From Confrontation to Cooperation

Asian Survey ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 61 (4) ◽  
pp. 615-640
Author(s):  
Yun Zhang ◽  
Yimeng Jia

Why and how did the International Labor Organization and the military junta of Myanmar transform their relationship so dramatically, from confrontation to cooperation, between 2007 and 2010? What insights can be drawn from this case regarding the successful operation of an international organization in an authoritarian environment? By investigating the evolution of the military leadership’s perception, this article aims to demystify authoritarian decision-making and identify the interactive mechanisms operating between internal and external dynamics and between an authoritarian regime and an international organization. The qualitative fieldwork includes direct interviews with former top military government leaders, who provide valuable insights into the decision-making logic at the highest level.

Author(s):  
HUSEYIN SEVGI

Objective: International Labor Organization (ILO) has established some supervisory systems to check the extent to which its decisions are implemented. With these supervisory systems, the organization tries to determine to what extent its decisions are implemented by the member countries. In this context, this study aims to classify the types of ILO supervisory systems and to analyze how they work and how effective they are. Methods: This study is based on a systematic literature review. Rather than the traditional literature review, a systematic literature review implies that efficient, systematic, and reproducible methods to identify, evaluate, and synthesize existing literature. As the basis of the literature review, ScienceDirect databases have been selected. 239 research articles and 23 book chapters were analyzed. Results: When we examine the supervisory mechanisms in the ILO, one point should be emphasized to fully grasp the topic as a whole and to define the impact of the organization in today’s global capitalist system: ILO is an international organization with no concrete sanction power despite its many supervisory systems. Conclusions: The main reason for the lack of sanction tools in the ILO’s control system lies in its ideological background. As a representative of the reformist ideology, the ILO aims to impose its rules on the states by “persuasion method” as required by this ideology.


CHEST Journal ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 114 (6) ◽  
pp. 1740-1748 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura S. Welch ◽  
Katherine L. Hunting ◽  
John Balmes ◽  
Eddy A. Bresnitz ◽  
Tee L. Guidotti ◽  
...  

1948 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 359-360 ◽  

Report to the Economic and Social Council: The International Labor Organization submitted to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations on, September 29, 1947 a report on its activities during the year 1947. This report, the first of a regular series which ILO had agreed to submit regularly (Article V paragraph 2(a) of the Agreement between the United Nations and the ILO), included background information and covered the period from the establishment of the United Nations to July 15, 1947. This report dealt with the decisions of five successive sessions of the International Labor Conference, i.e., those held in Philadelphia, May 1947, in Paris, October–November 1945, in Seattle, June 1946, in Montreal, September–October 1946, and in Geneva, June–July 1947. Future reports, it was announced, would cover only one year's work. The report was accompanied by a volume containing a series of appendices which included the text of the Constitution of ILO as amended by the 1946 Instrument of Amendment, the text of the Agreement between the United Nations and ILO, a list of the committees of ILO, a list of meetings convened by ILO as well as meetings of other international organizations at which ILO was represented during the period covered by the report, a list of and the texts of Conventions, Recommendations, and some of the Resolutions adopted by the International Labor Conference, resolutions adopted by the third Conference of American States Members of ILO, held in 1946, and the text of the agreement between ILO and FAO.


1954 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 418-421

The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration held its fifth session at Geneva from April 16 to 24, 1953. Representatives were present from 21 of the 22 member governments, and several non-member governments and agencies sent observers. The subcommittee on finances reported that gross income had amounted to $26,114,357 in 1952, and gross expenditures totaled $19,446,549, leaving a budgetary surplus of $6,667,808. Reimbursements for movements completed in 1952 had been “most satisfying”, but it was anticipated that a slower rate of reimbursement would prevail in 1953, and that additional funds would therefore be required. The subcommittee also re-ported that between February 1, 1952, and December 21, 1952, 77,626 persons, among them 31,226 refugees, had been moved from Europe. The Director, Mr. Hugh Gibson, reported the following developments in the activities of ICEM: 1) provision had been made for training building laborers in Italy destined to migrate to Brazil (in collaboration with the Brazilian and Italian governments and the International Labor Organization), and for a number of preselection projects; 2) in Greece, in collaboration with UNESCO, a language training program for prospective migrants to Australia had been initiated; 3) Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Venezuela were making “definite progress” in the area of land resettlement; and 4) other projects of a “technical nature” were being considered. The fifth session also studied a draft constitution for the Committee which had been prepared by the Director at the request of the fourth session. The delegates concluded that eventual acceptance of the constitution by member governments would give the Committee “more stability and an anticipated life span of from three to five years”, and decided to refer the draft agreement to governments for comment before the next session of ICEM.


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