Kant’s Political Philosophy as ausübende Rechtslehre

Kant Yearbook ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-47
Author(s):  
Bo Fang

Abstract Based on Kant’s own concept of politics, it is possible to construct his political philosophy that is related to but also different from his metaphysics of right. Politics is the practice of realizing the principles of right in experience; therefore, Kant’s political philosophy must explore the general conditions that make this practice possible. These conditions, such as political judgement, publicity and the enlightenment of the people, are indispensable to Kant’s thinking about human external freedom but do not belong to the metaphysics of right. Kant’s metaphysics of right is undoubtedly a liberal theory, but we can also identify some republican elements in his political philosophy. In this way, Kant provides us with a very instructive programme to absorb republican elements within a liberal theory.

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 352-366 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce Baugh

In Bergsonism, Deleuze refers to Bergson's concept of an ‘open society’, which would be a ‘society of creators’ who gain access to the ‘open creative totality’ through acting and creating. Deleuze and Guattari's political philosophy is oriented toward the goal of such an open society. This would be a democracy, but not in the sense of the rule of the actually existing people, but the rule of ‘the people to come,’ for in the actually existing situation, such a people is ‘lacking’. When the people becomes a society of creators, the result is a society open to the future, creativity and the new. Their openness and creative freedom is the polar opposite of the conformism and ‘herd mentality’ condemned by Deleuze and Nietzsche, a mentality which is the basis of all narrow nationalisms (of ethnicity, race, religion and creed). It is the freedom of creating and commanding, not the Kantian freedom to obey Reason and the State. This paper uses Bergson's The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, and Deleuze and Guattari's Kafka: For a Minor Literature, A Thousand Plateaus and What is Philosophy? to sketch Deleuze and Guattari's conception of the open society and of a democracy that remains ‘to come’.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olivier Klein

This is a pdf of the original typed manuscript of a lecture made in 2006. An annotated English translation will be published by the International Review of Social Psychology. I this text, Moscovici seeks to update his earlier work on the “conspiracy mentality” (1987) by considering the relationships between social representations and conspiracy mentality. Innovation in this field, Moscovici argues, will require a much thorough description and understanding of what conspiracy theories are, what rhetoric they use and what functions they fulfill. Specifically, Moscovici considers conspiracies as a form of counterfactual history implying a more desirable world (in which the conspiracy did not take place) and suggests that social representation theory should tackle this phenomenon. He explicitly links conspiracy theories to works of fiction and suggests that common principles might explain their popularity. Historically, he argues, conspiracism was born twice: First, in the middle ages, when their primary function was to exclude and destroy what was considered as heresy; and second, after the French revolution, to delegitimize the Enlightenment, which was attributed to a small coterie of reactionaries rather than to the will of the people. Moscovici then considers four aspects (“thematas”) of conspiracy mentality: 1/ the prohibition of knowledge; 2/ the duality between the majority (the masses, prohibited to know) and “enlightened” minorities; 3/ the search for a common origin, a “ur phenomenon” that connects historical events and provides a continuity to History (he notes that such a tendency is also present in social psychological theorizing); and 4/ the valorization of tradition as a bulwark against modernity. Some of Moscovici’s insights in this talk have since been borne out by contemporary research on the psychology of conspiracy theories, but many others still remain fascinating potential avenues for future research.


Author(s):  
Viriato Soromenho-Marques ◽  

In this paper the philosophical foundations of the first Portuguese Constitution are submitted to critical analysis. Drafted in the aftermath of the 1820 Revolution, the Constitution of 1822 is deeply determined by contradictory tensions and forces. We may see in it the trace of the freedom trends developed in the Enlightenment period and led to practical terms in the dramatic battleground of the French Revolution. Nevertheless, the Portuguese Constitution of 1822 reflect also the energetic resistance from the conservative sectors and values of the Portuguese society and also the coming influence of the Restoration Age political philosophy, aimed to fight the rationalistic paradigm of natural right constitutional theories.


Author(s):  
Daniel M. Stout

Chapter four looks at Charles Dickens’s 1859 novel, A Tale of Two Cities. By examining parallels between the novel and Robespierre’s political philosophy, this chapter argues that Dickens’s novel understands the French Revolution not as an event that gave individuals the right of self-governance but as the event that formalized a conception of citizenship in which individual persons stand as avatars for the national will. The Revolutionary Terror and the guillotine are thus seen as the logical consequence of a theory of the nation that prioritized the People over individual persons.


2020 ◽  
pp. 166-182
Author(s):  
Ari Hirvonen ◽  
Susanna Lindroos-Hovinheimo

In this chapter Hirvonen and Lindroos-Hovinheimo argue that the revolutionary power of constituent power and popular sovereignty are relevant conditions of radical emancipatory and egalitarian politics. How the people become the people – and what makes the people in its becoming – are relevant questions in modern democracy. The article considers the power of the people as a theoretical idea and political possibility. It brings together the older tradition of political philosophy with contemporary theory by discussing Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s ideas together with those of Jacques Rancière, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Alain Badiou.


2019 ◽  
pp. 145-166
Author(s):  
S. Elizabeth Penry

In 1774, a mob of commoner Andeans in one town in the viceroyalty of Peru attacked and killed their cacique, claiming that no person could be held responsible because the común, the community of commoners, had done it. The political theory was simple: if the cacique is good, he should be obeyed, but if he is a tyrant, if he does not serve justice, the people of the community have a right to overthrow him. A synthesis of pre-Columbian practices, religious teachings, and Spanish political philosophy, it was taught by officers in the cabildo and cofradías of the town. Also known as the rey común, Andeans defined it as “the ayllus together.” In testimony and written petitions, comuneros defended their right to overthrow their cacique, while professing loyalty to the Crown by paying tribute and serving mita. This idea of commoner self-government spread to other indigenous towns.


Author(s):  
Mark Hulliung

Montesquieu, one of the greatest figures of the Enlightenment, was famous in his own century both in France and in foreign lands, from Russia to the American colonies. Later generations of French philosophes took for granted his concern to reform the criminal laws, to replace the Inquisition with a reign of tolerance, and to repudiate the vicious conquests of the Spaniards in the Americas. They also accepted his finding that Protestant, commercial, and constitutionalist England and Holland represented all the best possibilities of Europe; whereas Catholic, economically backward, and politically absolutist Portugal and Spain represented the worst of the Western world and constituted a warning to the French. Although the findings and specific reforms proposed by Montesquieu were repeated by many another figure of the French Enlightenment, his work in certain respects remained unique in the circles of the most advanced thinkers. In his efforts to think systematically about politics and to do so by employing the comparative method, he stands virtually alone in his age. Other thinkers sharing his commitments resorted to the universalizing language of natural rights when they ventured into the realm of political philosophy. Or, like Voltaire, they tied their thoughts about politics to a succession of specific issues, each essay bearing so indelibly the imprint of specific time and place that there was no room for theory in their writings. Finally, as is true of Diderot or D’Alembert, many of the philosophes were slow to recognize what Montesquieu knew from the outset, that if Enlightenment does not extend to politics it is futile. Steeped in Montaigne’s scepticism, Montesquieu found that in the absence of absolutes there were good reasons to appreciate the ‘more than/less than’ and ‘better than/worse than’ judgments of comparative analysis. In his notebooks he commented that the flaw of most philosophers had been to ignore that the terms beautiful, good, noble, grand, and perfect are ‘relative to the beings who use them’. Only one absolute existed for Montesquieu and that was the evil of despotism, which must be avoided at all costs. Montesquieu wrote three great works, each teaching lessons about despotism and freedom,The Persian Letters (1721), the Considerations of the Grandeur of the Romans and the Cause of Their Decline (1734), and The Spirit of the Laws (1748).


ICL Journal ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 403-427
Author(s):  
Xiaodong Ding

AbstractThis article studies the debate between Schmitt’s theory and legal positivism, which Schmitt identifies as a typical liberal theory of law. Schmitt’s theory, I argue, provides a powerful critique of legal positivism, while offering a meaningful, alternative understanding of law that begins not with norms, but with the will of a legitimate decider. To demonstrate the continuing relevance of the debate Schmitt had with legal positivism, I turn to what I describe as a similar legal positivism/Schmitt debate in American constitutional scholarship. Ultimately, I take a side in this debate, arguing for a fully Schmittian understanding of the Constitution as the will or continuous decision of the people, rather than as positive constitutional norms existing independently of politics.


2020 ◽  
pp. 73-86
Author(s):  
Mohsen Kadivar

This chapter investigates critically the Treatise on Rights (Resalat al-Huquq) of the fourth Shi‘a Imam ‘Ali b. al-Husain Sajad (48–94 h/658–713 ad), which is mostly ethical teachings and in fact, was a letter he wrote to one of his companions. The chapter includes the following: first, a brief consideration of the sources of the treatise, assessing the documents of the treatise, determining the most accurate text of the treatise among differing versions, and a general review of the introduction and categorization of the fifty-one rights listed in the treatise. Following this, the chapter addresses the meaning of “rights” in the Treatise of Rights. To do so, the chapter will distinguish various terminologies of right in the Qur’an, the hadith as well as in philosophy, theology, ethics and fiqh, and compare Imam Sajjad’s notion of “right” with the concept as it appears in the philosophy of law, political philosophy and law. Finally, and as an example, the chapter analyses the section on political rights (al-huquq al-asasi), that is, the rights of the sultan and the people (the ruler and the ruled) in relation to one another.


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