Hungarian Constitutional Court: The Limits of EU Law in the Hungarian Legal System

ICL Journal ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-151
Author(s):  
Tímea Drinóczi

Abstract The Constitutional Court declared in its ruling 22/2016 (XII 5) that by exercising its competences, it can examine whether the joint exercise of competences under Article E) (2) of the Fundamental Law of Hungary infringes human dignity, other fundamental rights, the sovereignty of Hungary, or Hungary’s self-identity based on its historical constitution.

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 91-111
Author(s):  
Ana Paula Barcellos

The paper deals with a situation that perhaps represents one of the most radical and profound challenges to the claim that contemporaneous western societies – and Brazilian society in particular – share the values concerning equality and essential or ontological dignity of mankind. It is an attempt to investigate how Brazilian society, immersed in a context of fear as a result of urban violence, deals with its prison population. This paper is divided into three main parts. Part one deals with a situation of fact: traditional, ongoing, generalized, serious and practically institutionalized violation of the fundamental rights of prison inmates in Brazil. This situation of fact easily leads one to conclude that inmates in Brazil are not treated like human beings (and are probably not even considered as human beings). Part two is an attempt to examine some possible explanations of why this situation exists. In part three, the paper tries to suggest that there is a connection between how prisoners are treated and the current level of urban violence in Brazil as a contributing factor. Considering that neither the principle of human dignity nor the actions of the legal system have been able to change the scenario that has built up in recent decades, perhaps it would be useful to suggest that inhumane treatment of inmates is not just a problem restricted to prisons: society as a whole receives the effects of this policy in the form of more violence. 


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 91-111
Author(s):  
Ana Paula Barcellos

The paper deals with a situation that perhaps represents one of the most radical and profound challenges to the claim that contemporaneous western societies – and Brazilian society in particular – share the values concerning equality and essential or ontological dignity of mankind. It is an attempt to investigate how Brazilian society, immersed in a context of fear as a result of urban violence, deals with its prison population. This paper is divided into three main parts. Part one deals with a situation of fact: traditional, ongoing, generalized, serious and practically institutionalized violation of the fundamental rights of prison inmates in Brazil. This situation of fact easily leads one to conclude that inmates in Brazil are not treated like human beings (and are probably not even considered as human beings). Part two is an attempt to examine some possible explanations of why this situation exists. In part three, the paper tries to suggest that there is a connection between how prisoners are treated and the current level of urban violence in Brazil as a contributing factor. Considering that neither the principle of human dignity nor the actions of the legal system have been able to change the scenario that has built up in recent decades, perhaps it would be useful to suggest that inhumane treatment of inmates is not just a problem restricted to prisons: society as a whole receives the effects of this policy in the form of more violence. 


2021 ◽  
pp. 94-140
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter takes an overall view of the EU legal order and examines its legal system, including the elements which are either different from or similar to member states’ legal systems. It begins by taking an overall view of the EU legal order, the different forms of EU law, and the various sources of law contributing to this legal order, in particular now the rich source of human and fundamental rights in the EU legal order. It considers the non-strictly legally binding rules known as ‘soft law’. It also looks at the ways or processes by which the binding laws are made and reviews alternative decision-making and law-making developments.


Author(s):  
Juan Ignacio Ugartemendia Eceizabarrena

Este artículo es un estudio relativo a la tutela judicial de los Derechos Fundamentales cuando se aplica Derecho de la Unión en el ámbito interno, y a cuáles son los principales problemas con los que se topa el Juez nacional que aplica el Derecho de la Unión al llevar a cabo dicha función protectora. El trabajo, dicho de forma más concreta, se centra en el examen de una serie de recientes y decisivas resoluciones jurisdiccionales, dictadas tanto por parte del Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea como por parte del Tribunal Constitucional Español, que analizan problemas y señalan soluciones relativas a esas cuestiones, además de mostrar cuál es la evolución y el estado de la situación al respecto. Se trata de resoluciones que abordan cuestiones de fondo, como, por ejemplo: ¿hasta qué punto es posible utilizar estándares nacionales de protección de los Derechos Fundamentales en situaciones conectadas con el Derecho de la Unión o con su aplicación, en lugar de utilizar el sistema de protección de los Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea? Y asimismo, resoluciones que atienden a cuestiones de dimensión más procesal como la de dirimir hasta qué punto tiene autonomía el Juez nacional a la hora de plantear una petición prejudicial (se entiende a la hora de tutelar derechos reconocidos por normas de la Unión) en relación a las normas procesales nacionales.This article deals with the judicial protection of fundamental rights when EU Law is applied at national level and the main problems national judges have to deal with when applying EU Law as protectors of rights. More precisely, the work is focused on the examination of some recent and decisive judicial decisions, both by the European Court of Justice and by the Spanish Constitutional Court which analyze the problems and address the solutions to those questions besides showing the evolution and current situation in that regard. They are decisions that deal with the merits as for example to which extent it might be possible to use national standards of protection of fundamental rights in situations connected to EU Law or to its application instead of using the system of protection of EU human rights. Likewise, they are decisions which handle with more procedural questions as for example to what extent national judges are autonomous to file a preliminary question (it is understood that when it comes time to protect rights acknowledged by the EU) relative to national procedural rules.


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosaria Sicurella

The decision of the Court of Justice in the M.A.S. and M.B. case marks a very significant step forward in the Taricco saga. It clearly shows the intention of the European Court to tone down the confrontation with the Italian Constitutional Court, while at the same time maintaining the most relevant achievement of the decision in the Taricco case, that is to say the fact to consider Article 325 TFEU as having direct effect. The author expresses quite a critical view on the solution adopted by the ECJ which finally results in a sort of “flexibilization” of the principle of legality at EU level in order to meet some of the claims by the Italian Constitutional Court. In the author's opinion, such a solution risks to undermine the overall coherence and soundness of the protection of fundamental rights at EU level, although it can appear at a first glance to boost the legality principle. A better solution could have been to develop a different reasoning relying on rights in the Charter other that the nullum crimen principle, and avoid to touch at the well-established scope of this principle as established in Article 49 Charter and also in Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights.


2013 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Herwig C.H. Hofmann ◽  
C. Mihaescu

Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU – Multiple sources of fundamental rights in the EU legal system – Non-hierarchical, pluralistic understanding of their interrelationship – Case study: the right to good administration – Difficulties in defining the scope of the right to good administration under the Charter and that of the right to good administration as a general principle of EU law – Adoption of a pluralistic understanding of the EU fundamental rights’ sources allows for a clarification and improved understanding of the individual's rights in the EU legal system


Author(s):  
O. Kosilova

The article analyzes human dignity as a legal category and fundamental natural human right. The place and role of the right to human dignity in the system of constitutional rights of Ukraine and Germany are compared. The scientific substantiation of the right to human dignity in Ukraine and Germany, its normative protection in both countries, is investigated. The approaches to defining and interpreting the right to human dignity in the practice of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine and the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany are compared. The relationship between the right to human dignity and other human rights is determined, as well as the sphere of protection of this right. In particular, there are parallels between the right to life and the right to human dignity, and their relationship is determined. It is substantiated that the human life and dignity of each person enjoy the same constitutional protection regardless of the duration of the individual's physical existence. It is established that among Ukrainian scholars there is no unified view of the right to dignity as a fundamental natural right. The right to human dignity in Ukraine is enshrined in the norms of constitutional, civil and criminal law. For the most part, the protection of the right to human dignity is correlated with the right to the protection of honour and goodwill. The right to human dignity and honour are not clearly distinguished. The legisla- tion of Ukraine does not contain a legal norm defining the concept of the right to human dignity. The case-law of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in this area is not sufficiently developed and does not constitute a proper legal framework. In Germany, the right to human dignity is a decisive and fundamental human right that is fundamental to all other rights. Human dignity is the supreme fundamental value and the root of all fundamental rights. The right to human dignity enshrined in Article 1 of the Constitution of the Fed- eral Republic of Germany defines it as an absolute value, which means that it cannot be restricted by any other norm, even by another fundamental right that follows from human dignity.


Author(s):  
María Cinta Costa Torné

En este artículo se pretende hacer un breve estudio de la ilicitud de la prueba y de las consecuencias jurídicas que ello conlleva, así como de las excepciones a dicha ilicitud. La sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional 114/1984, de 29 de noviembre, introdujo en nuestro sistema legal la prohibición de utilizar pruebas obtenidas vulnerando derechos fundamentales. Consecuencia de esta sentencia fue el artículo 11.1 Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial que prohíbe expresamente la valoración de dichas pruebas, que puedan surtir efectos en el proceso y sirvan para basar en ellas una sentencia condenatoria. No obstante esta regla de exclusión de la prueba ilícita, el riesgo de admitir una prueba obtenida habiéndose vulnerado derechos fundamentales está presente en nuestro proceso a través de las cada vez más frecuentes excepciones, apreciadas por los Tribunales, tanto por el Tribunal Supremo como por el Tribunal Constitucional, que permiten que una prueba ilícitamente obtenida, se llegue a valorarse para que determinados delitos no queden impunes.This repot is a brief study of the illegality of the evidence and its legal consequences, as well as the exceptions to that illegality. The sentence of the Constitutional Court 114/1984, 29th November, introduced in our legal system the prohibition on using evidence obtained violating fundamental rights. According to that sentence Article 11.1 LOPJ prohibit expressly assessment of such evidence that can have an impact on the process and serve them to base a conviction. However this rule of exclusion of illegal evidence, the risk of admitting obtained evidence having violated fundamental rights is present in our laws, through increasingly frequent exceptions, appreciated by both the Spreme Court and the Constitutional Court, which allow that an illegally obtained evidence, could be valuable for certain crimes not to go unpunished.


2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (S1) ◽  
pp. 19-26
Author(s):  
Karsten Schneider

AbstractThe First Senate of the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) has recently introduced the express promise that where EU fundamental rights take precedence over German fundamental rights, the Court itself could directly review, on the basis of EU fundamental rights, the application of EU law by German authorities. There are, however, differences between the Basic Law as the relevant standard of review and other standards of review that are dangerous to ignore. The constitutional status of the FCC’s jurisdiction depends crucially on whether the Court relies on the constitution or on EU fundamental rights. If the constitutional status of the novel jurisdiction covered any binding-effect, and that is a big if, the FCC still would not safeguard the unity and coherence of Union law. Leaving aside the fact that the First Senate is confined to reversing and remanding (unable to enforce anything directly), no beneficial effect on legal certainty grows apparent. Any binding-effect of the novel jurisdiction only provides for consistency without finality. And to venture further into the question: Even if anyone welcomed this novel kind of consistency without finality (virtually “provisional consistency”), this oddish consistency would still be a localized consistency, i.e. in German courts only.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 91-111
Author(s):  
Ana Paula Barcellos

The paper deals with a situation that perhaps represents one of the most radical and profound challenges to the claim that contemporaneous western societies – and Brazilian society in particular – share the values concerning equality and essential or ontological dignity of mankind. It is an attempt to investigate how Brazilian society, immersed in a context of fear as a result of urban violence, deals with its prison population. This paper is divided into three main parts. Part one deals with a situation of fact: traditional, ongoing, generalized, serious and practically institutionalized violation of the fundamental rights of prison inmates in Brazil. This situation of fact easily leads one to conclude that inmates in Brazil are not treated like human beings (and are probably not even considered as human beings). Part two is an attempt to examine some possible explanations of why this situation exists. In part three, the paper tries to suggest that there is a connection between how prisoners are treated and the current level of urban violence in Brazil as a contributing factor. Considering that neither the principle of human dignity nor the actions of the legal system have been able to change the scenario that has built up in recent decades, perhaps it would be useful to suggest that inhumane treatment of inmates is not just a problem restricted to prisons: society as a whole receives the effects of this policy in the form of more violence. 


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