scholarly journals Ontological Indifference of Theories and Semantic Primacy of Sentences

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dirk Greimann
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Scientific Theory ◽  
Ontological Commitment ◽  
Philosophy Of Mathematics ◽  
Ontological Commitments ◽  
Ontological Reduction ◽  
Structuralist View ◽  
New Interpretation

Abstract In his late philosophy, Quine generalized the structuralist view in the philosophy of mathematics that mathematical theories are indifferent to the ontology we choose for them. According to his ‘global structuralism’, the choice of objects does not matter to any scientific theory. In the literature, this doctrine is mainly understood as an epistemological thesis claiming that the empirical evidence for a theory does not depend on the choice of its objects. The present paper proposes a new interpretation suggested by Quine’s recently published Kant Lectures from 1980 according to which his global structuralism is a semantic thesis that belongs to his theory of ontological reduction. It claims that a theory can always be reformulated in such a way that its truth does not presuppose the existence of the original objects, but only of some objects that can be considered as their proxies. Quine derives this claim from the principle of the semantic primacy of sentences, which is supposed to license the ontological reductions he uses to establish his global structuralism. It is argued that these reductions do not actually work because they do not account for some hidden ontological commitments that are not detected by his criterion of ontological commitment.

Science, Scientism, and Evolution

2020 ◽  
pp. 125-138
Author(s):  
Michael L. Peterson
Keyword(s):  
Social Policy ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Strong Evidence ◽  
Scientific Theory ◽  
Science And Religion ◽  
Philosophical Naturalism ◽  
General Audience ◽  
Theory Of Evolution ◽  
The World ◽  
Evolutionary Science

This chapter discusses some themes to which Lewis returned often because they reflect philosophical errors that are still influential in culture—science and scientism, evolution and evolutionism. Under the facade of science, even the science of evolution, philosophical naturalism, materialism, and reductionism serve as the paragons of knowledge and often guide social policy. Thus, “scientism” and “evolutionism” are labels for the combination of naturalism and science in general and evolutionary science in particular. Lewis defines science as seeking natural causes for natural effects, which, when successful, formulates laws of the physical operation of nature. Such an intellectual enterprise is neutral with respect to religious and theological positions and is hardly strong evidence for naturalism and empiricism. Lewis identifies the conflict as occurring, not between science and religion (or theism), but between naturalism and theism as philosophical worldviews. As a case in point, Lewis sees no conflict between the scientific theory of evolution and its increasing confirmation by empirical evidence, but he does see a conflict between evolution as interpreted by philosophical naturalism—with ideas that humanity is not of special worth, that there is no God who is ultimately responsible for the existence of the world, and so on. An item of particular interest is the Lewis–Van Osdall correspondence (recently discovered, never before published) regarding what advice Lewis would offer on Van Osdall’s contemplated book aimed at presenting science to a general audience, especially a Christian audience.

Truthmaking, Supervenience, and Reduction

2018 ◽  
Vol 95 (4) ◽  
pp. 520-540
Author(s):  
Mohsen Zamani
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Commitment ◽  
Reduction Theory ◽  
Plausible Account ◽  
Ontological Reduction ◽  
Composite Objects ◽  
Commitment Theory

There are two main theories of ontological commitment: the quantifier view, and the truthmaker view. Since there are some truths that apparently commit us to certain entities, but actually do not, any ontological commitment theory must also contain an ontological reduction theory. Advocates of the quantifier view propose the paraphrasing method of reduction, while some advocates of the truthmaker view propose the supervenience method. In this paper, after a brief discussion of the quantifier view, the author proposes a modified version of truthmaker-based ontology, and shows that a plausible account of the supervenience method can be deduced from his version. He then shows that the supervenience method could explain why the paraphrasing method is successful. The author also argues that according to the truthmaker view we must accept composite objects as something over and above the particles which constitute them.

THE KING'S MEN IN UGARIT AND SOCIETY IN LATE BRONZE AGE SYRIA

2002 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ignacio Márquez Rowe
Keyword(s):  
Bronze Age ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Debt Service ◽  
Late Bronze Age ◽  
Social Categories ◽  
The Social ◽  
Modern Economic ◽  
King's Men ◽  
New Interpretation ◽  
Cette Notion

AbstractThis paper examines the sector of society generally known as the "palace dependents" in Late Bronze Age Syria. The discussion, however, is not centred on the notion itself (and the whole model of two economically divided sectors of society), but rather on the empirical evidence found in the cuneiform archives of Ugarit, Alalakh and Emar. Therefore, the social designations "king's man" in Ugarit (Ugaritic bunušu malki), and (Hurrian) eǵelli in Alalakh are revaluated, with the result of a new interpretation which seems to find confirmation in the terminology used in Emar. Rather than a designation based on modern economic notions, the dependent nature of these social categories seems to reveal a juridical ground, namely antichretic debt service. Cet article examine le secteur de la société connu généralement comme les "dépendants du palais" en Syrie à l'âge du Bronze récent. L'étude, cependant, n'est pas centrée autour de cette notion-ci (ou de l'idée plus générale qui met en cause une division bipartite de la société selon des critères d'ordre économique), mais vise plutôt à analyser l'évidence empirique des textes cunéiformes d'Ougarit, Alalakh et Emar. Il s'agit, donc, d'un réexamen de la terminologie sociale: d'une part les "hommes du roi" à Ougarit (en Ougaritique, bunušu malki), et, d'autre part, la désignation hourrite eǵelli à Alalakh. Le résultat c'est une nouvelle interprétation qui semble trouver une certaine confirmation dans la propre terminologie attestée à Emar. Plutôt qu'une terminologie basée sur des notions économiques modernes, la nature dépendante de ces catégories sociales semblent révéler une base d'ordre juridique, notamment le service antichrétique pour dettes.

scholarly journals The No Alternatives Argument

2019 ◽  
pp. 67-80
Author(s):  
Jan Sprenger ◽  
Stephan Hartmann
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Particle Physics ◽  
Scientific Theory ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Empirical Theory ◽  
Degree Of Belief ◽  
Feasible Alternative ◽  
Theory Confirmation ◽  
Degree Of Confirmation

Convincing scientific theories are often hard to find, especially when empirical evidence is scarce (e.g., in particle physics). Once scientists have found a theory, they often believe that there are not many distinct alternatives to it. Is this belief justified? We model how the failure to find a feasible alternative can increase the degree of belief in a scientific theory—in other words, we establish the validity of the No Alternatives Argument and the possibility of non-empirical theory confirmation from a Bayesian point of view. Then we evaluate scope and limits of this argument (e.g., by calculating the degree of confirmation it provides) and relate it to other argument forms such as Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) or “There is No Alternative” (TINA).

On What Exists

2020 ◽  
pp. 200-229
Author(s):  
Nathan Salmón
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Commitment ◽  
Ontological Commitments ◽  
Correct Criterion

Quine’s criterion of theoretical ontological commitment is subject to a variety of interpretations, all of which save one yield incorrect verdicts. Moreover, the interpretation that yields correct verdicts is not what Quine meant. Instead the intended criterion unfairly imputes ontological commitments to theories that lack those commitments and fails to impute commitments to theories that have them. Insofar as Quine’s criterion is interpreted so that it yields only correct verdicts, it is trivial and of questionable utility. Moreover, the correct criterion invokes analyticity, a notion that Quine spent most of his life tirelessly combating. This yields a dilemma for Quinean philosophy: either his criterion of ontological commitment is incorrect, or else Quine is committed to a traditional philosophical notion that he emphatically rejected as disreputable.

Fictionalism

2020 ◽  
pp. 103-121
Author(s):  
Richard Joyce
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Commitment ◽  
Moral Discourse ◽  
Ontological Commitments ◽  
The World ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
As If

The moral error theorist maintains that our ordinary use of moral discourse involves ontological commitments that the world fails to satisfy. What, then, should we do with our broken moral discourse? The revolutionary fictionalist recommends maintaining it but removing the problematic ontological commitment, in a manner modeled on our familiar engagements with fictions. The hermeneutic fictionalist, by contrast, claims that this is already how we use moral discourse. One problem for the revolutionary fictionalist is that there is a multitude of possible moral fictions, so why prefer one to another? One problem for the hermeneutic fictionalist is that it really doesn’t feel as if moral discourse resembles an engagement with fiction. Reflection on the nature of the familiar “mini-fictions” of metaphorical language—whereby we say something false as a way of conveying something true—helps solve both these problems in the moral fictionalist’s favor.

scholarly journals Does Ontology Exist?

Philosophy ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 77 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-260 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans-Johann Glock
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Framework ◽  
Ontological Commitment ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Ontological Commitments ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Ontological Turn ◽  
Analytic Ontology

Early analytic philosophers like Carnap, Wittgenstein and Ryle regarded ontology as a branch of metaphysics that is either trivial or meaningless. But at present it is generally assumed that philosophy can make substantial discoveries about what kinds of things exist and about the essence of these kinds. My paper challenges this ontological turn. The currently predominant conceptions of the subject, at any rate, do not license the idea that ontology can provide distinctively philosophical insights into the constituents of reality. I distinguish four main sources of analytic ontology—Strawson's descriptive metaphysics, Kripke's realist semantics, the Austro-Australian truth-maker principle, Quine's naturalistic conception of ontology—and indicate briefly why the first three do not rehabilitate ontology. In the remainder, I concentrate on the most influential and promising position. Quinean ontology seeks to bring out and reduce the ontological commitments of our best scientific theories through logical paraphrase. Against this programme, I argue that Quine's conception of ontological commitment is inadequate, and that his logical paraphrase cannot contribute to the exploration of reality, but at most to the clarification of our conceptual framework.

The Transcendence of The Natural-Language “Exist” When Used to Assert or Deny Ontological Commitment

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jody Azzouni
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language ◽  
Ontological Commitment ◽  
Language Usage ◽  
Natural Languages ◽  
Ontological Commitments ◽  
The Past ◽  
The World ◽  
The Future

It’s shown that the existence concept that we express in natural languages and that we use to think about what we—philosophers and non-philosophers—take to exist in the world is criterion-transcendent, transcendent, and univocal. That is, speakers use a notion that they take to be fixed in its extension across languages and to be the same one they’ve used in the past and will use in the future. Furthermore, the existence concept has no meaning entailments. We do not understand what exists to have certain properties (or not to have certain properties) on the basis of the meaning of the word “exist.” “Exist” and “there is,” when used to express or deny ontological commitments, are neither ambiguous nor polysemous. Language-usage evidence is presented that confirms these claims.

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