A2. British Former Senior Diplomats, Open Letter to Prime Minister Tony Blair on British Policy on the Arab-Israeli Problem and Iraq, London, April 2004.

2004 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 174-175

The sharply critical letter from the fifty-two former British ambassadors and senior government officials was prompted by Prime Minister Blair's support for Sharon's unilateral disengagement plan and apparent backing of President Bush's new stance on the refugee right of return (see Special Doc. B in this issue). The letter, published in the Guardian of London on 27 April 2004, inspired a similar initiative by former U.S. diplomats (see Doc. B1 below). Among the fifty-two signatories are former ambassadors to Egypt, Israel, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Syria; several former ambassadors to Iraq; and a former permanent representative to the United Nations.

2004 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 180-181

The following letter, drafted following the example of the senior British diplomats' letter to British prime minister Tony Blair (Doc. A2), was signed by eighty retired U.S. diplomats, including former ambassadors to Albania, Bangladesh, Egypt, El Salvador, Greece, Guyana, India, Kuwait, Lebanon, Nepal, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Togo, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen, as well as a number of chiefs of mission, consuls general, and chiefs of station. In contrast to the British letter, which criticizes British policy both with regard to Israel and Iraq, the U.S. letter focuses exclusively on Bush's policies in the Israeli-Palestinian arena and most notably his endorsement of the Sharon plan and recent policy changes on final status issues. The letter was published in the Guardian on 4 May and is available online at www.commondreams.org


Author(s):  
Patrick Porter

The Epilogue offers two speeches to leave the matter for readers to judge. First, there is the televised address Prime Minister Tony Blair gave on the eve of war, outlining the logic of his position and asking for support. And there is an alternative address that a British premier could had given, against military action, setting out an alternative logic of restraint. It draws on arguments and warnings made and neglected at the time, and developed in this book.


2021 ◽  
pp. 002085232199756
Author(s):  
Julia Gray ◽  
Alex Baturo

When political principals send agents to international organizations, those agents are often assumed to speak in a single voice. Yet, various types of country representatives appear on the international stage, including permanent representatives as well as more overtly “political” government officials. We argue that permanent delegates at the United Nations face career incentives that align them with the bureaucracy, setting them apart from political delegates. To that end, they tend to speak more homogeneously than do other types of speakers, while also using relatively more technical, diplomatic rhetoric. In addition, career incentives will make them more reluctant to criticize the United Nations. In other words, permanent representatives speak more like bureaucratic agents than like political principals. We apply text analytics to study differences across agents’ rhetoric at the United Nations General Assembly. We demonstrate marked distinctions between the speech of different types of agents, contradictory to conventional assumptions, with implications for our understandings of the interplay between public administration and agency at international organizations. Points for practitioners Delegations to international organizations do not “speak with one voice.” This article illustrates that permanent representatives to the United Nations display more characteristics of bureaucratic culture than do other delegates from the same country. For practitioners, it is important to realize that the manner in which certain classes of international actors “conduct business” can differ markedly. These differences in tone—even among delegates from the same principal—can impact the process of negotiation and debate.


1978 ◽  
Vol 8 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 111-111

Vice President Mondale has been participating extensively in Africa-related foreign policy matters since taking office in January, 1977. The Vice President works closely with Secretary of State Vance and Ambassador to the United Nations Andrew Young in the development of Africa-related policy recommendations for consideration by the President. The Vice President also participates in meetings with visiting African leaders and monitors political developments in Africa. Finally, at the President’s request, Vice President Mondale met with Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa to explain the new Administration’s policies toward southern Africa. Information on the Vice President’s staff’s involvement in Africa-related matters was requested but not received.


2016 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 24-39
Author(s):  
Nabila El-Ahmed ◽  
Nadia Abu-Zahra

This article argues that Israel substituted the Palestinian refugees' internationally recognized right of return with a family reunification program during its maneuvering over admission at the United Nations following the creation of the state in May 1948. Israel was granted UN membership in 1949 on the understanding that it would have to comply with legal international requirements to ensure the return of a substantial number of the 750,000 Palestinians dispossessed in the process of establishing the Zionist state, as well as citizenship there as a successor state. However, once the coveted UN membership had been obtained, and armistice agreements signed with neighboring countries, Israel parlayed this commitment into the much vaguer family reunification program, which it proceeded to apply with Kafkaesque absurdity over the next fifty years. As a result, Palestinians made refugees first in 1948, and later in 1967, continue to be deprived of their legally recognized right to return to their homes and their homeland, and the family reunification program remains the unfulfilled promise of the early years of Israeli statehood.


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 434-441
Author(s):  
Ahmad Saher Ahmad Al-Qteishat

One of the most important goals of Russian foreign policy during Vladimir Putins presidency is to strengthen Russian influence in the Caucasus region and Central Asia, as well as to develop relations with such countries as Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. The Russian government has always expressed concern about the so-called color revolutions that took place in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, as well as the fact that many of them were supported by Western forces. Russia believes that the events of the Arab Spring are in some way similar to the aforementioned revolutions, and that with the support of the West they could bring Islamists to power, which is a dangerous model not only for the countries of the region and the countries neighboring Russia, but also for Russia itself. For these reasons, in the Syrian conflict, Moscow sought to preserve the Assad regime, because believes that the Western model in solving regional problems can lead to the general chaos, like it was, for example, in the Iraqi and Libyan models. Despite the difficulties faced by government officials in Syria since the beginning of the civil war, and thanks to Russian military assistance and reforms, Syria preserved the legitimate regime and did not allow destroying all state institutions. Participation in the Syrian conflict brought Russia a significant role in the region and allowed it to become a successful mediator in most regional issues, as well as to strengthen its economic and political relations with the most important players in the region, as Turkey, Iran, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document