scholarly journals Anscombe and Davidson on Practical Knowledge. A Reply to Hunter

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Olav Gjelsvik
Keyword(s):  
Practical Knowledge ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Donald Davidson ◽  
Careful Consideration ◽  
Observational Knowledge

David Hunter has recently argued (in this journal) that Donald Davidson and Elizabeth Anscombe were in basic agreement about practical knowledge. In this reply, it is my contention that Hunter’s fascinating claim may not be satisfactorily warranted. To throw light on why, a more careful consideration of the role of the notion of practical knowledge in Anscombe’s approach to intentional action is undertaken. The result indicates a possible need to distinguish between what is called ‘practical knowledge’ and ‘(non-observational) knowledge of what one is doing’, and shows that Hunter’s claim concerning the closeness of Anscombe to Davidson only has plausibility for knowledge of what one is doing. Contrary to an interesting suggestion by Hunter, the paper argues that it is hard to see how Davidson’s position can benefit substantially from making use of the notion of knowledge of what one is doing.

scholarly journals Davidson on Practical Knowledge

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (9) ◽  
Author(s):  
David Hunter
Keyword(s):  
Early Treatment ◽  
Practical Knowledge ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Donald Davidson ◽  
Careful Study ◽  
Primary Reason ◽  
Standard Interpretation ◽  
General Belief

Did Donald Davidson agree with G.E.M. Anscombe that action requires a distinctive form of agential awareness? The answer is No, at least according to the standard interpretation of Davidson’s account of action. A careful study of Davidson’s early writings, however, reveals a much more subtle conception of the role of agential belief in action. While the role of the general belief in Davidson’s theory is familiar and has been much discussed, virtually no attention has been paid to the singular belief. This essay makes a start on remedying this neglect. I begin, in section 1, by examining Davidson’s claim that for a desire or belief to rationalize and cause an action it must have a suitable generality. It must, he says, be ‘logically independent’ of the action itself. While he was clear about this requirement in the case of the desire that forms part of a person’s primary reason, I show in section 2 that his early treatment of belief confuses general and singular beliefs. This confusion reflects his failure clearly to distinguish the two roles belief can play in his account of action: as rationalizing cause and as agential awareness. Somewhat surprisingly, though, after he carefully drew the distinction and announced that intentional action requires practical knowledge, he pretty much ignored it. This may explain why some have assumed that Davidson parted ways with Anscombe on this. But a careful study of their writings shows that in fact they held remarkably similar views on the nature and need for practical knowledge.  <br /><p> </p>

Practical Knowledge

2019 ◽  
pp. 155-200
Author(s):  
John Schwenkler
Keyword(s):  
Practical Knowledge ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
Efficient Cause ◽  
The World ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
Strict Requirement ◽  
Observational Knowledge

This chapter discusses the argument of Sections 44-48 of G.E.M. Anscombe’s Intention. It begins by situating her appeal to the concept of practical knowledge in relation to the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. Following this, the chapter shows how several elements in Aquinas’ account are drawn on by Anscombe in her argument that an agent’s self-knowledge of her act is “the cause of what it understands”. It is argued that Anscombe meant to characterize an agent’s practical knowledge as both formal and efficient cause of its object. Finally, the chapter considers whether Anscombe succeeds in defending her thesis that intentional action is necessarily known without observation. Here it is argued, first, that knowledge of one’s act is not a strict requirement of doing something intentionally, and second, that the role of observation in an agent’s self-knowledge is different from that of evidence in observational knowledge of the world.

scholarly journals Practical Knowledge and Acting Together

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olle Blomberg
Keyword(s):  
General Theory ◽  
Joint Action ◽  
Practical Knowledge ◽  
Special Kind ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Philosophical View ◽  
Observational Knowledge

This chapter explores a problem that joint action raises for an influential philosophical view of the nature of intentional action. According to this view, an agent is intentionally -ing if and only if she has a special kind of practical and non-observational knowledge that she is -ing. It is here argued, however, that this view faces serious problems when extended to make sense of the possibility of an intentional action performed by several agents together. Since a general theory of intentional action should be applicable to both singular and joint intentional action, this suggests that practical and non-observational knowledge is not essential to intentional action as such.

scholarly journals Deviant Formal Causation

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah K. Paul
Keyword(s):  
Side Effects ◽  
Practical Knowledge ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Causal Theory ◽  
Theory Of Action ◽  
Causal Theory Of Action ◽  
Causal Chains ◽  
The Right ◽  
Formal Causation

What is the role of practical thought in determining the intentional action that is performed? Donald Davidson’s influential answer to this question is that thought plays an efficient-causal role: intentional actions are those events that have the correct causal pedigree in the agent's beliefs and desires. But the Causal Theory of Action has always been plagued with the problem of “deviant causal chains,” in which the right action is caused by the right mental state but in the wrong way. This paper addresses an alternative approach to understanding intentional action inspired by G.E.M. Anscombe, interpreting that view as casting practical thought in the role of formal rather than efficient cause of action and thereby avoiding the problem of deviant (efficient) causal chains. Specifically, on the neo-Anscombean view, it is the agent’s “practical knowledge” – non-observational, non-inferential knowledge of what one is doing – that confers the form of intentional action on an event and is the contribution of thought to determining what is intentionally done. This paper argues that the Anscombean view is subject to its own problematic type of deviance: deviant formal causation. What we know non-observationally about what we are doing often includes more than what we intend to be doing; we also know that we are bringing about the foreseen side effects of acting in the intended way. It is argued that the neo-Anscombean view faces difficulty in excluding the expected side effects from the specification of what is intentionally done, whereas the Causal Theory has no such difficulty. Thus, the discussion amounts to an argument in favor of the Causal Theory of Action.

Anscombe on Practical Knowledge

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Moran
Keyword(s):  
Practical Knowledge ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Knowing That ◽  
Philosophical Account ◽  
Observational Knowledge ◽  
The Way

The notion of “practical knowledge” is a central part of the philosophical account of intentional action in Elizabeth Anscombe’s monograph Intention. It is characterized in a number of different ways: as a form of “non-observational” knowledge of what one is doing, as the way a person knows what she will do when this is grounded in an intention and not a mere prediction, as a “non-contemplative” mode of knowing that is “the cause of that which it understands.” The paper attempts to organize and show the coherence of these various strands in Anscombe’s conception of practical knowledge, and argues that it enables us to understand both how the agent’s perspective on what she is doing plays a constitutive role in the identity of the intentional action in question, while yet allowing that a person can fail to do what she takes herself to be doing.

scholarly journals Anscombe on the Expression of Intention

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Moran ◽  
Martin J. Stone
Keyword(s):  
Intentional Action ◽  
Donald Davidson ◽  
Philosophy Of Action ◽  
Verbal Expression

This paper asks an interpretive question about the place of “expression of intention” in Anscombe’s opening presentation of three familiar employments of a concept of intention, commonly taken as distinguishing between (1) having or forming the intention to do something, (2) doing something intentionally, and (3) doing something with a certain intention. An initial project in philosophy of action is, then, determining which of these employments is primary and can be used to explain the others. Anscombe’s own first division, however, is not the having of an intention but the expression of intention, as when someone says, “I’m going for a walk.” The paper argues that attention to the role of expression is not a mere peculiarity of Anscombe’s, and that specifically verbal expression provides a way to see how radically different in orientation Anscombe’s conception of intentional action is from the “standard story” of action since Donald Davidson.

Practical Knowledge and Luminosity

Mind ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 129 (516) ◽  
pp. 1237-1267 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan S Piñeros Glasscock
Keyword(s):  
Practical Knowledge ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Donald Davidson ◽  
Perceptual Knowledge ◽  
Necessary Connections ◽  
Practical Nature

Abstract Many philosophers hold that if an agent acts intentionally, she must know what she is doing. Although the scholarly consensus for many years was to reject the thesis in light of presumed counterexamples by Donald Davidson, several scholars have recently argued that attention to aspectual distinctions and the practical nature of this knowledge shows that these counterexamples fail. In this paper I defend a new objection against the thesis, one modelled after Timothy Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument. Since this argument relies on general principles about the nature of knowledge rather than on intuitions about fringe cases, the recent responses that have been given to defuse the force of Davidson’s objection are silent against it. Moreover, the argument suggests that even weaker theses connecting practical entities (e.g. basic actions, intentions, attempts, etc.) with knowledge are also false. Recent defenders of the thesis that there is a necessary connection between knowledge and intentional action are motivated by the insight that this connection is non-accidental. I close with a positive proposal to account for the non-accidentality of this link without appeal to necessary connections by drawing an extended analogy between practical and perceptual knowledge.

The Equality of Women: The Bahá’í Principle of Complementarity

1990 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 55-66
Author(s):  
John S. Hatcher
Keyword(s):  
Careful Consideration ◽  
Careful Study ◽  
Men And Women ◽  
Complementary Relationship ◽  
Baha'i Faith ◽  
Religious Convictions ◽  
Role Of Women ◽  
Principle Of Complementarity

The Bahá’í teachings simultaneously assert the equality of men and women while advocating in some cases distinct duties according to gender. Since the Bahá’í Faith also teaches that religious convictions should be examined by the “standards of science,” this ostensible paradox invites careful study. At the heart of the response to this query is the Universal House of Justice statement that “equality between men and women does not, indeed physiologically it cannot, mean identity of functions.” To appreciate and to accept this thesis that there can be gender distinction, even insofar as the assignment of fundamental tasks is concerned, without any attendant diminution in the role of women, we must turn to statements in the Bahá’í writings about the complementary relationship between men and women. Through a careful consideration of this principle, we can discover how there can indeed be gender distinction without inequality in status or function.

THE ISSUE OF MINORS’S GUARDIANSHIP SENTENCED TO IMPRISONMENT

2020 ◽  
pp. 33-37
Author(s):  
Ирина Викторовна Евстафьева
Keyword(s):  
Juvenile Offenders ◽  
Legal Status ◽  
Careful Consideration ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Sufficient Detail ◽  
Domestic Legislation ◽  
The Status ◽  
Correct Understanding ◽  
The Given

В статье исследуются вопросы попечительства в отношении несовершеннолетних, отбывающих наказание в виде лишения свободы. Проблема, поднимаемая автором настоящей статьи, многогранна, касается различных аспектов отбывания наказания несовершеннолетними в воспитательных колониях и требует комплексного исследования, способного ответить на определенно значимый вопрос: является ли колония законным представителем находящихся в ней несовершеннолетних со всеми вытекающими из статуса законных представителей последствиями. При этом необходимо обращать внимание на специфику правового статуса лиц, отбывающих наказание в воспитательных колониях, которые, во-первых, являются несовершеннолетними, то есть не обладают дееспособностью в полном объеме и нуждаются в особой заботе, защите и представительстве, а во-вторых, осуждены за совершение тяжкого или особо тяжкого преступления, влекущего изоляцию от общества и определенные ограничения и лишения. Отечественное законодательство достаточно детально регламентирует особенности режима отбывания наказания в виде лишения свободы несовершеннолетними, не определяя при этом статуса воспитательных колоний, кем они являются: воспитателями, попечителями или исключительно учреждениями исполнения наказаний. Между тем правильное понимание значения и роли воспитательной колонии в жизни находящихся в ней несовершеннолетних преступников, по мнению автора, поможет избежать ряда проблем, объективно складывающихся в учреждениях подобного рода. С этой точки зрения предлагаемая тема представляет интерес не только для ученых-теоретиков, но и для практиков - сотрудников соответствующих учреждений. Особо следует подчеркнуть, что исследований по данной тематике в специальной литературе нет. Отдельные исследования, встречающиеся в современной литературе, касаются исключительно общего гражданско-правового статуса несовершеннолетних осужденных. Однако это обстоятельство может свидетельствовать только о новизне данной темы, но никак не об отсутствии самой проблемы. The article analyzes the issues of the status of educational colonies as guardians of minors serving a sentence of imprisonment. In fact, the problem raised by the author of this article is multifaceted, concerns various aspects of the serving of punishment by minors in educational colonies and requires a comprehensive study that can answer, it seems, a definitely significant question: whether the colony is the legal representative of the minors in it with all the consequences arising from the status of legal representatives in the form of duties and responsibilities. At the same time, it seems, it is necessary to pay attention to the specifics of the legal status of citizens serving sentences in educational colonies, who, firstly, are minors, i.e. do not have full legal capacity and need special care, protection and representation, and, secondly, are convicted of committing a serious or particularly serious crime, entailing isolation from society and certain restrictions and deprivation. Domestic legislation regulates in sufficient detail the peculiarities of the regime of serving sentences in the form of deprivation of liberty by minors, without determining the status of educational colonies. Who are they: educators, Trustees or only institutions of execution of punishments. Meanwhile, the correct understanding of the importance and role of the educational colony in the life of juvenile offenders in it, according to the author, will help to avoid a number of problems that objectively develop in institutions of this kind. From this point of view, the proposed topic is of interest not only for theoretical scientists, but for practitioners-employees of relevant institutions. It should be emphasized that there are no studies on this subject in the special literature. However, this circumstance can testify only about novelty of the given subject, but in any way about absence of the problem. It seems that the relevance and importance of a problem is not always measured by the number of studies devoted to it. Sometimes these its traits are manifest only under particularly careful consideration.

Conclusion

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karin Nisenbaum
Keyword(s):  
Practical Knowledge ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
German Idealism ◽  
Human Action ◽  
The World ◽  
Fundamental Tension

The concluding chapter draws on the story of Rosenzweig’s near conversion to Christianity and return to Judaism to explain why, for Kant and his heirs, what is at issue in reason’s conflict with itself is our ability to affirm both the value of the world and of human action in the world. The chapter explains why Rosenzweig came to view the conflict of reason as the manifestation of a more fundamental tension between one’s selfhood and one’s worldliness, which could only be dissolved by understanding human action in the world as the means by which God is both cognized and partly realized. To make Rosenzweig’s ideas more accessible, the chapter compares them with contemporary interpretations of Kant’s views on the nature of practical knowledge and (intentional) action. It also shows how the book’s take on the issues that shaped the contours of post-Kantian German Idealism can help us see that the conflict of reason can be regarded as the underlying concern that recent competing interpretations of this period share.

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