scholarly journals The Regional Role of Russia after Military Aid to Syria

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 434-441
Author(s):  
Ahmad Saher Ahmad Al-Qteishat
Keyword(s):  
Saudi Arabia ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
Russian Government ◽  
Military Aid ◽  
Caucasus Region ◽  
Western Model ◽  
Political Relations ◽  
Russian Military ◽  
Syrian Conflict ◽  
The Arab Spring

One of the most important goals of Russian foreign policy during Vladimir Putins presidency is to strengthen Russian influence in the Caucasus region and Central Asia, as well as to develop relations with such countries as Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. The Russian government has always expressed concern about the so-called color revolutions that took place in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, as well as the fact that many of them were supported by Western forces. Russia believes that the events of the Arab Spring are in some way similar to the aforementioned revolutions, and that with the support of the West they could bring Islamists to power, which is a dangerous model not only for the countries of the region and the countries neighboring Russia, but also for Russia itself. For these reasons, in the Syrian conflict, Moscow sought to preserve the Assad regime, because believes that the Western model in solving regional problems can lead to the general chaos, like it was, for example, in the Iraqi and Libyan models. Despite the difficulties faced by government officials in Syria since the beginning of the civil war, and thanks to Russian military assistance and reforms, Syria preserved the legitimate regime and did not allow destroying all state institutions. Participation in the Syrian conflict brought Russia a significant role in the region and allowed it to become a successful mediator in most regional issues, as well as to strengthen its economic and political relations with the most important players in the region, as Turkey, Iran, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

scholarly journals «Dobrudzhan Catastrophy» as a reflection of Russian-Romanian military-political relations in summer–autumn period of 1916.

2018 ◽  
pp. 87-101
Author(s):  
V. Soloviov
Keyword(s):  
Point Of View ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
The South ◽  
Military Aid ◽  
The North ◽  
Russian Army ◽  
Political Relations ◽  
The First World War ◽  
Russian Military ◽  
First World

Romania’s entry into the First World War was considered by Russian military-political leadership primarily from the point of view of its own military interests, without taking into account possible negative consequences and prospects of Russian-Romanian military cooperation. According to General Headquarters' estimations, Romanian army attacks in Transylvania, together with Thessaloniki Allied army actions, were to restrain considerable enemy forces and thus ensured the success of Russian army attacks. At the same time, in spite of the fiercest battles on the SWF, the enemy succeeded in forming two new armies in Transylvania by creating a qualitative and quantitative advantage against the 1st and the 2nd Romanian armies operating at this region. When in mid-September of 1916 the need for direct military assistance to Romanian army became obvious for General Alekseyev, who was the immediate Russian army commander, he did not have enough will to insist on his decision. Thus, the South-Western Front attack, which had lost its military significance by that time, was continued. As a result, the plan of military aid to Romania, embodied by General Headquarters, was essentially defensive, and included only indirect assistance, in the form of limited 9th Russian Army attacks from Northern Moldova, and a slight strengthening of the Dobrudzhan army. In addition to this, the incorrect assessment of the situation, both by Russian and Romanian military forces, was obvious. A long pause in enemy's activity in the south, caused by waiting for reinforcements, and enemy's activity in the north, instilled confidence that the main attack would come from there. As a result, all Romanian reserves from the South were transferred to the North, while the enemy struck in the South in Dobrudzh. When Russian General Headquarters realized the consequences of Chernovody-Constanza railway loss, it simply could not transfer Russian military reserves in time. Thus, the lack of coherence between Russian and Romanian sides and their allies, the pursuit of each side's selfish interests led to the loss of military initiative by the allies in Romania, which was completely transferred to the enemy.

Russian-Turkish Relations after 2015: New Trends, Old Dilemmas

2021 ◽  
Vol 65 (11) ◽  
pp. 88-96
Author(s):  
S. Sherstyukov ◽  
N. Bodishteanu
Keyword(s):  
Military Coup ◽  
International Affairs ◽  
Bilateral Relations ◽  
Self Defense ◽  
Current Context ◽  
Russian Military ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
The Arab Spring ◽  
Competitive Cooperation ◽  
Geographical Space

As the events of the past few years indicate, relations between Russia and Turkey are increasingly determined by security-related issues. Such a shift in priorities in bilateral relations should be perceived not only as a response to the emerging threats to the internal and external security of the two countries but also as a consequence of the changes in the strategic orientation of Russia and Turkey after the end of the Cold War. The most important events in the formation of a new model of relations between Russia and Turkey were such as the “Arab Spring”, the wars in Syria and Libya, US support for the Syrian Kurds from the “People’s Self-Defense Forces”, the revolution in Ukraine and the subsequent Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the Russian military operation in Syria, the 2015 crisis in Russian-Turkish relations, and the attempted military coup in Turkey in 2016. Regional crises near the borders of Russia and Turkey and the growing securitization of the policies of both states not only pushed Moscow and Ankara to interact in the security sphere but also created new challenges for their relations. In this article, the authors examine the dynamics of Russian-Turkish relations, paying particular attention to the security dimension, as well as the opportunities and limitations for cooperation between the two countries, given that security is becoming an increasingly important element in bilateral relations. The main focus is on the analysis of competitive cooperation between Russia and Turkey in Eurasia, for the understanding of which it is necessary to refer not only to the current context but also to the historical experience of interaction between the two countries in this wide geographical space. Acknowledgements. Published with the financial support of the project “The influence of the policy of Iran and Turkey on transformation of the Middle East and Post-Soviet space” of the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs of HSE-University.

Turkey’s Islamic Public Diplomacy in the Post-Davutoğlu Era: Neo-Ottomanism, Humanitarianism and the Legitimation of Hamas after the Arab Spring

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Hae Won Jeong
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Critical Discourse Analysis ◽  
Soft Power ◽  
Public Diplomacy ◽  
Arab Spring ◽  
Policy Position ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
Turkish Government ◽  
The Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
The Arab Spring

Summary What are the public diplomacy strategies for legitimising a pro-Islamist foreign policy? This research unveils how Turkey, which has been a vocal supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates across the Middle East since the Arab Spring, draws on pan-Islamic soft power, neo-Ottoman myth-making and public diplomacy strategies embedded in the precepts of the strategic depth doctrine to rationalise its pro-Hamas foreign policy position under the Justice and Development Party (AKP). By employing critical discourse analysis to the political speeches delivered by the Turkish government officials in domestic and international fora, this article suggests that Turkey has sought to legitimise its pro-Islamist foreign policy and subvert the terrorist designation of Hamas internationally through the humanitarian, Islamic and neo-Ottoman framings of the Palestinian issue. It is argued that Turkey’s public diplomacy of Hamas constitutes part and parcel of the AKP’s grand strategy to project Islamic soft power.

scholarly journals Understanding the root causes of the conflict in Yemen

2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 14-20
Author(s):  
Hani Albasoos ◽  
Buthaina Al Hinai
Keyword(s):  
Saudi Arabia ◽  
Arab Spring ◽  
Peace Process ◽  
The Other ◽  
Humanitarian Crisis ◽  
Trace Back ◽  
Proxy War ◽  
The Media ◽  
Number Of Parties ◽  
The Arab Spring

Following the Arab Spring in 2011, Yemen’s devastating conflicts have deepened even further, leading the country to be the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. Despite the international community's multiple attempts to resolve this conflict, the conflict seems to have reached a stalemate. To make matters worse, resolving the conflict is made difficult by the large number of parties involved, internally and externally, and by the complex, dual and fluid nature of the relationships they share. Although the media and international community's focus is directed towards the binary conflict between the Hadi government and Saudi Arabia on one side and Iran and the Houthis on the other, the conflict is greatly multifaceted and far from being binary. This paper critically analyzes and explores other participating actors to comprehend the root causes of the conflict entirely. Although this conflict has been advertised as a proxy war, while others trace back the motivation to sectarianism, this paper argues how this analysis can be misleading and hindering the peace process.

Arab League

1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 619-620
Keyword(s):  
Saudi Arabia ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Foreign Minister ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
The Political ◽  
Collective Security ◽  
Military Alliance ◽  
The Press ◽  
Arab League ◽  
Syrian Conflict

On May 14, 1951 meetings were held of the Council and Political Committee of the Arab League in Damascus. Press reports indicated that the meeting of the Political Committee concerned the question of whether or not the Arab states should put into effect a real military alliance. On the same day the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Egyptian Chamber of Deputies had discussed the ratification of the Arab collective security pact. Egypt had been the originator of the pact which although initialled by six of the seven Arab nations had only been ratified by Saudi-Arabia. The press deduced from these reports that Syria wanted to know where it stood in case the Israeli-Syrian conflict became more serious. Iraq had already offered any support Syria asked for and sent some military detachments and an anti-aircraft unit through Syrian territory to the Israeli border. The Acting Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Israel (Sharett), however, in an address to the Knesset Parliament in Jerusalem, warned the Political Committee that Israel was firmly resolved to defend every inch of her territory against encroachment or domination by Syria.

In the name of the national interests: Foreign policy of Saudi Arabia after the Arab Spring

2022 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 131-161
Author(s):  
G. G. Kosach
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Saudi Arabia ◽  
Arab Spring ◽  
Arab World ◽  
The United States ◽  
Strategic Partnership ◽  
National Interests ◽  
The One ◽  
The Arab Spring

The paper examines the evolution of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy in the context of wider changes in the Middle East and in the Arab world triggered by the Arab Spring. The author argues that during this decade the Kingdom’s foreign policy has witnessed a fundamental transformation: the very essence of the Saudi foreign policy course has changed signifi cantly as the political es-tablishment has substantially revised its approaches to the country’s role in the region and in the world. Before 2011, Saudi Arabia — the land of the ‘Two Holy Mosques’ — positioned itself as a representative of the international Muslim community and in pursuing its foreign policy relied primarily on the religious authority and fi nancial capabilities. However, according to Saudi Arabia’s leaders, the Arab Spring has plunged the region into chaos and has bolstered the infl uence of various extremist groups and movements, which required a signifi cant adjustment of traditional political approaches. Saudi Arabia, more explicit than ever before, has declared itself as a nation state, as a regional leader possessing its own interests beyond the abstract ‘Muslim Ummah’. However, the author stresses that these new political ambitions do not imply a complete break with the previous practice. For example, the containment of Iran not only remains the cornerstone of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy, but has become even more severe. The paper shows that it is this opposition to Iran, which is now justifi ed on the basis of protecting the national interests, that predetermines the nature and the specifi c content of contemporary Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy including interaction with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), approaches towards the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian confl ict, combating terrorism, and relations with the United States. In that regard, the transformation of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy has, on the one hand, opened up new opportunities for strengthening the Kingdom’s interaction with Israel, but, at the same time, has increased tensions within the framework of strategic partnership with the United States. The author concludes that currently Saudi Arabia is facing a challenge of diversifying its foreign policy in order to increase its international profi le and political subjectivity.

Far More Dangerous Times

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joanne Randa Nucho
Keyword(s):  
Saudi Arabia ◽  
Arab Spring ◽  
State Actors ◽  
The Arab Spring

This concluding chapter begins by summarizing the arguments in the preceding chapters. It then attempts to contextualize the present discourse about the Shi'a versus Sunni conflict within the region in the wake of the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011. It describes a “new sectarianism,” characterized by state actors, particularly in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, who “make decisions on the basis of a sectarian assessment of politics,” whereby Iran is presented as a Shi'a rival. The fact that these same state actors are opposed to Sunni Islamist groups makes it clear that the mobilization of sectarian rhetoric is, at least in some instances, a cynical tactic of scapegoating.

The Value of Implicit Political Connections

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
David Broadstock ◽  
Xiaoqi Chen ◽  
C. S. Agnes Cheng ◽  
Wenli Huang
Keyword(s):  
Work Experience ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Top Management Team ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Political Connections ◽  
The Political ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
The Public ◽  
Political Relations ◽  
The Government

ABSTRACT We investigate whether the aggregated political relations of a firm's top management team (TMT) add value to the firm's performance. We distinguish between the political relations that arise from TMT's own work experience, which are termed direct political connections (DPC), and the relations that TMT develops from working for the same institution with the government officials, which are termed implicit political connections (IPC). We find that IPC are positively associated with firm performance and that they often have a stronger effect than DPC do. We also find that the effect of IPC on firm value is stronger in SOEs and in firms located in under-developed provinces. Moreover, we find that after the anti-corruption campaign, the effect of DPC decreases but the effect of IPC does not significantly change. Overall, our results suggest the importance of investigating a firm's aggregated political connections, especially its IPC. JEL Classifications: G32; D72; J33; L33. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

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