The Market, Preferences, and Equality

1994 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin M. Macleod

The perfectly competitive market of economic theory often enters political philosophy because it can be represented as illuminating important values. Theorists who are enthusiastic about the heuristic potential of the market claim that we can learn much about individual liberty, the promotion of mutual advantage and efficiency in the distribution of goods by studying it. However, a principal limitation of the market for many theorists is its supposed insensitivity to the demands of egalitarian justice. According to the standard charge, markets—even idealised ones—are hostile to the achievement and maintenance of an equitable distribution of resources. It is striking, then, that a leading exponent of egalitarian justice like Ronald Dworkin should argue that there are very deep and systematic links between equality and the market. He contends that, contrary to the received view, “the best theory of equality supposes some actual or hypothetical market in justifying a particular distribution of goods and opportunities.” Moreover, the articulation of Dworkin’s influential egalitarian account of liberal political morality depends on acceptance of the market as an ally of equality. Thus Dworkin claims not only that the market plays a crucial role in the elaboration of a doctrine of distributive justice but also that it illuminates the distinctively liberal commitments to the protection of extensive individual liberty and to the requirement that the state must be neutral between different conceptions of the good. The aim of this paper is to raise some doubts about the soundness of one of the fundamental onnections Dworkin draws between the market and distributive justice.

Philosophy ◽  
2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith Hyams ◽  
Igor Shoikhedbrod

Political philosophy is that branch of philosophy concerned with political morality and associated concepts. Dominant themes include justice, equality, liberty, democracy, rights, the distribution of resources, and political authority. This entry focuses on contemporary discussions and debates in political philosophy.


Dialogue ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 553-568 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth F. Rogerson

For some time there have been arguments in favour of the claim that “free markets” are necessary for a proper account of distributive justice. Traditionally the arguments have come from two quarters. On the one hand markets are recommended for reasons of efficiency. This fits into a utilitarian argument claiming that market economies best promote the greatest good when compared to the alternatives. On the other hand there is a libertarian argument claiming that only free markets are consistent with individual liberty. Neither of these arguments have been met with widespread support. However, Ronald Dworkin has offered an argument supporting markets that breaks new ground. He argues that market economies have the considerable virtue of treating people as “equals” with respect to their preferences for goods and careers. This fits well with his larger claim that social justice in economics and politics requires treating people as equals.


Author(s):  
G. A. Cohen

G. A. Cohen was one of the most gifted, influential, and progressive voices in contemporary political philosophy. At the time of his death in 2009, he had plans to bring together a number of his most significant papers. This is the first of three volumes to realize those plans. Drawing on three decades of work, it contains previously uncollected articles that have shaped many of the central debates in political philosophy, as well as papers published here for the first time. In these pieces, Cohen asks what egalitarians have most reason to equalize, he considers the relationship between freedom and property, and he reflects upon ideal theory and political practice. Included here are classic essays such as “Equality of What?” and “Capitalism, Freedom, and the Proletariat,” along with more recent contributions such as “Fairness and Legitimacy in Justice,” “Freedom and Money,” and the previously unpublished “How to Do Political Philosophy.” On ample display throughout are the clarity, rigor, conviction, and wit for which Cohen was renowned. Together, these essays demonstrate how his work provides a powerful account of liberty and equality to the left of Ronald Dworkin, John Rawls, Amartya Sen, and Isaiah Berlin.


Author(s):  
Geoffrey Parsons Miller

This chapter explores the thesis that the historical narratives of the Hebrew Bible address abstract ideas about politics, government, and law. Taking issue with critics who view the Bible’s spiritual and theological message as incommensurable with political philosophy, the chapter argues that the stories of politics and kingship in the Hebrew Bible’s historical books set forth set forth an impressive political theory that rivals, in some respects, the work of Plato, Aristotle, and other Greek thinkers. The key is to bring out the general ideas behind the specific narrative elements. The chapter illustrates this thesis by examining the Hebrew Bible’s treatment of a number of classic problems of political theory: anarchy, obligation and sovereignty, distributive justice, and the comparative analysis of political organizations.


Legal Theory ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
Ira K. Lindsay

ABSTRACT Two rival approaches to property rights dominate contemporary political philosophy: Lockean natural rights and egalitarian theories of distributive justice. This article defends a third approach, which can be traced to the work of David Hume. Unlike Lockean rights, Humean property rights are not grounded in pre-institutional moral entitlements. In contrast to the egalitarian approach, which begins with highly abstract principles of distributive justice, Humean theory starts with simple property conventions and shows how more complex institutions can be justified against a background of settled property rights. Property rights allow people to coordinate their use of scarce resources. For property rules to serve this function effectively, certain questions must be considered settled. Treating existing property entitlements as having prima facie validity facilitates cooperation between people who disagree about distributive justice. Lockean and egalitarian theories endorse moral claims that threaten to unsettle property conventions and undermine social cooperation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Benoît De Courson ◽  
Daniel Nettle

AbstractHumans sometimes cooperate to mutual advantage, and sometimes exploit one another. In industrialised societies, the prevalence of exploitation, in the form of crime, is related to the distribution of economic resources: more unequal societies tend to have higher crime, as well as lower social trust. We created a model of cooperation and exploitation to explore why this should be. Distinctively, our model features a desperation threshold, a level of resources below which it is extremely damaging to fall. Agents do not belong to fixed types, but condition their behaviour on their current resource level and the behaviour in the population around them. We show that the optimal action for individuals who are close to the desperation threshold is to exploit others. This remains true even in the presence of severe and probable punishment for exploitation, since successful exploitation is the quickest route out of desperation, whereas being punished does not make already desperate states much worse. Simulated populations with a sufficiently unequal distribution of resources rapidly evolve an equilibrium of low trust and zero cooperation: desperate individuals try to exploit, and non-desperate individuals avoid interaction altogether. Making the distribution of resources more equal or increasing social mobility is generally effective in producing a high cooperation, high trust equilibrium; increasing punishment severity is not.


Geriatrics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 36
Author(s):  
David G Smithard ◽  
Nadir Abdelhameed ◽  
Thwe Han ◽  
Angelo Pieris

Discussion regarding cardiopulmonary resuscitation and admission to an intensive care unit is frequently fraught in the context of older age. It is complicated by the fact that the presence of multiple comorbidities and frailty adversely impact on prognosis. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation and mechanical ventilation are not appropriate for all. Who decides and how? This paper discusses the issues, biases, and potential harms involved in decision-making. The basis of decision making requires fairness in the distribution of resources/healthcare (distributive justice), yet much of the printed guidance has taken a utilitarian approach (getting the most from the resource provided). The challenge is to provide a balance between justice for the individual and population justice.


Author(s):  
Aaron James

Constructivism and intuitionism are often seen as opposed methods of justification in political philosophy. An “ecumenical” view sees them as different but unopposed: each style of reasoning can yield fundamental principles, for different questions of distributive justice, and we can rightly take up different questions, with different, equally valid, theoretical objectives, in hopes of cultivating a thousand blooming flowers. This chapter develops this position with special interest in Rawls’s constructivism, his treatment of reflective equilibrium, self-evidence, and “moral geometry,” and his evolving dialogue with the intuitionist Henry Sidgwick. Rawls’s main difference from Sidgwick lies in the way he frames the question of right or justice in the first instance. This brings out both the possibility and the attractions of the ecumenist conception in political philosophy.


Author(s):  
Jonathan Wolff

To trace the history of the concept of equality in political philosophy is to explore the answers that have been given to the questions of what equality demands, and whether it is a desirable goal. Considerations of unjust inequality appear in numerous different spheres, such as citizenship, sexual equality, racial equality, and even equality between human beings and members of other species. Ancient Greek political philosophy, despite Aristotle's famous conceptual analysis of equality, is generally hostile towards the idea of social and economic equality. Plato's account of the best and most just form of the state in the Republic is a society of very clear social, political, and economic hierarchy. It is with Thomas Hobbes that the idea of equality is put to work. This article explores equality as an issue of distributive justice; equality in the history of political philosophy; equality in contemporary political philosophy; the views of Ronald Dworkin, Karl Marx, and David Hume; equality of welfare; equality, priority, and sufficiency; Amartya Sen's capability theory; and luck egalitarianism.


Author(s):  
Rebecca Stone

Rights-based theories of private law tend to be wrongs based and defendant focused. But many private law wrongs do not seem like genuine wrongs, at least when the background distribution of resources is unjust. A very poor person, for example, may be held legally liable for breaching a one-sided contract with a very rich person. When such a contract reflects and reproduces existing injustice, it is hard to view the poor person’s breach of such a contract as a genuine wrong against the rich person. Conversely, some obvious moral wrongs do not generate legal liability. There is, for example, no private law duty of rescue in the absence of a prior relationship in many situations in which most would agree that there is a moral duty of rescue. Thus, private legal liability seems not to track moral wrongdoing in significant respects, raising the question what instead justifies such liability. Instead of justifying private liability in terms of the defendant’s wrongdoing, as corrective justice and civil recourse theorists do, we should seek a justification in terms of the plaintiff’s moral permission to enforce her apparent rights. Switching our gaze from the defendant’s wrongdoing to the plaintiff’s moral permission to enforce her rights will not be normatively consequential if the plaintiff’s moral permission arises when and only when the defendant has wronged her. But, I argue, background injustice can drive a wedge between genuine wrongdoing and the plaintiff’s moral permission. Thus, by reconceptualizing private liability in terms of a plaintiff’s moral permission to enforce her apparent rights, private law may be justified by the essential role it plays in constituting non-ideal political morality.


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