Reimagining Law and the Constitution: Carl Schmitt and American Constitutional Scholarship

ICL Journal ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 403-427
Author(s):  
Xiaodong Ding
Keyword(s):  
Legal Positivism ◽  
Carl Schmitt ◽  
Liberal Theory ◽  
The People ◽  
The Will ◽  
Theory Of Law ◽  
Alternative Understanding

AbstractThis article studies the debate between Schmitt’s theory and legal positivism, which Schmitt identifies as a typical liberal theory of law. Schmitt’s theory, I argue, provides a powerful critique of legal positivism, while offering a meaningful, alternative understanding of law that begins not with norms, but with the will of a legitimate decider. To demonstrate the continuing relevance of the debate Schmitt had with legal positivism, I turn to what I describe as a similar legal positivism/Schmitt debate in American constitutional scholarship. Ultimately, I take a side in this debate, arguing for a fully Schmittian understanding of the Constitution as the will or continuous decision of the people, rather than as positive constitutional norms existing independently of politics.

scholarly journals MENAKAR PROGRESIFITAS LEMBAGA PERADILAN DALAM MEWUJUDKAN DEMOKRASI BERINTEGRITAS

2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 2102-2117
Author(s):  
Alda Rifada Rizqi
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Legal Positivism ◽  
The People ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Law ◽  
Corrupt Behavior

Democracy with integrity will be realized if carried out in accordance with the will of the people as holders of sovereignty, the KPU (Komisi Pemilihan Umum) as the election organizer has the authority to make regulations that support a better democracy. KPU (Komisi Pemilihan Umum) Regulation No. 20 of 2018 as evidence that the KPU is committed to participating in preventing corrupt behavior. It was considered to have been considered as an effort to protect the interests of the people, but the regulation was submitted to a judicial review at the Supreme Court. Then, based on legal-formal considerations and based on the legal positivism of the Supreme Court, the request for the test is granted. The decision distanced itself from progressive legal values that justified the denial of what was regulated in legislation in order to put forward the values of public justice, because basically the law was made to fulfill human interests, accommodating the will of the people for the sake of order.

Schmitt’s democratic dialectic: On the limits of democracy as a value

2020 ◽  
pp. 019145372091651
Author(s):  
Larry Alan Busk
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Democratic Politics ◽  
Carl Schmitt ◽  
Parliamentary Democracy ◽  
Panoramic View ◽  
A Value ◽  
The People ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Will ◽  
Fundamental Value

In this essay, I attempt to measure various prevailing democratic theories against an argument that Carl Schmitt advances in the first chapter of his ‘Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy’. In practice, he claims there, democratic politics is compelled to introduce a distinction between ‘the will of the people’ and the behaviour of the empirical people, thus justifying the bracketing and unlimited suspension of the latter in the name of the former, even to the point of dictatorship. I argue that no contemporary approach to democracy as a fundamental value is able to mount a compelling response to this critique and that we should therefore reconsider the status of democracy as a normative commitment. I proceed by carefully and closely reading Schmitt’s chapter and then by juxtaposing various currents of democratic theory (including liberal, deliberative, epistemic and various hybrids thereof) with the trajectory of Schmitt’s argument. This essay is therefore less of a contribution to Schmitt scholarship, in the sense that it does not take a panoramic view of his corpus to determine his final stance on democracy, and more of an intervention into contemporary democratic theory using Schmitt’s argument as a kind of lever.

On the Disruption of Post-colonial Constitutional Order: Hans Kelsen or Carl Schmitt?

ICL Journal ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 6 (3-4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Syed Sami Raza
Keyword(s):  
Legal Positivism ◽  
Carl Schmitt ◽  
Liberal Theory ◽  
Constitutional Theory ◽  
Post Colonial ◽  
Theoretical Contribution ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Liberal Constitutionalism ◽  
Hans Kelsen

AbstractIn wake of a coup d′état in 1958, the Supreme Court of Pakistan is asked to decide on its legality. The court, faced with lack of precedent, relies on Hans Kelsen's legal positivism. Over the next five decades the key theoretical basis of the decision is summoned in several other cases in different post-colonial states. This essay develops a critique of the application of Kelsen's theory. The aim of the critique, as well as an added theoretical contribution, is that I engage Carl Schmitt's critique of Kelsen. Accordingly, I redeem the 1920s debate between Kelsen and Schmitt in order to caste critical light on the court decisions. Moreover, I engage Schmitt's own constitutional theory in order to provide an alternative answer to the question of constitutional disruption. The task is twofold: first, to evaluate Kelsen's (liberal) constitutional theory, which purportedly seeks to answer the non-liberal or non-democratic challenge posed by constitutional disruption and dictatorship, and second, to explore the democratic element in the non-liberal theory of Schmitt. My conclusion is that although Kelsen gives politically correct principle of “the efficacy of change” as the basis of legality of constitutional disruption, however, the main steps in his theory do not support the principle. Moreover, the principle draws him away from his liberal constitutionalism. On the other hand, Schmitt's explanation of the same principle based as it is in a non-liberal or realist theory, answers well the question of disruption and dictatorship. Thus the courts that engage Kelsen remain hardpressed to defend their decisions, while those other courts that challenge Kelsen come close to Schmitt.

On the Will of the People: Notes on the Political “Theory” of Populism

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Claus Offe
Keyword(s):  
Ethnic Identity ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Political Rhetoric ◽  
The Political ◽  
The People ◽  
National People ◽  
The Will

The “will of the (national) people” is the ubiquitously invoked reference unit of populist politics. The essay tries to demystify the notion that such will can be conceived of as a unique and unified substance deriving from collective ethnic identity. Arguably, all political theory is concerned with arguing for ways by which citizens can make e pluribus unum—for example, by coming to agree on procedures and institutions by which conflicts of interest and ideas can be settled according to standards of fairness. It is argued that populists in their political rhetoric and practice typically try to circumvent the burden of such argument and proof. Instead, they appeal to the notion of some preexisting existential unity of the people’s will, which they can redeem only through practices of repression and exclusion.

On the Artifactual—and Natural— Character of Legal Institutions

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Corrado Roversi
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
Common Ground ◽  
Legal Positivism ◽  
Legal Institutions ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Legal Realism ◽  
Natural Law Theory ◽  
The Law ◽  
Theory Of Law

Are legal institutions artifacts? If artifacts are conceived as entities whose existence depends on human beings, then yes, legal institutions are, of course, artifacts. But an artifact theory of law makes a stronger claim, namely, that there is actually an explanatory gain to be had by investigating legal institutions as artifacts, or through the features of ordinary artifacts. This is the proposition explored in this chapter: that while this understanding of legal institutions makes it possible to find common ground between legal positivism and legal realism, it does not capture all of the insights offered by these two traditions. An artifact theory of law can therefore be necessary in explaining the law, but it will not suffice to that end. This chapter also posits that legal artifacts bear a relevant connection to certain conceptions of nature, thus vindicating one of the original insights behind natural law theory.

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