scholarly journals Russell’s Use Theory of Meaning

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas Griffin
Keyword(s):  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
Theory Of Meaning

Russell is often accused of having a naive ‘Fido’–Fido theory of meaning of the sort Wittgenstein attacked at the beginning of the Philosophical Investigations. In this paper I argue that he never held such a theory though I concede that, prior to 1918, he said various things that might lead a very careless reader to suppose that he had. However, in The Analysis of Mind (1921), a book which (from the work of Garth Hallett) we know Wittgenstein studied closely, Russell put forward an account of understanding an utterance which clearly anticipates the use theory of meaning usually attributed to Wittgenstein. The paper concludes with some problems for understanding the use theory of meaning as presented by both Russell and, derivatively, Wittgenstein.

Möchte Chomsky erklären, was Wittgenstein beschreibt?

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-123
Author(s):  
Melanie Uth
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
The Other ◽  
Rule Following ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
Complementary Distribution ◽  
Linguistic Research ◽  
Theory Of Meaning ◽  
Basic Concepts ◽  
The One ◽  
Language Meaning

AbstractThis article examines the relation between the philosophy of language proposed by the later Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations, and his ambition to cure philosophy from the mapping of linguistic expressions to extra-linguistic entities, on the one hand, and Chomsky's statements regarding language, meaning, and thought, and regarding the sense and non-sense of different fields of linguistic research, on the other. After a brief descriptive comparison of both approaches, it is argued that Chomsky's criticism on Wittgenstein's theory of meaning (Chomsky 1974 – 1996), or on Wittgenstein's basic concepts such as e. g. rule-following (Chomsky 2000 onwards), respectively, is (a) unwarranted and (b) caused by a fundamental misconception. Moreover, it is argued that the hypothesis evoked by Grewendorf (1985: 126), according to which „Chomsky would like to explain what Wittgenstein describes“, is misleading since the objects of investigation of Chomsky and Wittgenstein are in complementary distribution one to the other.

Wittgenstein’s Children

1998 ◽  
pp. 235-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yasushi Maruyama
Keyword(s):  
Language Learning ◽  
Qualitative Difference ◽  
The Other ◽  
Second Child ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
Theory Of Meaning ◽  
First Child ◽  
The World ◽  
Crucial Problem ◽  
Ostensive Definition

The later Wittgenstein uses children in his philosophical arguments against the traditional views of language. Describing how they learn language is one of his philosophical methods for setting philosophers free from their views and enabling them to see the world in a different way. The purpose of this paper is to explore what features of children he takes advantage of in his arguments, and to show how we can read Wittgenstein in terms of education. Two children in Philosophical Investigations are discussed. The feature of the first child is the qualitative difference from adults. Wittgenstein uses the feature to criticize Augustinian pictures of language which tell us that children learn language by ostensive definition alone. The referential theory of meaning is so strong that philosophers fail to see the qualitative gap and to explain language-learning. The second child appears in an arithmetical instruction. Although he was understood to master counting numbers, he suddenly shows deviant reactions. Wittgenstein argues against the mentalistic idea of understanding by calling attention to the potential otherness of the child. This could happen anytime the child has not learned counting correctly. The two features show that teaching is unlike telling, an activity toward the other who does not understand our explanations. Since we might not understand learners because of otherness, the justification of teaching is a crucial problem that is not properly answered so long as otherness is unrecognized. As long as we ignore otherness, we would not be aware that we might mistreat learners.

The Money and the Cow

Philosophy ◽  
1992 ◽  
Vol 67 (259) ◽  
pp. 51-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. F. Thompkins
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Education ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
Profound Influence ◽  
Theory Of Meaning ◽  
Discernible Effect ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Theories Of Meaning ◽  
Alternative Theories

In spite of his profound influence on philosophy in general, Wittgenstein has had no discernible effect upon the philosophy of education. It was not to be expected that his rejection of doctrine in favour of the clarification of language as the goal of philosophical activity would readily find favour with those for whom the medium was intrinsically less important than the message it was intended to convey. Nevertheless philosophers of education have no medium other than language and no means of identifying the subject of their discourse other than the word ‘education’. They cannot convey a clear message if the meaning of their words, ‘education’ in particular, is not clear. Accordingly they cannot take for granted but must clarify in accordance with a postulated theory of meaning the nexus between ‘education’ and education. In his early Tractatus and his later Philosophical Investigations respectively, Wittgenstein proposes alternative theories of meaning. I apply each in turn to ‘education’ and sketch my view of a Wittgensteinian philosophy of education.

Conclusion

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roy Tzohar
Keyword(s):  
Figurative Language ◽  
Final Part ◽  
Theory Of Meaning

This, the conclusion of this book, draws out those features and themes that are common to the various accounts of metaphor presented in the preceding chapters and examines their possible applications. The text also briefly examines further ways in which these features may be applied to deepen and enrich our understanding of the Buddhist and more generally Indian philosophical engagement with figurative language. As a quick case study, the final part of the discussion explores how the Yogācāra theory of meaning sheds light on the concrete use of distinct figures, focusing on a list of similes prevalent in the school’s literature.

A Yogācāra Buddhist Theory of Metaphor

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roy Tzohar
Keyword(s):  
Figurative Language ◽  
Language Use ◽  
Potential Contribution ◽  
Philosophical Theory ◽  
Theory Of Meaning ◽  
Philosophical School ◽  
Intellectual Context ◽  
Philosophical Texts

This book is about what metaphors mean and do within Buddhist texts. More specifically, it is about the fundamental Buddhist ambivalence toward language, which is seen as obstructive and yet necessary for liberation, as well as the ingenious response to this tension that one Buddhist philosophical school—the early Indian Yogācāra (3rd–6th century CE)—proposed by arguing that all language use is in fact metaphorical (upacāra). Exploring the profound implications of this claim, the book presents the full-fledged Yogācāra theory of meaning—one that is not merely linguistic, but also perceptual.Despite the overwhelming visibility of figurative language in Buddhist philosophical texts, its role and use have received relatively little attention in scholarship to date. This book is the first sustained and systematic attempt to present an indigenous Buddhist philosophical theory of metaphor. By grounding the Yogācāra’s pan-metaphorical claim in its broader intellectual context, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist, the discussion reveals an intense Indian philosophical conversation about metaphor and language that reached across sectarian lines, and it also demonstrates its potential contribution to contemporary philosophical discussions of related topics. The analysis of this theory of metaphor radically reframes the Yogācāra controversy with the Madhyamaka; sheds light on the school’s application of particular metaphors, as well as its unique understanding of experience; and establishes the place of Sthiramati as an original Buddhist thinker of note in his own right, alongside Asaṅga and Vasubandhu.

Reply to Michael O’Sullivan

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Psychology ◽  
Philosophical Investigations

Between 1946 and 1949 Wittgenstein produced a series of manuscripts, whose contents are published in part as Part II of Philosophical Investigations, and as Remarks on Philosophy of Psychology I and II, and Last Writings I and II. For the most part these read like nightstand diaries (of a sort I ...

On Rule-Following

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marie McGinn
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Rule Following ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
Normative Constraint

In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein raises difficulties for the idea that what comes before my mind when I hear, or suddenly understand, a word can impose any normative constraint on what I go on to do. The conclusion his reflections seem to force on us gives rise to a paradox: there is no such thing as going on to apply an expression in a way that accords with what is meant by it. The paradox can be seen as one horn of a dilemma, the other horn of which is Platonism about meaning. It is generally agreed that resolving the paradox means finding a middle course between the two horns of the dilemma. This chapter looks at three attempts to find the middle course: communitarianism, naturalized Platonism, and quietism. It then considers whether Charles Travis offers a way out of the dilemma which avoids the problems of the other views discussed.

Is There Life in Possible Worlds?

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Machine Design ◽  
Lagrangian Mechanics ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
Search Spaces ◽  
Dimensional Modeling ◽  
Lower Dimensional

Scientists have developed various collections of specialized possibilities to serve as search spaces in which excessive reliance upon speculative forms of lower dimensional modeling or other unwanted details can be skirted. Two primary examples are discussed: the search spaces of machine design and the virtual variations utilized within Lagrangian mechanics. Contemporary appeals to “possible worlds” attempt to imbed these localized possibilities within fully enunciated universes. But not all possibilities are made alike and these reductive schemes should be resisted, on the grounds that they render the utilities of everyday counterfactuals and “possibility” talk incomprehensible. The essay also discusses whether Wittgenstein’s altered views in his Philosophical Investigations reflect similar concerns.

Coetzee’s Quest for Reality

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alice Crary
Keyword(s):  
Philosophical Discourse ◽  
The Real ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
Literature And Philosophy ◽  
Universal Truth

In this chapter, Alice Crary argues that a truly ‘realist’ work of literature might be one that, instead of conforming to familiar genre-specifications, attempts by other means to expose readers to the real—that is, to how things really are. Crary highlights Coetzee’s efforts to elicit what she calls ‘transformative thought’: a process that involves both delineating the progress of individual characters in their quests for reality, and, in formal terms, inviting readers to, for instance, imaginatively participate in such quests. With regard to The Childhood of Jesus, she highlights resonances between these features of Coetzee’s writing and Wittgenstein’s procedures in the Philosophical Investigations. In doing so, Crary brings out a respect in which literature and philosophy are complementary discourses: literature can deal in the sort of objective or universal truth that is philosophy’s touchstone, and philosophical discourse can have an essentially literary dimension.

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