Balance of Power or Balance of Threat: Revisiting Ottoman Alliance Politics before the Great War

AbstractThe Ottoman alliance politics before the Great War has not been explored for theorizing alliance politics though it presents a unique example of alliance formation under external threat. Thus, in this article, a neo-realist balance of threat theory is utilized to examine the Ottoman decision to align with Germany in the Great War. Unlike a historical account as to why the Ottomans sided with the German-Austrian alliance, this article develops a theoretical approach that takes insights from ‘alliance theories’ to explain the Ottomans’ fateful alignment. Such an alliance theory approach underlines the dilemmas of the Ottoman decision makers and demonstrates ‘rational’ elements of their strategy of balancing the main source of the threat. By bringing alliance theories and Ottoman historiography together it is argued that the Ottomans, in their search for an alliance before the Great War, sought a “balance of threat” politics rather than a “balance of power” politics.

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France and the Serbian government's Yugoslav project

Balcanica ◽

10.2298/balc0637171p ◽

2006 ◽

pp. 171-193

Author(s):

Vojislav Pavlovic

Keyword(s):

Balance Of Power ◽

Great War ◽

French Politics ◽

Extreme Caution ◽

French Government ◽

The Creation ◽

The Great War ◽

Actual Realization

The French government and statesmen had never considered the creation of a unified South-Slav state as an objective of the Great War. Officially acquainted with the project through the Nis Declaration in December 1914 they remained silent on the issue, as it involved both the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy and, following the Treaty of London in May 1915, an open conflict with Italy. In neither case, then, did French diplomacy deem it useful to trigger such a shift in the balance of power in Europe just to grant the wishes of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Naturally, in the spring of 1918 the dismantlement of Austria-Hungary was envisaged, but with the view to weakening the adversary camp, while the destiny of the Yugoslav provinces remained undecided. Moreover, war imperatives required extreme caution in relation to Italian intransigency. The Italian veto weighed heavily on French politics, to the extent that even the actual realization of the Yugoslav project, proclamation of a unified state on 1 December 1918 in Belgrade, took place without a consent or implicit support on the part of the French government.

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Testing theories of alliance formation: the case of Southwest Asia

International Organization ◽

10.1017/s0020818300032823 ◽

1988 ◽

Vol 42 (2) ◽

pp. 275-316 ◽

Cited By ~ 55

Author(s):

Stephen M. Walt

Keyword(s):

International Relations ◽

Balance Of Power ◽

International Relations Theory ◽

Careful Examination ◽

Alliance Formation ◽

Geographic Proximity ◽

Power Theory ◽

Policy Debates ◽

Basic Issue ◽

Threat Theory

The question “what causes alignment?” remains a basic issue in international relations theory. Moreover, competing hypotheses about alliance formation underlie many recurring policy debates. Balance-of-power theory predicts states will ally to oppose the strongest state; the “bandwagoning hypothesis” predicts that alignment with the stronger side is more likely. These two hypotheses are usually framed solely in terms of the distribution of capabilities (that is, the balance of power), which neglects several other important factors and leads to faulty predictions about alliance choices. A careful examination of the alliance policies of Iran, Turkey, India, and Pakistan reveals that “balance-of-threat theory” provides a better explanation of alliance choices than these other conceptions. This theory predicts that states balance against the most threatening state, rather than the most powerful. Threats are a function of power, geographic proximity, offensive capability, and perceived intentions. Thus, balance-of-threat theory is an important refinement of structural balance- of-power theory.

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The elusive explanation: balance of power ‘theory’ and the origins of World War I

Review of International Studies ◽

10.1017/s0260210500112987 ◽

1989 ◽

Vol 15 (2) ◽

pp. 155-182 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Peter Gellman

Keyword(s):

World War I ◽

Balance Of Power ◽

Great War ◽

World War ◽

Power Theory ◽

Winston Churchill ◽

The Great War ◽

Looking Back

Martin Wight once asked why the balance of power ‘has inspired no great political writer to analysis and reflection’?Looking back in 1923, Winston Churchill wrote:One rises from the study of the causes of the Great War with a prevailing sense of the defective control of individuals upon world fortunes. It has been well said, ‘there is always more error than design in human affairs’. The limited minds even of the ablest men, their disputed authority, the climate of opinion in which they dwell, their transient and partial contributions to the mighty problem, that problem itself so far beyond their compass, so vast in scale and detail, so changing in its aspect—all this must surely be considered before the complete condemnation of the vanquished or the complete acquittal of the victors can be pronounced.

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Mozambickie zmagania Portugalczyków w czasie I wojny światowej

Klio - Czasopismo Poświęcone Dziejom Polski i Powszechnym ◽

10.12775/klio.2019.039 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 51 (4) ◽

pp. 109-136

Author(s):

Krzysztof Kubiak

Keyword(s):

East Africa ◽

British Empire ◽

Western Europe ◽

Balance Of Power ◽

Great War ◽

The South ◽

Military Literature ◽

Historical Literature ◽

The Great War

The historical literature devoted the Great War in Africa is dominated by the struggle between the German forces, superbly commanded by the initially lieutenant colonel, and finally general Major Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck and units of the British Empire. The main reason of such situation is that in the east of Africa, the Germans continued fighting until the ceasefire in Western Europe in November 1918. In this narrative, there is relatively little room for a broader description of the struggles between the Germans and the Portuguese in Mozambique. The Luzytan military effort was described mainly, and at the same time disapprovingly, by the British. The impression appears that Albion deprecating the Iberian ally tried to dump a significant portion of the responsibility for the South-East Africa failures. The intention of the author of this text is to show Portuguese actions in an objective manner, not burdened with the British imperial narrative. It serves, above all, the use of Portuguese materials. This is - according to the author's knowledge - the first such attempt in the area of Polish historical-military literature. The author discussed the course of armed operations between the Portuguese and German forces and their impact on the findings of international conferences building a new balance of power after the end of the Great War.

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Not the Radical republic: liberal ideology and central blandishment in France, 1901–1914

The Historical Journal ◽

10.1017/s0018246x00014898 ◽

1994 ◽

Vol 37 (3) ◽

pp. 593-614 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Donald G. Wileman

Keyword(s):

Third Republic ◽

Balance Of Power ◽

Great War ◽

Big Business ◽

The Third ◽

Liberal Ideology ◽

Dreyfus Affair ◽

Left And Right ◽

The Great War

ABSTRACTMadeleine Rebérioux was right to wonder whether France was truly a ‘Radical republic’ in the years between the Dreyfus affair and the Great War. Archives only opened or explored since Rebérioux published in 1975, and the re-interpretation of older newspaper sources, show that control of the Third Republic was still hotly contested in those years. The Radicals tried to build a republic in their own image, but in a situation where left and right were closely balanced, they were almost always foiled. Crucial to this process was a politically republican but socially conservative centre – best typified by the A.R.D. The A.R.D. wanted a Third Republic frankly favourable to the interests of big business. Since it held the parliamentary balance of power between the left and a right only partly republican, it generally got its way. Statistical sources also support this interpretation.

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