Why are states willing to give up their nuclear weapons programs? This book presents a new theory for how external inducements supplied by the United States can convince even the most committed of proliferators to abandon weapons pursuit. Existing theories focus either on carrots or sticks. I explore how using both positive and negative inducements, in the shadow of military force, can persuade both friends and foes not to continue their nuclear weapons pursuit. I draw on worldwide cross-national data on nuclear reversal, case studies of Iran and North Korea, among other countries, and interviews with diplomats, policy-makers, and analysts. I show that the majority of proliferators have been persuaded to reverse their nuclear weapons programs when offered incentives from the United States. Moreover, I demonstrate that these tools are especially effective during periods of leadership transition and can work on both allies and adversaries. My theory and evidence also suggest a broader conception of counterproliferation than currently exists, identifying how carrots and sticks used together can accomplish one of the international community’s most important policy objectives.
The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use
