Conditions and Obligations in ECB Supervisory Decisions as Ancillary Provisions under SSM Law

2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gianni Lo Schiavo
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Effects ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Insurance Supervision ◽  
European Central ◽  
The Right ◽  
National Competent Authorities ◽  
The Impact

The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) Regulation has conferred prudential tasks to the European Central Bank (ECB) which it shall carry out within a SSM composed of the ECB and national competent authorities (NCAs). This article assesses the legal feasibility to attach conditions and obligations in ECB supervisory decisions. It looks at other areas of EU administrative law (merger control and State aid law), assesses the ECJ Atradius (C-18/14) judgment in the area of insurance supervision and argues that conditions and/or obligations are ancillary provisions that can be included in ECB supervisory decisions as a matter of EU law. The article evaluates also the impact of the inclusion of conditions and/or obligations on the right to be heard under art.22 SSM Regulation. While conditions and obligations may have adverse effects, the article examines to what extent the right to be heard applies in cases the ECB includes conditions and/or obligations in ECB supervisory decisions.

Determinants of non-cash payments in the Eurozone: Culture matters

2020 ◽  
Vol 89 (4) ◽  
pp. 29-38
Author(s):  
Mechthild Schrooten ◽  
Armin Varmaz
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Cultural Factors ◽  
Uncertainty Avoidance ◽  
Cultural Issues ◽  
European Central ◽  
Cash Payment ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Basic Hypothesis ◽  
The Impact

Summary: Retail shops incentive contactless transactions during the current COVID-19 pandemic. Customers are asked to pay cashless to prevent contagion. Traditionally, there are large differences in the extent and acceptance of non-cash payments among nations. This paper analyzes empirically the determinants of the payment behavior in the member states of the Eurozone asking how to explain these traditional differences in non-cash payment preferences. Our basic hypothesis is that culture makes the difference across nations matter. The paper adds to the existing literature not only by focusing on the determinants of preferences for non-cash payments from a macroeconomic perspective but also by analyzing cultural factors. The payment data is gathered with the European Central Bank (ECB) and Eurostat. We examine the impact of culture on payment preferences by the means of the Hofstede indicators. Our empirical results show the importance of cultural issues to understand the acceptance of non-cash payments. In particular, the results suggest that a higher degree of uncertainty avoidance goes in line with more non-cash payments. Zusammenfassung: Im Zuge der Corona-Pandemie hat der Einzelhandel den Einsatz von non-cash Einzelhandel vorangetrieben. Um eine Covid-Ansteckung zu verhindern, werden Kund*innen gebeten bargeldlos zu zahlen. Tatsächlich es gibt zwischen einzelnen Volkswirtschaften große Unterschiede in der Verwendung von Bargeld und bargeldlosen Zahlungen. Im Beitrag wird empirisch der Frage nachgegangen, welche Faktoren hinter diesen Unterschieden stehen. Die zentrale Hypothese ist, dass Kultur eine große Rolle spielt. Dieses Paper analysiert auf der Grundlage der vorhandenen empirischen Literatur den Einfluss kultureller Faktoren auf den Einsatz von bargeldlosen Zahlungen. Dazu werden nicht nur makroökonomische Daten von der Europäischen Zentralbank und Eurostat, sondern auch die Hofstede Indikatoren herangezogen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass insbesondere die kulturelle Dimension „Uncertainty Avoidance“ die nationalen Differenzen der gesellschaftlichen Akzeptanz erklären kann. Volkswirtschaften mit einer höheren „Uncertainty Avoidance“ setzen stärker auf non-cash.

Troika's Portuguese Ministry of Justice Experiment: Dissipation of Doubts about Success, Continuation and Confirmation of Positive Results

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (24) ◽  
pp. 40-53
Author(s):  
Pedro Miguel Alves Ribeiro Correia ◽  
◽  
Susana Antas Videira ◽  
Ireneu de Oliveira Mendes ◽  
◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Quantitative Analysis ◽  
Empirical Study ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
European Commission ◽  
International Monetary Fund ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
European Central ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Positive Effect ◽  
Positive Results

This article is the continuation of a series of studies on the impact of the measures implemented by the Portuguese Ministry of Justice. This research addresses the results obtained in the civil enforcement actions arising from objectives included in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between Portugal and the so-called Troika (International Monetary Fund / European Commission / European Central Bank). The empirical study was extended to cover the quantitative analysis of the results achieved not only during the Troika period but also during the post-Troika period. The results show and confirm a continued positive effect on the level of civil enforcement actions in the period analyzed.

scholarly journals The ‘Haircut’ of Public Creditors under EU Law

2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 223-239 ◽  
Author(s):  
Armin Steinbach
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Debt Restructuring ◽  
Active Involvement ◽  
European Central ◽  
State Financing ◽  
The Eu

Haircut of public creditors as next step in the escalation of the euro debt crisis? – Exploring the boundaries set by the EU Treaty on debt restructuring – Limitations imposed by no-bailout clause and prohibition of monetary state financing – Standards set inPringleandGauweiler– Haircut on nominal debt infringes no-bailout clause – Active involvement by European Central Bank violates ban on monetary state financing – Other forms of ‘soft haircuts’ may be compatible with EU law

Article 284 TFEU

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leo Flynn
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Governing Council ◽  
European Central ◽  
Right To Vote ◽  
The Right

Article 113 EC The President of the Council and a Member of the Commission may participate, without having the right to vote, in meetings of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank.

scholarly journals The Single Supervisory Mechanism Regulation: Questions of ne bis in idem and implications for the further integration of the system of fundamental rights protection in the EU

2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 194-216
Author(s):  
Bas van Bockel
Keyword(s):  
European Central Bank ◽  
Integrated System ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Single Supervisory Mechanism ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
European Central ◽  
Ne Bis In Idem ◽  
National Competent Authorities ◽  
The Eu

This article discusses the enforcement framework of Regulation No. 1024/2013 (the Single Supervisory Mechanism Regulation, or ‘SSMR’) in light of the potential ne bis in idem situations which may arise, both in the interaction between the different modes and instruments of enforcement available to the European Central Bank (ECB) and National Competent Authorities (NCAs) under the SSMR, as well as in relation to national laws. 1 Shared enforcement of the rules for credit institutions under the SSMR transcends the familiar legal divide between the EU and the Member States, and the division of tasks and competences between national and EU authorities that is characteristic of EU law. The question raised here is whether the integrated enforcement architecture of the SSMR is matched by a sufficiently integrated system of fundamental rights protection in the EU, as viewed through the ‘lens’ of the ne bis in idem principle.

Institutions of the European Union

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Lisbon Treaty ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Fourth Edition ◽  
European Central ◽  
Council Of Ministers ◽  
The Impact

The Institutions of the European Union explains the functions, powers, and composition of the European Union institutions. From the Council of Ministers to the European Central Bank, all of the most important organisations are analysed and explained. Updates for the fourth edition include discussions of the impact of the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and the financial crisis in the Eurozone on the EU’s institutions, as well as the rise of Euroscepticism. Authoritative yet accessible, it remains the best guide to how this range of different bodies work together to provide political direction, manage policies, and integrate contrasting interests within the European Union. Each chapter includes helpful features such as boxes, websites, and suggested further reading to aid learning.

scholarly journals Unconventional Monetary Policies: Lessons from the Past and the Present to Future Monetary Policy Frameworks

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-99
Author(s):  
Cristiano Boaventura Duarte ◽  
André Modenesi ◽  
Antonio Licha ◽  
Emmanuel Carré
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Adverse Effects ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Evolutionary Perspective ◽  
Monetary Policies ◽  
European Central ◽  
The Past ◽  
Policy Frameworks

This article intends to debate important aspects related to past and recent experiences of monetary policy accommodation, focusing on unconventional monetary policies. We intend to draw lessons from these experiences to discuss the design of future monetary policy frameworks.First, by reporting several historical experiences of major central banks, we highlight that policies which after 2008 crisis were considered “unconventional” were not new, with central banks intervening to avoid broader deterioration of macro-financial conditions.Moreover, analyzing the experience of the European Central Bank after 2008, we observe this institution has adapted its measures according to its former programs and to other central banks' experiences, to face numerous challenges and enhance its framework. Finally, we argue that central banks need to take advantage of past and recent experiences to improve the design of their future monetary policy frameworks under an evolutionary perspective. Based on this, measures previously implemented would have three possible destinations in new frameworks: i) Be discarded, due to their predominantly adverse effects; ii) Not be regularly implemented, but be kept as backstop mechanisms if needed; iii) Be incorporated as regular measures of monetary policy frameworks.

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