scholarly journals The Origins of European Security: the Factor of Neutrality in the early 1970s

2021 ◽  
Vol 103 (3) ◽  
pp. 71-82
Author(s):  
Alexey Sindeev ◽  

The article continues to explore a topic of «Sources of European Security».The author analyzes the role of personalities, processes and factors that have influenced the modern European security system, sustainable and variable elements of the transformation of the European segment of international relations. On the basis of documents from the Swiss Federal Archives, this article highlightsthe position of Switzerland and, in some cases, Austria before the start of the substantive discussions of the agreed agenda at the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The 1970 Moscow Treaty between the USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany and the start of the CSCE process led to the Soviet Union abandoning its longstanding attempts to establish cooperation between the great powers in parallel with the UN structures.The Foreign Minister of the USSR Andrei Gromyko warned against this. Subsequently, the role of the small and medium-sized countries in the two ideological camps increased. The overall picture of interstate relations became more complicated. It is therefore no coincidence that the CSCE is treatedcontroversially in historiography. Considering that transformations are associated with continuous forms, positions, and mechanisms that have been tested over time, the author makes hypotheses and recommendations at the end of the article.

Secret Wars ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 99-141
Author(s):  
Austin Carson

This chapter analyzes foreign combat participation in the Spanish Civil War. Fought from 1936 to 1939, the war hosted covert interventions by Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union. The chapter leverages variation in intervention form among those three states, as well as variation over time in the Italian intervention, to assess the role of escalation concerns and limited war in the use of secrecy. Adolf Hitler's German intervention provides especially interesting support for a theory on escalation control. An unusually candid view of Berlin's thinking suggests that Germany managed the visibility of its covert “Condor Legion” with an eye toward the relative power of domestic hawkish voices in France and Great Britain. The chapter also shows the unique role of direct communication and international organizations. The Non-Intervention Committee, an ad hoc organization that allowed private discussions of foreign involvement in Spain, helped the three interveners and Britain and France keep the war limited in ways that echo key claims of the theory.


2006 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 443-452
Author(s):  
KARL CHRISTIAN LAMMERS

This article introduces Scandinavia (or the Norden, as the region is sometimes called) and describes the position of the five Nordic countries, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, during the Cold War. The Cold War created a new political situation in the Nordic region, and to some degree divided the Nordic countries between East and West and also on the German question. The introduction analyses how the Nordic countries dealt with Germany – that is with the two German states, the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, and also describes the role of the Soviet Union and how it tried to influence the Nordic stance on the German question.


Author(s):  
David M. Edelstein

This book examines how existing great powers in international relations respond to the rise or resurgence of other great powers. More specifically, it seeks to account for why existing powers often cooperate with rising powers despite the long-term threat that they potentially pose. To account for this behavior, the theory presented in the book focuses on the time horizons of political leaders . Leaders are unlikely to adopt competitive and costly strategies in the face of uncertainty about a rising power’s long-term intentions. Instead, they profit from cooperation in the short-term while they await more and better information about the rising state’s interests and intentions. To test this argument against alternative arguments, the book presents case studies of four modern examples of rising great powers and their strategic interactions with existing great powers: the rise of late nineteenth century Germany, the emergence of the United States at the turn of the twentieth century, the resurgence of interwar Germany, and the development of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the cold war. The book concludes with a discussion of the implications of the argument for international relations theory and the contemporary rise of China.


2007 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
James J. Marquardt

In recent years, scholars have devoted considerable attention to the role of transparency in international relations. U.S. efforts during the early Cold War to press for greater openness as a way of reducing tensions with the Soviet Union are often cited by specialists on military transparency. Yet the ill-fated Open Skies proposal has not been thoroughly investigated. This article draws on primary documents from the Truman and Eisenhower administrations to show that proponents of transparency have generally drawn the wrong conclusions about Open Skies. The U.S. proposal for a system of aerial observation was part and parcel of a strategy to contain and ultimately defeat the Soviet Union. Consequently, Open Skies does not conform to the logic of transparency as a confidence-building measure; it instead affirms basic realist thinking about the competition for security between rivals. Future scholarship that appreciates how the quest for a more open world is affected by the competition for security would improve our understanding of the causes, consequences, and limitations of transparency.


1973 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Skubiszewski

The present article examines the provisions on the western frontier of Poland in the treaties concluded by the Federal Republic of Germany in 1970 with the Soviet Union and Poland. The emphasis will be on the Polish-German Treaty, which is essentially concerned with the settlement of the frontier issue between the two parties. The article deals with the position of the German party and its competence to enter into treaty obligations that bear on the frontiers of Germany, as well as with the competence of the Great Powers to do so. Further, the article elucidates the meaning and effects of the resolution which the German Bundestag adopted when it voted the laws which approved the treaties and enabled the President of the Federal Republic to ratify them. Against this background of the competences of the interested states, the article briefly analyzes the contents of the clauses that bear on the Oder-Neisse frontier.


Slavic Review ◽  
1979 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 473-480
Author(s):  
Robert M. Slusser

Ever since the Berlin blockade of 1948 the attention of historians of modern and recent international relations has been engaged by the problem of how Germany and its capital, Berlin, came to be divided, first among the major powers of the anti-Hitler Grand Alliance—Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, and France—and then, in 1949, into two rival states, the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. This problem lies at the heart of the much-debated question regarding the origins of the Cold War. This review article makes no pretense at being a comprehensive report on the literature of the German problem. My aim is, rather, to call attention to some recent contributions to the literature and place them in context.


1974 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 345-373 ◽  
Author(s):  
B. David Meyers

This article examines the intraregional conflict management activities of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Three traditional regionalist claims are tested and suggestions concerning the future role of such organizations are provided. The findings indicate that in a number of cases the OAU was not an effective agent for conflict management; its limitations were clearest in internal disputes and those international conflicts involving allegations of subversion. Evidence from this study does not convincingly support the proposition that similarities of interests, problems, and loyalties found at the regional level make it more likely that attempts at settlement will be forthcoming and successful. Other findings indicate that the organization was able to isolate intra-regional conflicts from entanglement in more complex global disputes; this ability was, however, highly dependent on the desire of the great powers to remain uninvolved. The OAU was able to relieve the UN of the potential burden of numerous local conflicts, but this too sometimes proved dependent on policy decisions made by the United States or the Soviet Union. It is suggested that regional organizations may assist the superpowers in avoiding unwanted involvement in local disputes, but that unless the conflict management capacity of such organizations is increased, the result may be that many conflicts will remain unsettled.


1976 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 322-336 ◽  
Author(s):  
John C. Campbell

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE MEANING AND THE EFFECTS OF THE CONFERence on Security and Cooporation in Europe (CSCE) and its product, the Final Act signed at Helsinki in August 1975, are of sufficient variety to suit anybody's taste. Governments on both sides have hailed the Final Act as a great landmark, the opening of a new era of international relations in Europe based on high principle. Some of the same governments and their spokesmen, mainly on the Eastern side, have also called it the ineluctable result of the changed balance of forces in Europe; and among observers in the West who have agreed with that proposition some have argued that the Soviet Union has by Helsinki prepared the way for the domination or ‘Finlandization’ of the nations of Western Europe, and that the latter are too stupid or too complaisant or too scared to do anything about it. Then there are those in the West who feel neither satisfaction nor alarm but see the whole negotiation as much ado about nothing, changing neither the existing balance nor the outstanding differences.


1973 ◽  
Vol 8 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 155-171 ◽  
Author(s):  
Trygve Mathisen

In the following article an attempt has been made to identify factors affecting the implementation of expansionist and imperialist policies, and consequently it sheds light on the problem why some weaker states become the sphere of influence of greater powers while other small states are less exposed to such influence. Domestic motive forces which may prompt a great power to embark on policies of expansion are only briefly dealt with. On the basis of historical considerations a tentative conclusion is made concerning some factors affecting sphere of influence relationships. These factors are applied to the contemporary situation in an attempt to identify what areas are likely to remain exposed to strong great power influence, and to suggest in what directions the great powers are likely to expand their influence. It is assumed that the United States has reached at least a temporary climax with regard to the intensity and extension of its political influence. The Soviet Union and China, and most probably also Japan, are considered more capable of expanding their influence in the immediate future. It is, therefore, assumed that parts of Asia and Africa will remain areas of great power rivalry, but the present role of the great powers will reveal considerable changes, particularly in Southeast Asia.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document