expected utility theory is adopted to allow firms to plan their strategies, we investigate the effects of the interaction between pessimistic and optimistic firms on economic dynamics described by a two-dimensional map. In particular, the study of the local and global behaviour of the map is performed under three assumptions: (1) both firms have complete information on the market demand and adjust production over time depending on past behaviours (static expectations—“best reply” dynamics); (2) both firms have incomplete information and production is adjusted over time by following a mechanism based on marginal profits; and (3) one firm has incomplete information on the market demand and production decisions are based on the behaviour of marginal profits, and the rival has complete information on the market demand and static expectations. In cases 2 and 3 it is shown that complex dynamics and coexistence of attractors may arise. The analysis is carried forward through numerical simulations and the critical lines technique.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document