On the Disruption of Post-colonial Constitutional Order: Hans Kelsen or Carl Schmitt?

ICL Journal ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 6 (3-4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Syed Sami Raza
Keyword(s):  
Legal Positivism ◽  
Carl Schmitt ◽  
Liberal Theory ◽  
Constitutional Theory ◽  
Post Colonial ◽  
Theoretical Contribution ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Liberal Constitutionalism ◽  
Hans Kelsen

AbstractIn wake of a coup d′état in 1958, the Supreme Court of Pakistan is asked to decide on its legality. The court, faced with lack of precedent, relies on Hans Kelsen's legal positivism. Over the next five decades the key theoretical basis of the decision is summoned in several other cases in different post-colonial states. This essay develops a critique of the application of Kelsen's theory. The aim of the critique, as well as an added theoretical contribution, is that I engage Carl Schmitt's critique of Kelsen. Accordingly, I redeem the 1920s debate between Kelsen and Schmitt in order to caste critical light on the court decisions. Moreover, I engage Schmitt's own constitutional theory in order to provide an alternative answer to the question of constitutional disruption. The task is twofold: first, to evaluate Kelsen's (liberal) constitutional theory, which purportedly seeks to answer the non-liberal or non-democratic challenge posed by constitutional disruption and dictatorship, and second, to explore the democratic element in the non-liberal theory of Schmitt. My conclusion is that although Kelsen gives politically correct principle of “the efficacy of change” as the basis of legality of constitutional disruption, however, the main steps in his theory do not support the principle. Moreover, the principle draws him away from his liberal constitutionalism. On the other hand, Schmitt's explanation of the same principle based as it is in a non-liberal or realist theory, answers well the question of disruption and dictatorship. Thus the courts that engage Kelsen remain hardpressed to defend their decisions, while those other courts that challenge Kelsen come close to Schmitt.

Reimagining Law and the Constitution: Carl Schmitt and American Constitutional Scholarship

ICL Journal ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 403-427
Author(s):  
Xiaodong Ding
Keyword(s):  
Legal Positivism ◽  
Carl Schmitt ◽  
Liberal Theory ◽  
The People ◽  
The Will ◽  
Theory Of Law ◽  
Alternative Understanding

AbstractThis article studies the debate between Schmitt’s theory and legal positivism, which Schmitt identifies as a typical liberal theory of law. Schmitt’s theory, I argue, provides a powerful critique of legal positivism, while offering a meaningful, alternative understanding of law that begins not with norms, but with the will of a legitimate decider. To demonstrate the continuing relevance of the debate Schmitt had with legal positivism, I turn to what I describe as a similar legal positivism/Schmitt debate in American constitutional scholarship. Ultimately, I take a side in this debate, arguing for a fully Schmittian understanding of the Constitution as the will or continuous decision of the people, rather than as positive constitutional norms existing independently of politics.

Part VI Constitutional Theory, D The Role of Constitutional Principles in Canadian Constitutional Law, Ch.47 Constitutional Principles in the Secession Reference

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leclair Jean
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Constitutional Theory ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Constitutional Changes ◽  
Political Compromises

In Reference Re Secession of Quebec, 1998, the Supreme Court of Canada concluded that the unwritten constitutional principles of federalism and democracy dictated that the clear repudiation of the existing constitutional order and the clear expression of the desire to pursue secession by the population of a province gave rise to a reciprocal obligation on all parties to the federation to negotiate constitutional changes to respond to that desire. To understand this astonishing decision, the author first examines how, over time, in Canada and Quebec, issues of identity(ies), constitutional law, and democracy came to be formulated in absolutist terms, making political compromises next to impossible. Only then does he analyse the Supreme Court’s decision and attempts to explain why the latter chose to decide as it did.

Carl Schmitt's Internal Critique of Liberal Constitutionalism: Verfassungslehre as a Response to the Weimar State Crisis

1997 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 203-225 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Seitzer
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Law ◽  
Carl Schmitt ◽  
Structural Defects ◽  
Constitutional Theory ◽  
Comparative History ◽  
Conceptual Approach ◽  
Concrete Situation ◽  
Liberal Constitutionalism ◽  
History Of ◽  
Constitutional Tradition

In one of his most famous dicta, the German legal and political theorist Carl Schmitt proclaimed it “obvious” that “all political concepts, images, and terms have a polemical meaning,” because “[t]hey are focused on a specific conflict and are bound to a concrete situation.” Taking Schmitt at his word, I argue that one must read Schmitt's masterpiece of comparative law from the Weimar period, Verfassungslehre, as a response to the Weimar state crisis. Schmitt's conceptual approach in Verfassungslehre aims to create a form of constitutional theory capable of compensating for structural defects of the Weimar state. Reading Verfassungslehre in this way also reveals that Schmitt does not present his constitutional theory as an alternative to liberal constitutionalism, but rather Schmitt's comparative history of constitutionalism in Verfassungslehre locates his decisionism at the very core of the liberal constitutional tradition.

Carl Schmitt's Critique of Liberal Constitutionalism

1996 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 299-322 ◽  
Author(s):  
William E. Scheuerman
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Legal Positivism ◽  
Carl Schmitt ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
Liberal Constitutionalism ◽  
History Of ◽  
Legal Thinking ◽  
Political Thinker

Despite growing interest in the ideas of Carl Schmitt, twentieth-century Germany's premier right-wing authoritarian political thinker, most American scholars continue to downplay the centrality of Schmitt's legal thinking to his overall theory. This article attempts to overcome this lacuna by critically scrutinizing Schmitt's influential critique of liberal constitutionalism. However provocative, Schmitt's critique ultimately proves untenable because (1) it relies on an overly selective, even caricatured reading of the history of liberal jurisprudence and (2) it reproduces the most worrisome methodological claims of Schmitt's main intellectual opponent, Hans Kelsen's legal positivism.

scholarly journals Constitutional Theory and The Quebec Secession Reference

2000 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sujit Choudhry ◽  
Robert Howse
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Constitutional Theory ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Political Consequences ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
Law And Politics ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Explicit Process

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Secession Reference has produced a torrent of public commentary. Given the fundamental issues about the relationship between law and politics raised by the judgment, what is remarkable is that that commentary has remained almost entirely in a pragmatic perspective, which asks how positive politics entered into the motivations and justifications of the Court, and looks at the results in terms of their political consequences, without deep or sustained reflection on the ultimate grounds for the role the Court took upon itself, or on the normative sources of its reasoning. In this article, we explore the Quebec Secession Reference through the lens of constitutional theory. In particular, we highlight three unconventional aspects of the Court’s reasoning: (a) the supplementation of the written constitution through an explicit process of amendment-like interpretation to craft a new legal framework governing the secession of a province from Canada, (b) the vesting by the Court of substantial, if not exclusive responsibility for interpreting the constitutional rules on secession in particular situations or contexts with political organs, not the courts, and (c) the ascent by the court to abstract normativity, in articulating a normative vision of the Canadian constitutional order, whence it derived the legal framework governing secession. In addition to drawing attention to these unusual aspects of the judgment, we articulate the theoretical justifications that both explain and justify those features of the judgment, and identify issues for future discussion.

Riccardo Saccenti, Debating Medieval Natural Law: A Survey. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2016, XIII, pp. 155.

Mediaevistik ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 318-320
Author(s):  
Scott L. Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Natural Rights ◽  
Legal Positivism ◽  
Great Chain Of Being ◽  
History Of ◽  
History Of Concepts ◽  
Hans Kelsen ◽  
University Of Notre Dame ◽  
Conceptual Shift

Saccenti’s volume belongs to the category of Begriffsgeschichte, the history of concepts, and more particularly to the debate over the existence or nonexistence of a conceptual shift in ius naturale to encompass a subjective notion of natural rights. The author argues that this issue became particularly relevant in mid-twentieth century, first, because of the desire to delimit the totalitarian implications of legal positivism chez Hans Kelsen; second, in response to Lovejoy’s The Great Chain of Being and its progeny; and third, as a result of a revival of neo-Thomistic and neo-scholastic perspectives sometimes labelled “une nouvelle chrétienté.”

scholarly journals Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi sebagai Tata Konstitusional Abnormal dan Implikasi Yuridis Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 36/PUU-XV/2017

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 130
Author(s):  
Titon Slamet Kurnia
Keyword(s):  
Classical Model ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Court Decision ◽  
Constitutional Theory ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
The Status

Artikel ini mencerminkan pendapat penulis yang tidak setuju dengan keberadaan KPK dan Teori Konstitusi yang mendasarinya. Artikel ini didasarkan pada teori trias politica klasik dan mengajukan pendapat bahwa keberadaan badan-badan yang bersifat eksekutif harus sesuai dengan preskripsi teori unitary executive. Sesuai dengan teori unitary executive, presiden harus diberikan kewenangan to appoint and remove setiap pejabat eksekutif secara eksklusif. Kaidah ini didasarkan pada status presiden sebagai Chief Executive. Berdasar pengertian ini, KPK, sebagai badan independen, inkonstitusional. Seturut dengan Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi No. 36/PUU-XV/2017 yang mengkualifikasikan KPK sebagai eksekutif, tata konstitusional kita yang abnormal, dengan keberadaan KPK, harus dinormalkan sesuai dengan teori unitary executive. This article expresses the author’s view to disagree with the existence of the KPK and its supporting Constitutional Theory. This article is based on classical model of the trias politica theory and suggests that the existence of executive bodies should conform with the prescription of unitary executive theory. According to the unitary executive theory, the president should have the power to appoint and remove any executive official exclusively. This norm is based on the status of the president as the Chief Executive. According to this notion, the KPK, as independent agency, is unconstitutional. In line with the Constitutional Court Decision No. 36/PUU-XV/2017, qualifying the KPK as executive, our abnormal constitutional order, with the existence of the KPK, should be normalized in accordance with the unitary executive theory.

scholarly journals Do positivismo ao positivismo jurídico: reverberações na formação do Bacharel em Direito (From Positivism to Legal Positivism: reverberations in Bachelor of Law Training)

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ricardo Morais Pereira ◽  
Sônia Aparecida Siquelli
Keyword(s):  
Rio De Janeiro ◽  
Sao Paulo ◽  
Legal Positivism ◽  
São Paulo ◽  
Porto Alegre ◽  
Hans Kelsen ◽  
The Law ◽  
Theory Of Law ◽  
Legal Concepts ◽  
The Right

This article analyzes the pedagogical ideas of legal education in Brazil, in a historical and political perspective, seeking to question how positivist thought has exerted and still exerts influence in the formation of Law professionals, since, at present, the egress profile has was shown with the characteristics of a technical professional, who was often incapable of exercising a reflection of his own practice. Conceived in the nineteenth century, the positivist school, whose precursor was the philosopher Augusto Comte, maintained that only the laws established by science should be accepted. In the juridical field, positivism was elaborated in detail by the Austrian jurist and philosopher Hans Kelsen in his work "Pure Theory of Law", which corroborated the influence of philosophical positivism in the legal field, by maintaining that only the law is able to fully realize the Right. For the rigid thought, the norm is sufficient, being the main source of the Law, prevailing over all the others. The methodology used in the research was of a qualitative nature, developed from a bibliographic analysis of the philosophical legal concepts that compose the formation of this professional. A documentary investigation was also made in the curricular guidelines pointed out by the Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC). The final results of this research identified that legal positivism continues to influence the formation of the bachelor of Law. However, it is not the only factor that forges the current legal professional.ResumoO presente artigo analisa as ideias pedagógicas do ensino jurídico no Brasil, numa perspectiva histórica e política, buscando questionar como o pensamento positivista exerceu e ainda exerce influência na formação dos profissionais do Direito, uma vez que, atualmente, o perfil do egresso tem se mostrado com características de um profissional técnico, entretanto incapaz muitas vezes de exercer uma reflexão de sua própria prática. Concebida no século XIX, a escola positivista, que teve como precursor o filósofo Augusto Comte, sustentava que apenas as leis estabelecidas pela ciência deveriam ser aceitas. No campo jurídico, o positivismo foi detalhadamente trabalhado pelo jurista e filósofo austríaco Hans Kelsen em sua obra “A Teoria Pura do Direito”, que corroborou a influência do positivismo filosófico no campo jurídico, ao sustentar que apenas a lei é capaz de realizar plenamente o Direito. Para o rígido pensamento, a norma se basta, sendo a principal fonte do Direito, prevalecendo sobre todas as demais. A metodologia empregada na pesquisa foi de natureza qualitativa, desenvolvida a partir de uma análise bibliográfica dos conceitos filosóficos jurídicos que compõem a formação deste profissional. Também foi feita uma investigação documental nas diretrizes curriculares apontadas pelo Ministério da Educação e Cultura (MEC). Os resultados finais desta pesquisa identificaram que o positivismo jurídico continua influenciando a formação do bacharel do Direito. No entanto, não é o único fator que forja o atual profissional da área jurídica.Keywords: Positivism, Legal positivism, Curricular guidelines, Bachelor's degree in law.Palavras-chave: Positivismo, Positivismo jurídico, Diretrizes curriculares, Bacharelado em direito.ReferencesBITTAR, E. C. B. Curso de filosofia do direito. 4 ed. São Paulo: Atlas, 2005.BRASIL. Constituição (1988). Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil. Brasília, DF: Senado Federal: Centro Gráfico, 1988. 292 p.BRASIL. Resolução CNE/CES n. 9/2004. Brasília: CNE, 2004.COMPARATO, F. K.  Ética: direito, moral e religião no mundo moderno. 3 ed. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2016.COMTE, A. Comte (Os pensadores) Curso de filosofia positiva; Discurso sobre o espírito positivo; Discurso preliminar sobre o conjunto do positivismo; Catecismo positivista. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1978.DELBONO, B. F. Os Direitos difusos e coletivos como componentes obrigatórios na organização curricular das faculdades de direito do Brasil. 2007. Tese (Doutorado em Direito das Relações Sociais), Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, São Paulo, 2007.KELSEN, Hans. Teoria geral das normas. Tradução de Jose? Florentino Duarte. Porto Alegre: Fabris, 1986.KELSEN, Hans. Teoria Geral do Direito e do Estado. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1998a.KELSEN, Hans. Teoria pura do direito. Tradução: João Baptista Machado. 6 ed. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1998b. MENDONÇA, J. S. Curso de Filosofia do Direito: o homem e o Direito. 2 ed. São Paulo: Rideel, 2011.MOSSINI, D. E. S. Ensino jurídico: história, currículo e interdisciplinaridade. 2010. Tese (Doutorado em Educação). Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo – PUC-SP, São Paulo, 2010.MOTTA, C. D. B; BROLEZZI, A. C. A influência do positivismo na história da educação matemática no Brasil. Universidade de São Paulo, 2008. OLIVEIRA, A. G. de. Filosofia do Direito. São Paulo: Editora Saraiva, 2012.REALE, M. Lições preliminares de Direito. 27 ed. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2002.ROCHA, J. L. A educação matemática na visão de Augusto Comte. 2006. Tese de Doutorado em Educação. Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro, 2006.ROCHA. L. S. Epistemologia e democracia. 2 ed. São Leopoldo: Unisinos, 2003.SAVIANI, D. A educação na Constituição Federal de 1988: avanços no texto e sua neutralização no contexto dos 25 anos de vigência. Revista Brasileira de Política e Administração da Educação, v. 29, n. 2, p. 207-221, maio/ago. 2013.SAVIANI, D. História das ideias pedagógicas no Brasil. Campinas: Autores Associados, 2007. SIMIONI, R. L. Curso de hermenêutica jurídica contemporânea: do positivismo clássico ao pós-positivismo jurídico. Curitiba: Juruá, 2014.SANCHES, R. C. F.; PEREIRA, N. C. F. O ensino dogmático do direito como elemento limitador à universalização do acesso à justiça. XVIII CONGRESSO NACIONAL DO CONPEDI. Anais...  São Paulo, 2009.WARAT, L. A. A pureza do poder: uma análise crítica de teoria jurídica. Florianópolis: Ed. da UFSC, 1983.WARAT, L. A. Introdução geral ao direito: a epistemologia jurídica da modernidade. Porto Alegre:  Safe, 2002.WARAT, L. A. Introdução geral ao direito: O direito não estudado pela teoria jurídica moderna. Porto Alegre: Safe, 1997.WARAT, L. A. Saber crítico e senso comum teórico dos juristas. In: Seqüência. UFSC, Florianópolis, SC, Brasil, ISSNe 2177-7055, 1982.WOLKMER, A. C. História do Direito no Brasil. 2 ed. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Forense, 2000. 

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