Welfare Luck Egalitarianism and Expensive Tastes

2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nils Holtug

AbstractIn his classic paper “Equality of What? Part 1: Equality of Welfare”, Ronald Dworkin argued that we should reject the notion that welfare is the currency of egalitarian justice. One reason is that this notion implies we should compensate individuals for expensive tastes they have deliberately cultivated. However, several egalitarians have objected that Dworkin conflates the resource/welfare and the luck/choice distinction. In particular, welfare luck egalitarianism implies that expensive tastes that are deliberately cultivated may not be compensable. In response to this criticism, Dworkin has more recently argued that welfare luck egalitarianism in fact collapses into ordinary welfare egalitarianism, or relies on an account of luck that is either incoherent or at least cannot provide a basis for egalitarian redistribution. Therefore, according to Dworkin, welfare luck egalitarianism does not solve the problem of expensive tastes. In the current article, I critically assess these recent arguments of Dworkin’s about the inadequacy of welfare luck egalitarianism. I argue that Dworkin has not shown that this notion collapses into ordinary welfare egalitarianism, or that it harbours a problematic account of luck.

1994 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin M. Macleod

The perfectly competitive market of economic theory often enters political philosophy because it can be represented as illuminating important values. Theorists who are enthusiastic about the heuristic potential of the market claim that we can learn much about individual liberty, the promotion of mutual advantage and efficiency in the distribution of goods by studying it. However, a principal limitation of the market for many theorists is its supposed insensitivity to the demands of egalitarian justice. According to the standard charge, markets—even idealised ones—are hostile to the achievement and maintenance of an equitable distribution of resources. It is striking, then, that a leading exponent of egalitarian justice like Ronald Dworkin should argue that there are very deep and systematic links between equality and the market. He contends that, contrary to the received view, “the best theory of equality supposes some actual or hypothetical market in justifying a particular distribution of goods and opportunities.” Moreover, the articulation of Dworkin’s influential egalitarian account of liberal political morality depends on acceptance of the market as an ally of equality. Thus Dworkin claims not only that the market plays a crucial role in the elaboration of a doctrine of distributive justice but also that it illuminates the distinctively liberal commitments to the protection of extensive individual liberty and to the requirement that the state must be neutral between different conceptions of the good. The aim of this paper is to raise some doubts about the soundness of one of the fundamental onnections Dworkin draws between the market and distributive justice.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nir Eyal

In its standard formulation, luck-egalitarianism is false. Disadvantages that result from free choice to take a risk can constitute egalitarian injusticeóso long as that free choice is morally praiseworthy or at least neutral. A modified formulation of luck-egalitarianism avoids these problems. The formulation offered here focuses on the notion of innocence: lack of free and morally wrong choice to take a risk. Innocent disadvantage negates justice in both punitive and distributive contexts, suggesting that it may negate justice ìitself.î The modified formulation of luck-egalitarianism may thus shed light on distributive justice and perhaps on the essence of justice itself; applying it to the punitive context can also illuminate some of the discussion of moral luck.


Author(s):  
G. A. Cohen

This chapter is a reply to “Equality and Capability,” in which Ronald Dworkin responded to some of the criticisms of his work that the Cohen made in “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice.” It begins by distinguishing two broad criticisms of equality of welfare that Dworkin has developed, one surrounding the indeterminacy of the concept of welfare and one surrounding the problem of expensive taste. It then explains what the phrase “expensive taste” means within the present debate. The remainder of the chapter discusses brute taste, that is, taste that is not guided by judgment; refutes the principal argument that Dworkin deploys against compensation for expensive judgmental taste; explains why the dispute about expensive taste matters; and offers a fragment of a taxonomy that distinguishes contrasting degrees of control that people display over the acquisition and the persistence of their tastes.


Author(s):  
G. A. Cohen

This chapter examines answers to the question posed by Amartya Sen in his Tanner Lecture of 1979 called “Equality of What?” Sen asked what metric egalitarians should use to establish the extent to which their ideal is realized in a given society. What aspect(s) of a person's condition should count in a fundamental way for egalitarians, and not merely as cause of or evidence of or proxy for what they regard as fundamental? The chapter also advances the Cohen's own answer to Sen's question. This answer is the product of an immanent critique of Ronald Dworkin, one that rejects Dworkin's declared position because it is not congruent with its own underlying motivation.


Author(s):  
G. A. Cohen

G. A. Cohen was one of the most gifted, influential, and progressive voices in contemporary political philosophy. At the time of his death in 2009, he had plans to bring together a number of his most significant papers. This is the first of three volumes to realize those plans. Drawing on three decades of work, it contains previously uncollected articles that have shaped many of the central debates in political philosophy, as well as papers published here for the first time. In these pieces, Cohen asks what egalitarians have most reason to equalize, he considers the relationship between freedom and property, and he reflects upon ideal theory and political practice. Included here are classic essays such as “Equality of What?” and “Capitalism, Freedom, and the Proletariat,” along with more recent contributions such as “Fairness and Legitimacy in Justice,” “Freedom and Money,” and the previously unpublished “How to Do Political Philosophy.” On ample display throughout are the clarity, rigor, conviction, and wit for which Cohen was renowned. Together, these essays demonstrate how his work provides a powerful account of liberty and equality to the left of Ronald Dworkin, John Rawls, Amartya Sen, and Isaiah Berlin.


Author(s):  
Richard J. Arneson

Ronald Dworkin is a founding father of what has come to be called “luck egalitarianism,” a family of distributive justice doctrines that hold that the inequalities in people’s condition that are brought about by sheer brute luck falling on them in ways that are beyond their power to control should be reduced or eliminated, but that inequalities that arise through people’s own fault or choice, such that they can reasonably be deemed responsible for their condition, need not be reduced or eliminated. Dworkin himself has come to embrace an alternative view, “justice as fair insurance.” This chapter characterizes Dworkin’s view, compares it to luck egalitarianism, and criticizes both doctrines.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Mirski ◽  
Mark H. Bickhard ◽  
David Eck ◽  
Arkadiusz Gut

Abstract There are serious theoretical problems with the free-energy principle model, which are shown in the current article. We discuss the proposed model's inability to account for culturally emergent normativities, and point out the foundational issues that we claim this inability stems from.


Author(s):  
R. Beeuwkes ◽  
A. Saubermann ◽  
P. Echlin ◽  
S. Churchill

Fifteen years ago, Hall described clearly the advantages of the thin section approach to biological x-ray microanalysis, and described clearly the ratio method for quantitive analysis in such preparations. In this now classic paper, he also made it clear that the ideal method of sample preparation would involve only freezing and sectioning at low temperature. Subsequently, Hall and his coworkers, as well as others, have applied themselves to the task of direct x-ray microanalysis of frozen sections. To achieve this goal, different methodological approachs have been developed as different groups sought solutions to a common group of technical problems. This report describes some of these problems and indicates the specific approaches and procedures developed by our group in order to overcome them. We acknowledge that the techniques evolved by our group are quite different from earlier approaches to cryomicrotomy and sample handling, hence the title of our paper. However, such departures from tradition have been based upon our attempt to apply basic physical principles to the processes involved. We feel we have demonstrated that such a break with tradition has valuable consequences.


2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (6) ◽  
pp. 1418-1422
Author(s):  
Bre Myers ◽  
J. Andrew Dundas

Purpose The primary aim of the current article is to provide a brief review of the literature regarding the effects of noise exposure on the vestibular and balance control systems. Although the deleterious effects of noise on the auditory system are widely known and continue to be an active area of research, much less is known regarding the effects of noise on the peripheral vestibular system. Audiologists with working knowledge of how both systems interact and overlap are better prepared to provide comprehensive care to more patients as assessment of both the auditory and vestibular systems has been in the audiologists' scope of practice since 1992. Method A narrative review summarizes salient findings from the archival literature. Results Temporary and permanent effects on vestibular system function have been documented in multiple studies. Hearing conservation, vestibular impairment, and fall risk reduction may be more intimately related than previously considered. Conclusions A full appreciation of both the vestibular and auditory systems is necessary to address the growing and aging noise-exposed population. More cross-system studies are needed to further define the complex relationship between the auditory and vestibular systems to improve comprehensive patient care.


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